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Abstract
This dissertation presents original results in Temporal Logic and Spatial Logic. Part I
concerns Branching-Time Logic. Since Prior 1967, two main semantics for Branching-
Time Logic have been devised: Peircean and Ockhamist semantics. Zanardo 1998
proposed a general semantics, called Indistinguishability semantics, of which Peircean
and Ockhamist semantics are limit cases. We provide a finite axiomatization of the In-
distinguishability logic of upward endless bundled trees using a non-standard inference
rule, and prove that this logic is strongly complete.
In Part II, we study the temporal logic given by the tense operators F for future and
P for past together with the derivative operator 〈d〉, interpreted on the real numbers. We
prove that this logic is neither strongly nor Kripke complete, it is PSPACE-complete,
and it is finitely axiomatizable.
In Part III, we study the spatial logic given by the derivative operator 〈d〉 and the
graded modalities {^n | n ∈ N}. We prove that this language, call it L, is as expres-
sive as the first-order language Lt of Flum and Ziegler 1980 when interpreted on T3
topological spaces. Then, we give a general definition of modal operator: essentially,
a modal operator will be defined by a formula of Lt with at most one free variable. If
a modal operator is defined by a formula predicating only over points, then it is called
point-sort operator. We prove that L, even if enriched with all point-sort operators,
however enriched with finitely many modal operators predicating also on open sets,
cannot express Lt on T2 spaces. Finally, we axiomatize the logic of any class between
all T1 and all T3 spaces and prove that it is PSPACE-complete.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation presents original results in Modal Logic. Modal Logic has been an
active area of research over the last century (seminal is the work of Lewis [68]) and
its roots go back to Ancient Greek Philosophy. Modal Logic has started as the study
of the notions of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’. These notions have been denoted by
symbols,  for necessity and ^ for possibility, called modal operators, and added to
Propositional Logic, obtaining formulas of the like:
(p→ q)→ (p→ q),
meaning: (necessarily (p implies q)) implies ((necessarily p) implies (necessarily q)).
Since the late ’50s, this language traditionally has been interpreted over Kripke
models (seminal is the work of Kripke [59, 60, 61]). Kripke models are structures
(W,R,V) such that W is a nonempty set, R is a binary relation on W, and V is a map
that associates every propositional variable to a set of elements of W. Intuitively, W
represents a set of possible worlds; wRv represents that a world v is accessible from a
world w; and, for every propositional variable p, V(p) represents the set of worlds at
which p is true. Then, the semantics of ‘necessarily’ () and ‘possibly’ (^) have been
defined as follows:
• ‘Necessarily ϕ’ (ϕ) is true at a world w provided ϕ is true at all worlds accessi-
ble from w (that is, all worlds v such that wRv).
• ‘Possibly ϕ’ (^ϕ) is true at a world w provided ϕ is true at some possible world
accessible from w (that is, some world v such that wRv).
Observe that ^ϕ is equivalent to ¬¬ϕ.
Kripke semantics has been very successful: the expressivity of modal languages on
Kripke models, the definability of particular classes of Kripke models, the axiomati-
zability of the modal logics of several classes of Kripke models, the decidability and
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the complexity of these logics have been widely studied (refer to [13, 14] for further
reading).
Also, Kripke semantics has been very robust in terms of applications. Modal lo-
gicians noticed that modal languages on Kripke models not only could represent the
notions of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’, but also those of ‘knowledge’, ‘belief’, ‘prefer-
ence’, ‘provability’, ‘in the future’, ‘after the execution of a program’, etc. Thus, Modal
Logic found applications in a plethora of fields, such as Artificial Intelligence, Com-
puter Science, Economics, Linguistics, Mathematics, etc. (refer to [14, 95] for further
reading).
Another reason for the success of Modal Logic in Kripke semantics is its good com-
putational behavior. In Kripke semantics, the modal operators quantify only over the
set of accessible worlds. This feature of locality makes many modal logics decidable
with relatively low complexity (refer to [13, 14] for further reading).
1.1 Modal logics of time
Part I of this dissertation is about the temporal interpretation of the modal operators.
Since the work of Prior in the ’60s [77], it has been noticed that if we take (W,R) as
a linear order, then (W,R,V) can be seen as a timeline: the elements of W represent
instants; wRv represents ‘v being in the future of w’; and every instant w has a set
of propositional variables true at w determined by V . Then, ϕ means: ‘ϕ will always
happen’; and^ϕ: ‘ϕwill eventually happen’. In this framework,  is generally denoted
by G, and ^ is generally denoted by F. Similarly, past operators H, meaning ‘always
in the past’, and P, meaning ‘sometime in the past’, can be defined.
Also, it has been noticed that if we take (W,R) to be a tree instead of a linear
order, then each maximal linear subset of the tree can be seen as a possible history in
a non-deterministic representation of time. Following this intuition, many languages
and semantics have been devised. For example, we may evaluate Gϕ at an instant w
and decide that Gϕ is true at w provided ‘ϕ will always be true in every possible future
of w’ (that is, in every v such that wRv); or we may evaluate Gϕ at an instant w with
respect to an history h passing through w, and decide that Gϕ is true at (w, h) provided
‘ϕ will always be true in the future of t in h’ (that is, in every instant v such that v ∈ h
and wRv); we can add an operator g, evaluate gϕ at an instant w, and decide that gϕ is
true at w provided ‘ϕ will always be true in some possible future of w’ (that is, there is
an history h passing through w such that ϕ is true at every instant v ∈ h such that wRv);
or we can add a modal operator N, and decide that Nϕ is true at (w, h) provided ‘ϕ is
true at (w, k) for every history k passing through w’.
Among the most important proposals in this direction, are the so called Peircean
and Ockhamist Logics. In [102] Zanardo offered a logic, call it Indistinguishability
Logic, which generalizes Peircean and Ockhamist Logics. We devote Part I of this
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dissertation to the axiomatization of Indistinguishability Logic, presenting an axiom-
atization that essentially blends the axioms for Peircean Logic presented in [20] with
those for Ockhamist Logic presented in [42, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306]. Also the proof
that the axioms are complete blends original elements with elements taken from [20]
and [42, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306].
1.2 Modal logics of space
Kripke semantics has not been the only semantics for modal languages. Since the
’40s, so predating Kripke semantics, a topological semantics has also been suggested
(seminal is the work of McKinsey and Tarski [71]). Languages are interpreted over
topological models. Topological models are structures (A, τ,V) such that (A, τ) is a
topological space, and V a map that associates every propositional variable to a subset
of A. The semantics for  and ^ are defined as follows:
• ϕ is true at a point a provided there is a neighborhood U of a such that ϕ is true
at all points of U.
• ^ϕ is true at a point a provided, for every neighborhood U of a, ϕ is true at some
point of U.
Observe that ^ϕ is equivalent to ¬¬ϕ. Also, under this semantics, the  and ^
operators corresponds respectively to the topological interior and closure operators.
For, the set of points at which ϕ is true is equal to the interior of the set of points at
which ϕ is true; while the set of points at which ^ϕ is true is equal to the closure of the
set of points at which ϕ is true.
Other operators have also been considered, for example, the coderivative operator
[d] and the derivative operator 〈d〉 (already suggested in [71]), of which the semantics
are defined as follows:
• [d]ϕ is true at a point a provided there is a neighborhood U of a such that ϕ is
true at all points of U \ {a}.
• 〈d〉ϕ is true at a point a provided, for every neighborhood U of a, ϕ is true at
some point of U \ {a}.
Observe that 〈d〉ϕ is equivalent to ¬[d]¬ϕ. In this case, [d] and 〈d〉 correspond respec-
tively to the topological coderivative and derivative operators.
Although, since its introduction, Kripke semantics has been more widely studied
than topological semantics, topological semantics has been continuously studied since
the ’70s, in particular by the ‘Georgian School’, which mostly focused on the operators
[d] and 〈d〉, obtaining results about expressivity, definability, axiomatizability, decid-
ability and complexity, and interest in topological semantics has increased since the
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2000s (see [4] and Section 8.2.1 for further reading, and [5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 32, 45, 46,
48, 52, 57, 58, 62, 64, 70, 72, 88, 91] for examples of recent work).
Also, it is interesting to observe that temporal and spatial semantics can be brought
together by the following intuition: given a linear order (W,R), the set of open intervals
constitutes a base for a topology over W, called interval topology. Then, as Scott
proposed in [83], together with temporal operators, we can have the following ‘present
progressive’ operator : ϕ is true at an instant w provided there is an open interval
containing w such that all instants in that interval satisfy ϕ. This is nothing else than
the topological semantics with respect to the interval topology.
This suggestion was undertaken by Shehtman, who studied the G,H,-logic of the
rationals [86], and by Hodkinson, who studied the G,H,-logic of the reals [53]. In
Part II we follow this direction and study the G,H, [d]-logic of the reals: we axiomatize
this logic, prove that it is PSPACE-complete, and show that it is neither strongly com-
plete with respect to topological semantics nor Kripke complete, employing techniques
which owe much to both Shehtman’s and Hodkinson’s results.
Traditionally, the expressivity of modal languages on Kripke models have been
compared to the expressivity of first-order languages. This suggests to do the same
for modal languages on topological models. In [40], the first-order language Lt to
talk about topological spaces has been presented. Lt is a two-sorted language: we
have first-sort variables, constants, etc., that are assigned to points, and second-sort
variables, constants, etc., that are assigned to open sets. Moreover, second-sort quan-
tification can occur only in certain forms. If we remove these restrictions on second
sort quantification, we obtain the more general language L2. However, L2, when in-
terpreted on topological spaces, does not enjoy the Compactness, Lo¨wenheim Skolem
and Lindstro¨m Theorems, whereas Lt does. Furthermore, Lt can express a number of
interesting properties of topological spaces, namely every first-order property in L2 that
is invariant under changing base (see Section 17.1).
In Part III, we compare the expressivity of modal languages interpreted on topo-
logical spaces with that of Lt. We consider the language L with coderivative operator
[d] and graded operators {^n | n ∈ N}. The semantics of graded operators is defined as
follows:
• For every n ∈ N, ^nϕ is true (at a point a) provided there are more than n points
at which ϕ is true.
We prove that L can express Lt on the class of all T3 topological spaces, and that
there is a computable translation from L to Lt. Then, we look at ways to increase
the expressivity of L by adding new modal operators. Following Gabbay, Hodkinson
and Reynolds [42, Chapter 6], we define a modal operator as a symbol # of which
the semantics is given by a formula of Lt with at most one free first-sort variable and
no free second-sort variables. Call point-sort those operators of which the semantics
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is defined by a formula in which only first-sort variables occur. We show that even
if we enrich L with all the point-sort modal operators, call L+ the resulting language,
however we add finitely many modal operators to L+, we cannot express Lt on the class
of all T2 topological models. This result, although stemming from a similar result by
Hodkinson in Kripke semantics [51], uses a substantial amount of original techniques.
Finally, we study the logic in L of any class of topological models between the class of
all T3 and the class of all T1 topological models, axiomatizing this logic, and proving
that its complexity is PSPACE-complete.
1.3 Plan of the dissertation
• In Part I, we consider Indistinguishability Logic. More precisely, we axiomatize
the indistinguishability logic of bundled trees, that is trees of which only a given
selection of their histories is considered. This axiomatization uses a non-standard
rule, called ‘IRR rule’. We conclude this part, discussing ideas to study the
decidability and complexity of this logic, ideas to remove the IRR rule, and ideas
to axiomatize the unbundled version of this logic.
• In Part II, we consider the language with modal operators G,H and [d] inter-
preted over the reals. We axiomatize the arising logic, study its complexity prov-
ing that it is PSPACE-complete, and we prove that this logic is neither strongly
nor Kripke complete (and hence it does not have the finite model property either).
We conclude this part, presenting some ideas for future work. In particular, we
mention the study of this language interpreted on the rationals, and the splitting
of the derivative operator 〈d〉 in its future component K+ and past component
K−, suggested in [42, §6.1], of which the semantics is defined as follows:
– R, x |= K+ϕ provided, for every y > x, there is z ∈ (x, y) such that R, z |= ϕ.
– R, x |= K−ϕ provided, for every y < x, there is z ∈ (y, x) such that R, z |= ϕ.
• In Part III, we consider the language L with modal operators [d] and {^n | n ∈
N} interpreted over topological models. We compare its expressivity with the
expressivity of the two-sorted first-order language Lt of [40]. We prove that
L can express Lt on the class of all T3 topological models, and that there is a
computable translation from L to Lt. Then, in order to increase the expressivity of
Lt we generalize the definition of modal operator. Following Gabbay, Hodkinson
and Reynolds [42, Chapter 6], we define a modal operator as a symbol # the
semantics of which is defined by a formula of Lt with at most one free first-sort
variable and no free second-sort variables. If a modal operator has its semantics
defined by a formula with no second-sort variables occurring, then it is called
a point-sort modal operator. Call L+ the language that we obtain from L by
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adding all the point-sort modal operators. We prove that, however we add finitely
many modal operators to L+, the resulting language cannot express Lt on the
class of all T2 topological spaces. Then, we study the logic in L of every class
X of topological models in between the class of all T1 and the class of all T3
topological models. We prove that for every such X, this logic is always the
same, in particular the logic in L of all T1 topological models is equal to the
logic of all T2 topological models and to the logic all T3 topological models.
We axiomatize this logic, and prove that it is PSPACE-complete. We conclude
this part, presenting some questions for future work. In particular, questions
regarding the study of the logic in L of particular classes of topological models,
the enrichment of L with fixed-point operators, the application of Spatial Logic
to real-world situations, the study of modal operators intended as per the general
definition of modal operator given in this part, and the study of these two modal
operators:
– U(ϕ, ψ) holds at x provided there is a neighborhood U of x such that ϕ
holds in the boundary of U and ψ in U.
– 〈d〉nϕ holds at a point a provided for every neighborhood U of a there are
at least n points b ∈ U \ {a} such that ϕ holds at b.
1.4 Final remarks
This dissertation is the result of three and a half years of research activity. On one
hand, we present results in some of the traditional lines of research in the field. For
example, we have results in axiomatizability, expressivity, decidability and complexity
for a number of modal languages and resulting modal logics. On the other hand, we
hope that our results can contribute to the development of Modal Logic.
Indeed, consider for example the completeness proofs presented in every part, from
Part I to Part III. If, on one hand, they are built on the usual Lemmon-Scott construction
of a model satisfying a given formula or set of formulas, on the other hand, a number
of innovative elements are present, due to the particular classes of models on which our
languages are interpreted.
The same holds for the proof in Part III that the logic in L of any class X of topo-
logical models between the class of all T1 and the class of all T3 topological models
is decidable: on one hand, we use the well-known notion of quasi model, on the other
hand, we adapt its use to topological semantics. Moreover, the definition of quasi-
models of Part III must take into account that we are focusing on a particular class of
topological models, namely those between T1 and T3 topological models. Finally, also
the algorithm, which gives a PSPACE upper bound, is designed so that it can exploit
quasi models (in fact, a variation called optimal quasi models).
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More generally, we believe that the more mature contributions can be found in
Part III. Consider, for example the result according to which our modal language L
can express the first-order language Lt on the class of all T3 topological models. The
proof uses a game a` la Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´. Both because of the peculiar rules of the
game, and because of the particularities of T3 topological spaces, a number of original
elements are present in the proof. Moreover, this result can be seen as analogous to
the van Benthem and Kamp Theorems in topological settings. For, analogously to the
van Benthem Theorem, it states that on T3 topological models, L corresponds to the
fragment invariant under changing base of the first-order language L2; analogously to
the Kamp Theorem, it states that, on T3 topological models, L is as expressive as the
first-order language Lt.
Furthermore, this result opened the question if L could express Lt on the class of
all T2 topological models. We gave a negative answer, and consequently looked for
ways to increase the expressive power of L in order to express Lt on the class of all T2
topological models. This led to the aforementioned more general definition of modal
operators. The result according to which L together with all point-sort modal operators,
however enriched with finitely many modal operators, cannot express Lt on T2 topo-
logical spaces perhaps represents the most mature contribution of this dissertation, for
at least two reasons. First, the proof, although stemming from a result by Hodkinson
[51], required major original contributions. Second, the proof, due to its generality and
intricacy, seems to confirm, once again, that there is room in Modal Logic for results
of mathematical interest.
Talking about the mathematical potentiality of Modal Logic, it is also worth making
the following two points. The first point concerns the more general definition of modal
operators given in Part III. This definition seems to suggest a more general theory of
Modal Logic. Essentially, if we allow modal operators to be first-order formulas in a
given signature with at most one free variable, then we have at our disposal a plethora
of new modal operators, and structures on which to interpret them. Programs to study
Modal Logic in this generality, like, for example, a classification of modal operators
according to validity, expressivity and complexity may have not only an applicative but
also a theoretical and mathematical potentiality.
A second point concerns the interaction between Modal Logic and Geometry. Achiev-
ing the results of Part III required reasoning about topological spaces according to
logical criteria. Also the formulas ϕn of Section 18.2.1 or the basoid models Mn of
Section 18.2.2 are fruits of this paradigm. For, both the formulas and the models were
designed having a result in Modal Logic in mind. Nonetheless, the formulas are noth-
ing else than topological properties, and the basoid models Mn are nothing else than
topological spaces satisfying these properties. So, we see that objects of potential inter-
est in Mathematics may arise from logical situations. Also the notion of basoid space
(roughly, a couple (A,B) where A is a set and B a base for a topology on A) comes
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from the same paradigm. Essentially, basoid spaces have been introduced because of
the necessity of having a first-order counterpart of topological models (recall that be-
ing topological space is not first-order definable, whereas being a topological base is).
This seems to suggest that from Modal Logic we may get contributions in Geometry,
obtaining what we may call Logical Geometry.
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Chapter 2
Modal Logic
This chapter is about classical definitions and results in Modal Logic. The aim of
this chapter is to fix notation and concepts that will be used throughout the rest of
this document. As this dissertation treats advanced topics in Logic, we assume the
reader familiar with these definitions and results. Therefore, we do not contextualize
or discuss them, and we may use them later without mentioning. We refer to [13,
Chapter 3]).
2.1 Sets and relations
Call a countable set every set A such that the cardinality of A is less or equal than the
cardinality of N. For every set A, subset B ⊆ A, element a ∈ A and binary relation R on
A, define:
• P(A) := {C |C ⊆ A}.
• R(a) := {b | aRb}.
• RB := R ∩ (B × B).
For every two sets A, B, we call B an R-generated subset of A provided for every
element b ∈ B and a ∈ A, if bRa then a ∈ B.
2.2 Modal languages
Let Φ be a nonempty countable set. The elements of Φ are called propositional vari-
ables and denoted by small Latin letters p, q, .... Let τ = {i}i∈I be a non empty count-
able set. The elements of τ are called modal operators. We define the modal language
LΦ,τ as the smallest set such that:
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• Φ ∪ {>} ⊆ LΦ,τ.
• If ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, then ¬ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ.
• If ϕ, ψ ∈ LΦ,τ, then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ LΦ,τ.
• If ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ and i ∈ I, then iϕ ∈ LΦ,τ.
The elements of LΦ,τ are called formulas (in LΦ,τ). To avoid proliferation of parenthe-
ses, the usual precedence rules among operators are assumed. As abbreviations define
⊥ := ¬>, ϕ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ→ ψ := ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ→ ϕ),
and, for every i ∈ I, ^iϕ := ¬i¬ϕ. For every finite set of formulas Γ := {γ0, ..., γn−1},
define:
∧
Γ :=
 >, if Γ = ∅,γ0 ∧ .... ∧ γn−1 otherwise;
and: ∨
Γ := ¬
∧
{¬γ | γ ∈ Γ}.
2.3 Kripke semantics
Call a Kripke model (for LΦ,τ) every tuple (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V) such that W is a non empty
set, for every i ∈ I, Ri is a binary relation on W, and V is a map V : Φ → P(W) called
evaluation. A Kripke model (W, {Ri}∈I ,V) is said to be finite provided W is finite.
Call a Kripke frame (for LΦ,τ) every tuple (W, {Ri}i∈I) such that W is a nonempty
set, and, for every i ∈ I, Ri is a binary relation on W. A Kripke frame (W, {Ri}∈I) is said
to be finite provided W is finite.
For every Kripke modelM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V), w ∈ W, and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, defineM,w |= ϕ
recursively as follows:
• M,w |= > always.
• For every p ∈ Φ,M,w |= p provided w ∈ V(p).
• M,w |= ¬ϕ provided notM,w |= ϕ.
• M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ providedM,w |= ϕ andM,w |= ψ.
• For every i ∈ I,M,w |= iϕ provided, for every v ∈ Ri(w), we haveM, v |= ϕ.
For every Kripke modelM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V), and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, we say thatM satisfies
ϕ provided there is w ∈ W such thatM,w |= ϕ.
For every Kripke modelM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V), and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, we say thatM validates
ϕ provided for every w ∈ W, we haveM,w |= ϕ.
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For every Kripke frame F = (W, {Ri}i∈I), and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, we say that F satisfies ϕ
provided there is an evaluation V : Φ→ P(W), and w ∈ W such that (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V),w |=
ϕ.
For every Kripke frame F = (W, {Ri}i∈I), and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, we say that F validates ϕ
provided, for every evaluation V : Φ→ P(W), and w ∈ W, we have (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V),w |=
ϕ.
2.3.1 Subframes and submodels
For every two Kripke frames F = (W, {Ri}∈I) and F ′ = (W ′, {R′i}i∈I), F is called a
subframe of F ′, notation F ⊆ F ′, provided W ⊆ W ′, and, for every i ∈ I, Ri = R′iW.
For every two Kripke modelsM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V) andM′ = (W ′, {R′i}i∈I ,V ′),M is
called a submodel ofM′, notationM ⊆ M′, provided (W, {Ri}∈I) ⊆ (W ′, {R′i}i∈I), and,
for every p ∈ Φ, V(p) = V ′(p) ∩W.
For every two Kripke frames F = (W, {Ri}∈I) and F ′ = (W ′, {R′i}i∈I) such that
F ⊆ F ′, F is called a generated subframe of F ′ provided for every i ∈ I, W is an
R′i-generated subset of W
′.
For every two Kripke modelsM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V) andM′ = (W ′, {R′i}i∈I ,V ′) such
thatM ⊆M′,M is called a generated submodel ofM′ provided (W, {Ri}∈I) is a gener-
ated subframe of (W ′, {R′i}i∈I).
Proposition 2.1. 1. For every two Kripke frames F and F ′ for LΦ,τ such that F is
a generated subframe of F ′, and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, if ϕ is valid on F ′ then ϕ is valid on
F .
2. For every two Kripke modelsM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V) andM′ = (W ′, {R′i}i∈I ,V ′) such
thatM is a generated submodel ofM′, ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, and w ∈ W,M′,w |= ϕ if and
only ifM,w |= ϕ.
Proof. See [13, Chapter 3]. 
For every Kripke frame F = (W, {Ri}∈I), and nonempty subset X of W, the smallest
generated subframe of F including X (plainly existing) is called the subframe of F
generated by X.
For every Kripke model M = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V) and nonempty subset X of W, the
smallest generated submodel of M containing X (plainly existing) is called the sub-
model ofM generated by X.
2.4 Logics
Call a modal logic (in LΦ,τ) every subset L of LΦ,τ such that:
• L contains all the propositional tautologies in LΦ,τ.
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• L is closed under modus ponens (i.e. if ϕ ∈ L and ϕ→ ψ ∈ L, then ψ ∈ L).
• L is closed under uniform substitution (i.e. if ϕ ∈ L, then L contains all the sub-
stitution instances of ϕ).
For every modal logic L in LΦ,τ, and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, we say that ϕ is deducible in L,
notation `L ϕ, provided ϕ ∈ L. The formula ϕ is said to be L-consistent provided
0L ¬ϕ.
For every modal logic L in LΦ,τ, and Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ LΦ,τ, we say that ϕ is deducible in L
from Γ, notation Γ `L ϕ, provided there are γ0, γ1, ..., γm−1 ∈ Γ such that `L ∧i∈m γi →
ϕ. The set Γ ⊆ LΦ,τ is called L-consistent provided Γ 0L ⊥. Observe that this is
equivalent to: for every γ0, γ1, ..., γm−1 ∈ Γ, 0L ¬∧i∈m γi.
Proposition 2.2. For every modal logic L in LΦ,τ, Γ maximal L-consistent subset of
LΦ,τ, and ϕ, ψ ∈ LΦ,τ, the following facts hold:
• > ∈ Γ
• ⊥ < Γ
• ¬ϕ ∈ Γ if and only if ϕ < Γ.
• ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ.
• ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ.
• ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if (ϕ ∈ Γ implies ψ ∈ Γ).
• If ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ, then ψ ∈ Γ.
• L ⊆ Γ.
Proof. See [13, Chapter 4]. 
Call a normal modal logic (in LΦ,τ) every modal logic L in LΦ,τ such that:
• Normality: for every i ∈ I, for every p, q ∈ Φ, L contains i(p → q) → (i p →
iq).
• L is closed under generalization (that is, for every i ∈ I, if ϕ ∈ L, then iϕ ∈ L).
It is well known that:
Proposition 2.3. For every normal modal logic L in LΦ,τ, i ∈ I, p, q ∈ Φ, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L,
the following facts hold:
1. `L ϕ→ ψ implies `L iϕ→ iψ.
2. `L ϕ→ ψ implies `L ^iϕ→ ^iψ.
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3. `L i(p ∧ q)↔ i p ∧ iq.
4. `L ^i(p ∨ q)↔ ^i p ∨ ^iq.
5. `L i p ∨ iq→ i(p ∨ q).
6. `L ^i(p ∧ q)→ ^i p ∧ ^iq.
7. `L i p ∧ ^iq→ ^i(p ∧ q).
Proof’s sketch. As an example we prove 7. By Propositional Logic:
`L p→ (¬(p ∧ q)→ ¬q).
Then, by generalization:
`L i(p→ (¬(p ∧ q)→ ¬q)).
Then, by normality, modus ponens, and Propositional Logic:
`L i p→ (i¬(p ∧ q)→ i¬q).
Then, by Propositional Logic:
`L i p→ (¬i¬q→ ¬i¬(p ∧ q)).
Then, by Propositional Logic and abbreviations:
`L i p ∧ ^i q→ ^i(p ∧ q). 
2.5 Canonical models
For every normal modal logic L in LΦ,τ, define the canonical model for L (in LΦ,τ) as
the Kripke modelMc = (Wc, {Rci }i∈I ,Vc) such that:
• Wc is the set of all maximal L-consistent subsets of LΦ,τ.
• For every i ∈ I, Rci is defined by: for every Γ,∆ ∈ Wc, ΓRci ∆ provided, for every
ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, iϕ ∈ Γ implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
• Vc : Φ→ P(Wc) is defined by: for every p ∈ Φ, Γ ∈ Vc(p) provided p ∈ Γ.
Define the canonical frame for L (in LΦ,τ) as the frame underlying the canonical model
for L. A formula ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ is called canonical if, for every normal modal logic L in LΦ,τ,
ϕ ∈ L implies ϕ is valid on the canonical frame for L.
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Proposition 2.4. For every w, v ∈ Wc, and i ∈ I, the following conditions are equiva-
lent:
• wRiv.
• For every ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, iϕ ∈ w implies ϕ ∈ v.
• For every ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, ϕ ∈ v implies ^iϕ ∈ w.
Proof. See [13, Chapter 4]. 
2.6 Sahlqvist formulas
For every propositional variable p ∈ Φ, and formula ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, we say that an occurrence
of p in ϕ is positive provided it is within the scope of an even number of negation signs,
and that it is negative provided it is within the scope of an odd number of negation signs.
We say that ϕ is positive in p provided every occurence of p in ϕ is postive, and that
ϕ is negative in p provided every occurence of p in ϕ is negative. We say that ϕ is
positive provided it is positive in every propositional variable occuring in ϕ, and that ϕ
is negative provided it is negative in every propositional variable occurring in ϕ.
Call a boxed atom (in LΦ,τ) every formula of LΦ,τ of the form i0i1 ...ik−1 p where,
for every j ∈ k, we have that i j ∈ τ, p ∈ Φ, and, if k = 0, then i0i1 ...ik−1 p is p. In
words, a boxed atom is a propositional atom preceded by a number (possibly zero) of
operators i ∈ τ.
A Sahlqvist antecedent (in LΦ,τ) is a formula built up from >,⊥, boxed atoms and
negative formulas, using ∧,∨ and, for every i ∈ I, operators^i. A Sahlqvist implication
(in LΦ,τ) is a formula of the form ϕ → ψ in which ψ is positive and ϕ is a Sahlqvist
antecedent.
A Sahlqvist formula (in LΦ,τ) is a formula that is obtained from Sahlqvist implica-
tions by freely applying, for every i ∈ I, operators i and ∧, and by applying ∨ only
between formulas that do not share any propositional variables.
2.7 Properties of the canonical model
Proposition 2.5. The following facts hold:
1. (Truth Lemma) For every ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ,Mc,Γ |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ.
2. (Lindenbaum Lemma) For every L-consistent Γ′ ⊆ LΦ,τ, there is Γ ∈ Wc such
that Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
3. (Existence Lemma) For every ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, Γ ∈ Wc and i ∈ I, if ^iϕ ∈ Γ, then there
is ∆ ∈ Wc such that ΓRci ∆ and ϕ ∈ ∆.
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4. (Sahlqvist Completeness Theorem) Every Sahlqvist formula is canonical.
Proof. See [13, Chapters 3, 4 and 5]. 
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Part I
On Branching-Time Logic with
Indistinguishability
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Chapter 3
Introduction
Branching-time logics, that is, logics on tree-like representations of time, traditionally
have played a major role in modeling non-deterministic notions of time. Since [77], two
main branching-time logics have been considered. Prior called these logics Peircean
and Ockhamist. The essential difference between them is the interpretation of the future
operator F.
In Peircean Logic, Fϕ is true at an instant t provided ‘ϕ eventually will be true, in
every possible future of t’. Peircean language also has a future operator G, of which
the semantics is: Gϕ is true at an instant t provided ‘ϕ always will be true, in every
possible future of t’.
Instead, the Ockhamist interpretation of Fϕ is relative to instants t with respect to
histories h passing through t, and Fϕ is true at (t, h) provided ‘ϕ eventually will be true
in the future of t in h’. The Ockhamist language counterpart of the branching aspect of
time is a modal operator N that quantifies over the set of histories passing through the
moment under consideration: Nϕ is true at (t, h) provided ‘ϕ is true at (t, k) for every
history k passing through t’.
Various works on logics of agency considered a partition of the set of histories
passing through the instant under consideration into undividedness classes, for example
[6]: two histories are undivided at t whenever their intersection contains a moment in
the future of t.
In [102], a generalization of the notion of undividedness is considered: for every
instant t, an equivalence relation It (indistinguishability at t) between the histories pass-
ing through t is given. The only property of the indistinguishability relations is that,
if two histories are indistinguishable at an instant t, they are also indistinguishable at
every instant in the past of t. This implies that undividedness is a particular case of
indistinguishability.
Trees with indistinguishability relations (I-trees) provide a semantics for a temporal
language with Peircean operators F and G and Ockhamist operator N. In this seman-
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tics, truth is relative to couple (t, pi), where t is an instant and pi is an indistinguishability
class at t. The operators F and G have a Peircean reading, but the quantification over
histories is restricted to the indistinguishability class under consideration. The operator
N has an Ockhamist reading, but the quantification is over indistinguishability classes.
As it is pointed out in [102], Ockhamist and Peircean semantics correspond to the
limit cases of the I-tree semantics in which every (respectively, no) history passing
through t is distinguishable at t from any other.
3.1 Content of Part I
In Part I, we give a finite axiomatization, with a non standard rule, of the logic of
bundled I-trees (see below). Some preliminary definitions are presented in Chapter 4.
Syntax and semantics are presented in Chapter 5. The language has the aforementioned
operators F,G, and N, plus a past operator H: Hϕ is true at an instant t provided ‘ϕ
always happened in the past of t in the class under consideration”.
The semantics is given with respect to the class of bundled I-trees. A bundle on
a tree is a selection of histories of the tree such that every moment occurs in at least
one history of the bundle. Moreover, trees are required to be upward endless. The
indistinguishability relations and the quantification of the operators are restricted to the
histories selected by the bundle.
There are two main reasons why we consider bundled I-trees instead of I-trees. A
technical one: completeness is achieved by a particular construction in which only his-
tories of a particular kind are desired and the bundle lets us select these histories. And
a conceptual one: it has been argued, for example in [73, 74], that bundled validity is a
more correct formalization of human intuition about time and possibility (nonetheless,
we cannot avoid to report that, for example in [79], doubts about preferring bundled
validity have been raised).
In Chapter 5, we also present a set of axioms and inference rules. These axioms and
rules are a mix of the axioms for Peircean semantics presented in [20] and the axioms
for Ockhamist semantics presented in [42, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306].
Among the deduction rules of the system, an IRR rule occurs. IRR rules have been
introduced in [41], where it is shown that they can characterize irreflexivity, a property
that, as it is well known, cannot be characterized by modal axioms. A version of this
rule is employed here because it yields important properties of the structure built to
prove completeness (see Section 6.1).
Completeness is achieved in Chapter 6 by a construction adapted from [20], mostly
for what concerns the Peircean aspects of the logic, and from [42, Section 7.7, pp. 299–
306], mostly for what concerns the Ockhamist aspects of the logic.
Part I is based on the following paper:
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[43] Alberto Gatto. Axiomatization of a Branching Time Logic with Indistinguisha-
bility Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(2):155–182, 2015.
3.2 Related Works
Peircean and Ockhamist semantics have been introduced in [77]. Peircean Logic has
been axiomatized in [20] with a form of the IRR rule and in [101] without. In [20] it has
also been proved that Peircean Logic is decidable. The bundled version of Ockhamist
logic has been axiomatized in [100] without IRR rule (an axiomatization with a form
of the IRR rule due to Gabbay is cited in [92]). An axiomatization of the unbundled
Ockhamist logic and a brief sketch of the completeness proof have been presented in
[80]. The decidability of bundled Ockhamist logic has been proved in [19, 49].
As for the notion of ‘indistinguishability’, the semantics with indistinguishability
relations has been defined in [102] as a generalization of the semantics with undivid-
edness relations of [6].
Many other logics of branching-time have been introduced. All of them are some
kind of variation of either Peircean or Ockhamist logic. For example, in [100] and
[101], the temporal operators G and H are replaced by the more expressive Since and
Until operators from [55]. Moreover, branching-time logics have often been used in
computer science. In that case, since time simulates the steps of a computation, time
is assumed discrete. Example of such logics are the Peircean logic CTL of [28], the
Ockhamist version CTL* of [29] and the P-extension of CTL*, PCTL*, of [67, 103].
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Chapter 4
Preliminaries
In this chapter we give some preliminary definitions, in particular we define what bun-
dled I-trees are. Bundled I-trees will be the structures on which we will interpret the
language studied on this part.
Definition 4.1. For every set A, and binary relation R on A:
1. Let Rr denote the reflexive closure of R.
2. R is said to be total provided, for every a, b ∈ A, aRrb or bRa.
3. R is said to be linear provided R is irreflexive, transitive and total.
4. R is called downward linear provided, for every a, b, c ∈ A such that bRa and
cRa, we have bRrc or cRb.
5. R is called serial provided, for every a ∈ A, there is b ∈ A such that aRb.
Definition 4.2. Call a tree every tuple (T, <), where T is a nonempty set, and < is an
irreflexive, transitive and downward linear binary relation on T .
Example 4.3. Consider the infinite binary tree T 2 := (<N2,⊂). As usual, <N2 denotes
the set of all functions f : n→ 2 for some n ∈ N. Then, <N2 can be identified with the
set of all sequences (a0, a1, ..., an−1) such that n ∈ N and, for every i ∈ n, ai ∈ 2. Let
⊂ be a binary relation on <N2 defined by: for every a, b ∈ <N2 we have a ⊂ b provided
the domain of a is a proper subset of the domain of b and b restricted to the domain of
a is equal to a. The set <N2 ordered by ⊂ is a tree.
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Figure 4.1: infinite binary tree T 2
Definition 4.4. For every tree T = (T, <), we call a history (of T ) every maximal
linear subset of T . Let HT denote the set of all histories of T . For every t ∈ T , let HT ,t
denote the set of all histories h of T such that t ∈ h - that is, passing through t. When
T is understood, HT ,t may be denoted by Ht, that is we may forget to mention T .
Example 4.5. Consider the set N2. As usual, for every two sets A and B, AB denotes the
set of all functions f : A → B. Then, N2 can be identified with the set of all countably
infinite sequences (a0, a1, ...) such that, for every i ∈ N, we have ai ∈ 2. For every
sequence a ∈ N2, and i ∈ N, let ai denote the ith component a(i) of a. One can easily
prove that the set HT 2 of all histories of T 2 is the set {{(a0, a1, ..., ai) | i ∈ N} | a ∈ N2}.
Remark 4.6. For every tree T = (T, <), and nonempty linear subset S ⊆ T , by Zorn
Lemma, it is possible to extend S to a history of T .
Definition 4.7. For every tree T = (T, <), call a bundle (on T ) every subset B ⊆ HT
such that T =
⋃
B. Call a bundled tree every tuple (T, <, B) such that (T, <) is a tree,
and B is a bundle on (T, <). For every bundled tree (T, <, B), and t ∈ T , let BT ,t denote
the set of all histories h ∈ B such that t ∈ h. When T is understood BT ,t may be denoted
by Bt.
Example 4.8. By Example 4.5, h 7→ ⋃ h is a bijection from HT 2 to N2. Then, we can
identify HT 2 with N2. Define B as the set of all sequences a ∈ N2 such that there is
i ∈ N and b ∈ {0, 1} with, for every j ≥ i, a j = b - that is, the set of all sequences that
become constant from a certain component onward. Let ⊂ denote proper inclusion.
One can easily prove that B ⊂ HT 2 is a countable bundle on T 2.
Definition 4.9. For every bundled tree T = (T, <, B), call an indistinguishability func-
tion (on T ) every function I : T → P(B × B) such that:
1. For every t ∈ T , I(t) is an equivalence relation on Bt, denoted by It.
2. For every h, k ∈ B, and t, s ∈ h ∩ k such that t < s, if hIsk, then hItk.
For every t ∈ T , and h ∈ HT ,t, [h]It denotes the equivalence class of h with respect to
It. Call a bundled I-tree every tuple T = (T, <, B, I) such that (T, <, B) is a tree and I is
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an indistinguishability function. For every bundled I-tree T = (T, <, B, I), and t ∈ T ,
let ΠT ,t denote the set of all equivalence classes of It. When T is understood ΠT ,t may
be denoted by Πt.
Example 4.10. Suppose that an agent A, for every a ∈ <N2, can distinguish histories
in HT 2,a if and only if they split in less than n steps from a for a fixed n > 1. That is,
let len(a) denote the length of a, and let h1, h2 ∈ N2 be two histories passing through
a. We set h1Iah2 provided for all i ∈ len(a) + n, the ith component of h1 is equal to the
ith component of h2. This defines an indistinguishability function on T 2, which might
distinguish undivided histories.
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Chapter 5
Language, semantics, axioms
and IRR rule
In this Chapter we define the language, the semantics, and we give a system of axioms
and inference rules.
5.1 Language
Let Φ be a countably infinite set, and τ := {G, F,H,N}. Throughout Part I, we will
work with the modal language L := LΦ,τ. Let f := ¬G¬, g := ¬F¬, P := ¬H¬, and
M := ¬N¬.
5.2 Semantics
In this section we define the semantics of L. We explain how the language L will be
interpreted on upward endless bundled I-trees.
Definition 5.1. Call a frame every bundled I-tree (T, <, B, I) such that < is serial. Call
a model every tuple M = (T, <, B, I,V) such that T = (T, <, B, I) is a frame and
V : Φ → P(⋃t∈T ({t} × ΠT ,t)) is a function called evaluation. Let M be the class of all
models.⋃
t∈T ({t} × ΠT ,t) is the set of all couples (t, pi) such that t ∈ T and pi ∈ ΠT ,t. Then,
an evaluation maps propositional variables to sets of couples (t, pi) where t is a point
of T and pi is a class of indistinguishable histories at t. Let (t, pi) ∈ M denote (t, pi) ∈⋃
t∈T ({t} × ΠT ,t).
Definition 5.2. For every model M = (T, <, B, I,V), (t, pi) ∈ M, and ϕ ∈ L, define
M, (t, pi) |= ϕ recursively as follows:
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• M, (t, pi) |= > always.
• For every p ∈ Φ,M, (t, pi) |= p provided (t, pi) ∈ V(p).
• M, (t, pi) |= ¬ϕ providedM, (t, pi) 6|= ϕ.
• M, (t, pi) |= ϕ ∧ ψ providedM, (t, pi) |= ϕ andM, (t, pi) |= ψ.
• M, (t, pi) |= Gϕ provided, for every h ∈ pi, and s ∈ h such that t < s, we have
M, (s, [h]Is ) |= ϕ.
• M, (t, pi) |= Fϕ provided, for every h ∈ pi, there is s ∈ h with t < s and
M, (s, [h]Is ) |= ϕ.
• M, (t, pi) |= Hϕ provided, for every h ∈ pi, and s ∈ h such that s < t, we have
M, (s, [h]Is ) |= ϕ.
• M, (t, pi) |= Nϕ provided, for every ρ ∈ ΠT ,t, we haveM, (t, ρ) |= ϕ.
Analogously to Section 2.3, for every modelM, and ϕ ∈ L, we say thatM satisfies
ϕ provided there is (t, pi) ∈ M such that M, (t, pi) |= ϕ. We say that ϕ is satisfiable
provided there is a model satisfying ϕ, and that ϕ is valid provided ¬ϕ is not satisfiable.
Let LM be the set of all valid formulas. Plainly, LM is a logic (see Section 2.4).
For every modelM, and Γ ⊆ L, we say thatM satisfies Γ provided there is (t, pi) ∈
M such that, for every γ ∈ Γ, we have M, (t, pi) |= γ. We say that Γ is satisfiable
provided there is a model satisfying Γ.
For Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, we say that Γ semantically entails ϕ, notation Γ |= ϕ, provided, for
every modelM, and (t, pi) ∈ M, if, for every γ ∈ Γ,M, (t, pi) |= γ, thenM, (t, pi) |= ϕ.
5.3 Axioms and IRR rule
In this section we give a finite list of axioms Λ, and define the smallest ‘normal modal
logic L (with respect to G, H, and N)’ containing Λ and closed under an additional
condition, called IRR rule. In Chapter 6, we prove that L is sound (that is, L ⊆ LM)
and complete (that is, LM ⊆ L) with respect to LM. Then, LM is axiomatized by Λ (that
is, LM = L). In fact, we also prove that LM is strongly complete (that is, for every
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, Γ |= ϕ implies Γ `LM ϕ).
Λ is a mix of the axioms for Peircean semantics given in [20] and the axioms for
Ockhamist semantics given in [42, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306]. In particular, Axioms
2a - 2m come from [20]; Axioms 2n - 2q are S5 for N, exactly as in [42, Section 7.7,
pp. 299–306]; and Axioms 2r and 2s are adapted from [42, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306].
Closure under some variation of the IRR rule is required both in [20] and in [42, Section
7.7, pp. 299–306].
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The reason why we may think of L as normal in {G,H,N} is because of the normal-
ity axioms for G, H, and N in Λ (Axioms 2b, 2a, and 2n, respectively), and because L
will be closed under generalization for G, H, and N.
On the other hand, the normality axiom for F, i.e. F(p → q) → (F p → Fq),
would not be sound with respect to LM, that is, F(p → q) → (F p → Fq) < LM.
Instead, we use axiom 2c G(p→ q)→ (F p→ Fq), which is somehow reminiscent of
the normality axiom for F. Generalization for F, although preserving validities over
models, is not necessary.
The IRR rule will let us use IRR maximal L-consistent sets (see Definition 6.1). For
every L-consistent set of formulas Γ, IRR maximal L-consistent sets will let us build
a model satisfying Γ. By classical arguments, this yields the completeness of L with
respect to LM, and, together with the soundness of L with respect to LM, also yields the
strong completeness of LM. Further comments and details will be given later.
Definition 5.3. Define Λ as the following set:
1. All tautologies of propositional logic.
2. Let p, q be any two distinct propositional variables:
(a) H(p→ q)→ (Hp→ Hq).
(b) G(p→ q)→ (Gp→ Gq).
(c) G(p→ q)→ (F p→ Fq).
(d) p→ H f p.
(e) p→ GPp.
(f) Hp→ HHp.
(g) Gp→ GGp.
(h) FF p→ F p
(i) Gp→ F p.
(j) Gp→ gp.
(k) Hp ∧ p ∧Gp→ GHp.
(l) Hp ∧ p ∧ gp→ gHp.
(m) FGp→ GF p.
(n) N(p→ q)→ (N p→ Nq).
(o) N p→ NN p.
(p) N p→ p.
(q) p→ NMp.
(r) MPp→ PMp.
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(s) Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ Nq→ GNH(M(Hp ∧ N¬p)→ q).
Let L be the smallest subset of L containing Λ and closed under the following inference
rules:
• Modus ponens: if ϕ ∈ L and ϕ→ ψ ∈ L, then ψ ∈ L.
• Uniform substitution: if ϕ ∈ L, then L contains all the substitution instances of ϕ.
• Generalization: if ϕ ∈ L, then {Gϕ,Hϕ,Nϕ} ⊆ L.
• IRR rule: if Hp ∧ N¬p→ ϕ ∈ L with p ∈ Φ not occurring in ϕ, then ϕ ∈ L.
We denote `L by ` and refer to L-consistency by saying consistency. Plainly, for every
ϕ ∈ L, we have ` ϕ if and only if there is n ∈ N and ϕ0, ...ϕn ∈ L such that ϕn = ϕ and,
for every i ≤ n, ϕi is either an axiom or is obtained from ϕ0, ..., ϕi−1 by the application
of an inference rule. Such a sequence ϕ0, ..., ϕn is called a derivation of ϕ.
5.4 Properties of L
In this section we prove a number of properties of L. These results will be used to study
IRR sets in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
Proposition 5.4. For every p, q ∈ Φ, ϕ, ψ ∈ L, and  ∈ {G,H,N} (and ^ abbreviating
¬¬), the following facts hold:
1. ` ϕ→ ψ implies ` ϕ→ ψ.
2. ` ϕ→ ψ implies ` ^ϕ→ ^ψ.
3. ` (p ∧ q)↔ p ∧ q.
4. ` ^(p ∨ q)↔ ^p ∨ ^q.
5. ` p ∨ q→ (p ∨ q).
6. ` ^(p ∧ q)→ ^p ∧ ^q.
7. ` p ∧ ^q→ ^(p ∧ q).
Proof’s sketch. Since L is normal in {G,H,N}, Proposition 2.3 yields the result. 
Proposition 5.5. For every ϕ, ψ, α, β ∈ L, if ` ϕ↔ ψ and β is like α except for having
ψ in one or more places where α has ϕ, then ` α↔ β.
35
Proof’s sketch. The proof is an easy induction on the complexity of α. The proposi-
tional and boolean cases are plain. The temporal cases (G, F,H) all follow a similar
pattern. We show the case in which α is Fγ. For every η, ϑ ∈ L, write R(η, ϑ) provided
ϑ is like η except for having ψ in one or more places where ϑ has ϕ. By hypothesis, we
have R(α, β) and β is of the form Fδ. Then, plainly, we have R(γ, δ). Then, by inductive
hypothesis, we have:
` γ → δ,
` δ→ γ.
Then, by generalization for G, we have:
` G(γ → δ),
` G(δ→ γ).
Then, by Axiom 2c (G(p → q) → (F p → Fq)), uniform substitution, and modus
ponens, we have:
` Fγ → Fδ,
` Fδ→ Fγ.

Remark 5.6. Propositions 5.4 and 5.5 are common in Modal Logic. Therefore, with
the exception of this chapter, we will use them without mentioning.
Proposition 5.7. For every p, q ∈ Φ, and ϕ, ψ ∈ L, the following facts hold:
1. If ` ϕ→ ψ then ` Fϕ→ Fψ.
2. If ` ϕ→ ψ then ` gϕ→ gψ.
3. ` Gp→ f p.
4. ` f gp→ f p.
5. ` Gp ∧ Fq→ F(p ∧ q).
6. ` F p ∧ gq→ f (p ∧ q).
7. ` gHp→ p.
8. ` Hp ∧ p ∧ gp→ Hgp.
9. ` Hp ∧ gq→ gH(P¬p→ q).
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Proof. 1. Straightforward from hypothesis, generalization for G, Axiom 2c (G(p →
q)→ (F p→ Fq)), uniform substitution, and modus ponens.
2. By hypothesis and propositional logic, we have:
` ¬ψ→ ¬ϕ.
Then, by 1, we have:
` F¬ψ→ F¬ϕ.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬F¬ϕ→ ¬F¬ψ.
3. By Axiom 2j (Gp→ gp), we have:
Gp→ ¬F¬p.
Moreover, by Axiom 2i (Gp→ F p), uniform substitution, and propositional logic, we
have:
¬F¬p→ ¬G¬p.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
Gp→ ¬G¬p.
4. By Axiom 2i (Gp → F p), uniform substitution, and propositional logic, we
have:
` ¬F¬p→ ¬G¬p.
Then, by Proposition 5.4(2), we have:
` ¬G¬¬F¬p→ ¬G¬¬G¬p. (5.1)
Moreover, by propositional logic, we have:
` G¬p→ ¬¬G¬p.
Then, by Proposition 5.4(1), we have:
` GG¬p→ G¬¬G¬p.
37
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬G¬¬G¬p→ ¬GG¬p. (5.2)
Finally, by Axiom 2g (Gp → GGp), uniform substitution, and propositional logic, we
have:
` ¬GG¬p→ ¬G¬p. (5.3)
Then, by (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3), we have:
` ¬G¬¬F¬p→ ¬G¬p.
5. By propositional logic, we have:
` p→ (q→ p ∧ q).
Then, by Proposition 5.4(1), we have:
` Gp→ G(q→ p ∧ q).
Moreover, by Axiom 2c (G(p → q) → (F p → Fq)), and uniform substitution, we
have:
` G(q→ p ∧ q)→ (Fq→ F(p ∧ q)).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` Gp→ (Fq→ F(p ∧ q)).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` Gp ∧ Fq→ F(p ∧ q).
6. By propositional logic, we have:
` ¬(p ∧ q)→ (p→ ¬q).
Then, by Proposition 5.4(1), we have:
` G¬(p ∧ q)→ G(p→ ¬q).
Moreover, by Axiom 2c (G(p → q) → (F p → Fq)), and uniform substitution, we
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have:
` G(p→ ¬q)→ (F p→ F¬q).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` G¬(p ∧ q)→ (F p→ F¬q).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` F p ∧ ¬F¬q→ ¬G¬(p ∧ q).
7. By Axiom 2e (p→ GPp), and uniform substitution, we have:
` ¬p→ G¬H¬¬p.
Moreover, by Axiom 2i (Gp→ F p), and uniform substitution, we have:
` G¬H¬¬p→ F¬H¬¬p.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬p→ F¬H¬¬p.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬F¬H¬¬p→ ¬¬p. (5.4)
Then, by Proposition 5.5, we have:
` ¬F¬Hp→ p.
8. By Axiom 2e (p→ GPp), and uniform substitution, we have:
` ¬p→ GP¬p.
Then, by 1 and 5.4(2), we have:
` PF¬p→ PFGP¬p. (5.5)
By Axiom 2m (FGp→ GF p), uniform substitution, and Proposition 5.4(2), we have:
` PFGP¬p→ PGFP¬p. (5.6)
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Then, by (5.5), (5.6), and propositional logic, we have:
` PF¬p→ PGFP¬p. (5.7)
Moreover, by Axiom 2d (p→ H f p), and uniform substitution, we have:
` ¬p→ H¬G¬¬p.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬H¬G¬¬p→ ¬¬p.
Then, by Proposition 5.5, we have:
` ¬H¬Gp→ p.
Then, by uniform substitution, we have:
` ¬H¬GFP¬p→ FP¬p. (5.8)
Then, by (5.7), (5.8), and propositional logic, we have:
` ¬H¬F¬p→ F¬H¬¬p.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬F¬H¬¬p→ ¬¬H¬F¬p.
Then, by Proposition 5.5, we have:
` gHp→ Hgp.
Then, by Axiom 2l (Hp ∧ p ∧ gp→ gHp), and propositional logic, we have:
` Hp ∧ p ∧ gp→ Hgp.
9. By propositional logic, we have:
` Hp→ ¬P¬p ∨ q. (5.9)
Then, by Proposition 5.4(1), we have:
` HHp→ H(¬P¬p ∨ q).
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Then, by Axiom 2f (Hp→ HHp), and propositional logic, we have:
` Hp→ H(¬P¬p ∨ q). (5.10)
Moreover, by propositional logic, we have:
` q→ ¬P¬p ∨ q.
Then, by 2, we have:
` gq→ g(¬P¬p ∨ q). (5.11)
Then, by (5.9), (5.10), (5.11), and propositional logic, we have:
Hp ∧ gq→ H(¬P¬p ∨ q) ∧ (¬P¬p ∨ q) ∧ g(¬P¬p ∨ q).
Then, by Axiom 2l (Hp ∧ p ∧ gp → gHp), uniform substitution, and propositional
logic, we have:
` Hp ∧ gq→ gH(¬P¬p ∨ q). 
Proposition 5.8. ` P(p ∧ Fq)→ P(Pp ∧ q) ∨ q ∨ Fq.
Proof. Let ϕ stand for Pp ∧ q. By Axiom 2e (p → GPp), propositional logic, and
Proposition 5.4(2), we have:
` P(p ∧ Fq)→ P(GPp ∧ Fq).
Also, by Proposition 5.7(5), uniform substitution, and Proposition 5.4(2) we have:
` P(GPp ∧ Fq)→ PF(Pp ∧ q).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` P(p ∧ Fq)→ PFϕ. (5.12)
Moreover, by Proposition 5.5 for the first line, propositional logic for the second, and
propositional logic and Proposition 5.7(1) for the third, we have:
` ¬P(Pp ∧ q)→ H¬(Pp ∧ q),
` ¬q→ ¬(Pp ∧ q),
` ¬Fq→ g¬(Pp ∧ q).
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Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq→ H¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ∧ g¬ϕ.
Then, by Proposition 5.7(8), and uniform substitution, we have:
` ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq→ Hg¬ϕ. (5.13)
Combining (5.12) and (5.13), we obtain:
` P(p ∧ Fq) ∧ ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq→ ¬H¬Fϕ ∧ H¬F¬¬ϕ.
Then, by Proposition 5.5, we have:
` P(p ∧ Fq) ∧ ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq→ ¬H¬Fϕ ∧ H¬Fϕ.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬(P(p ∧ Fq) ∧ ¬P(Pp ∧ q) ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬Fq). 
Proposition 5.9. For every:
• n ∈ N;
• ϕ, ψ, χ1, χ2, ..., χn in L;
• and 0,1, ...,n ∈ {G,H,N};
if we let:
• G− be H, H− be G, and N− be N;
• and, for every i ∈ n + 1, ^i be ¬i¬;
then:
` ϕ→ 0(χ1 → 1(χ2 → ...→ n−1(χn → n¬ψ))...) (5.14)
implies:
` ψ→ −n (χn → −n−1(χn−1 → ...→ −1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...). (5.15)
Proof. Let us assume (5.14). First we prove by induction on j ∈ n + 1 that:
`^ j(χ j+1 ∧ ^ j+1(χ j+2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)
→ (χ j → −j−1(χ j−1 → −j−2(χ j−2 → ...→ −1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...). (5.16)
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Indeed, by (5.14), propositional logic, and Proposition 5.5, we have:
` ^0(χ1 ∧ ^1(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)→ ¬ϕ.
Then, by Proposition 5.4(1), we have:
` −0^0(χ1 ∧ ^1(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)→ −0¬ϕ.
Then, by Axioms 2e (p → GPp), 2d (p → H f p), 2q (p → NMp), uniform substitu-
tion, and propositional logic, we have:
` (χ1 ∧ ^1(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)→ −0¬ϕ.
This is (5.16) for j = 0.
Consider a natural number m such that 0 ≤ m < n, and assume (5.16) for j = m.
That is:
`^m(χm+1 ∧ ^m+1(χm+2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)
→ (χm → −m−1(χm−1 → −m−2(χm−2 → ...→ −1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...).
We want to prove (5.16) for j = m + 1. By Proposition 5.4(1), we have:
`−m^m(χm+1 ∧ ^m+1(χm+2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)
→ −m(χm → −m−1(χm−1 → −m−2(χm−2 → ...→ −1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...).
Then, by Axioms 2e (p → GPp), 2d (p → H f p), 2q (p → NMp), uniform substitu-
tion, and propositional logic, we have:
` χm+1 ∧ ^m+1(χm+2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)
→ −m(χm → −m−1(χm−1 → ...→ −1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
`^m+1(χm+2 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(χn ∧ ^nψ))...)
→ (χm+1 → −m(χm → −m−1(χm−1 → ...→ −1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...).
That is (5.16) for j = m + 1 as desired:
Take (5.16) for j = n:
` ^nψ→ (χn → −n−1...−1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...).
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Then, by Proposition 5.4(1), we have:
` −n^nψ→ −n (χn → −n−1...−1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...).
Then, by Axioms 2e (p → GPp), 2d (p → H f p), 2q (p → NMp), uniform substitu-
tion, and propositional logic, we have:
` ψ→ −n (χn → −n−1...−1 (χ1 → −0¬ϕ))...).
That is (5.15) as desired. 
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Chapter 6
Completeness
In this chapter, we prove that L is sound (L ⊆ LM) and complete (LM ⊆ L) with respect
to LM. That is, LM is axiomatized by Λ (LM = L). In fact, we also prove that LM is
strongly complete (for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, Γ |= ϕ implies Γ `LM ϕ).
In order to prove the completeness of L with respect to LM, and the strong com-
pleteness of LM, it is sufficient to prove that:
Every consistent set is satisfiable. (6.1)
For, suppose that (6.1) holds, and for some Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, we have Γ 0 ϕ. Then, Γ∪ {¬ϕ}
is consistent. Then, by (6.1), Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is satisfiable. Then, Γ 6|= ϕ. Then:
For every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, we have that Γ |= ϕ implies Γ ` ϕ. (6.2)
This yields the completeness of L with respect to LM (just take Γ = ∅). Moreover,
together with the soundness of L with respect to LM, it also yields the strong complete-
ness of LM. For, suppose that Γ |= ϕ. Then, by (6.2), Γ ` ϕ. Then, by definition, there
are n ∈ N and γ0, ..., γn−1 ∈ Γ such that ` ∧i∈n γi → ϕ. Then, by soundness of L with
respect to LM, we have `LM ∧i∈n γ → ϕ. Then, by definition, Γ `LM ϕ.
We prove (6.1) in Sections 6.1-6.4. In Section 6.1 we define and study IRR sets.
In Section 6.2, for every IRR maximal consistent set Γ, we define a Kripke frame
associated to Γ. This Kripke frame is obtained through a construction adapted from
[20]. In Section 6.3, given an arbitrary IRR maximal consistent set Γ, the associated
Kripke frame is turned into a model satisfying Γ. This model is obtained through a
construction adapted from [42]. These results are then used in Section 6.4 to prove that
every consistent set is satisfiable on some model.
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6.1 IRR maximal consistent sets
In this section we define IRR sets, and relations≺ and∼ among IRR maximal consistent
sets like those in canonical models. More precisely, ≺ is the relation associated to G, 
that associated to H, and ∼ that associated to N.
The peculiarity of IRR sets is that they contain a ‘name’ (a formula of the form
Hp ∧ N¬p, for some propositional variable p) for themselves and for every IRR set
finitely reachable by a sequence of ‘(≺ ∪  ∪ ∼)-steps’.
This fact will allow us to prove:
• Proposition 6.10, which says that there are no two maximal IRR consistent sets
simultaneously ≺-related and ∼-related.
• Proposition 6.11 (using Axiom 2s), which says that, for every IRR maximal
consistent sets Γ ≺ ∆ ∼ ∆′, there is an IRR maximal consistent set Γ′ completing
the square (Γ ∼ Γ′ ≺ ∆′).
• Proposition 6.15, which says that if a formula ϕ is eventually satisfied in every
possible future of an IRR maximal consistent set Γ (Fϕ ∈ Γ), and there is an IRR
maximal consistent set ∆ in the future of Γ (Γ ≺ ∆) such that ϕ is not satisfied
neither at ∆ nor eventually in every possible future of ∆ (ϕ, Fϕ < ∆), then there
is an IRR maximal consistent set Θ between Γ and ∆ (Γ ≺ Θ ≺ ∆) such that ϕ is
satisfied at Θ (ϕ ∈ Θ).
These propositions, in turn, will let us prove important properties of the Kripke frame
that will be defined in Section 6.2. In particular, points 3, 4 and 8 of Proposition 6.22
are consequences of respectively Propositions 6.10, 6.11 and 6.15:
• Point 3 is a consequence of Proposition 6.10 and repeats the content of Proposi-
tion 6.10 for the Kripke frame.
• Point 4 is a consequence of Proposition 6.11 and repeats the content of Proposi-
tion 6.11 for the Kripke frame.
• Point 8 takes care of the operator g stating that for every formula gϕ satisfied at
an instant w, there is one possible future of w in which ϕ is always satisfied.
These properties, in turn, will let us define the model of Section 6.3.
The use of IRR maximal consistent sets is allowed by Propositions 6.3, 6.4 and
6.9. Observe that Propositions 6.4 and 6.9 are the adaption of respectively the Linden-
baum Lemma (Proposition 2.5(2)) and Existence Lemma (Proposition 2.5(3)) to IRR
maximal consistent sets. In proving Propositions 6.3 and 6.4, the IRR rule is crucial.
Let us define what IRR sets are:
Definition 6.1. Call IRR every Γ ⊆ L such that:
46
1. For some propositional variable p, Hp ∧ N¬p ∈ Γ.
2. For every formula ϕ ∈ Γ, and n ∈ N, if ϕ can be read as ^0(ψ0 ∧ ^1(ψ1 ∧
... ∧ ^n−1ψn−1))...), where, for every i ∈ n, ^i ∈ { f , P,M}, then, for some q not
occurring in ϕ, ^0(ψ0 ∧ ^1(ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1(Hq ∧ N¬q ∧ ψn−1))...) ∈ Γ.
Remark 6.2. For every n ∈ N, one can easily prove by induction on n that if a formula
ϕ can be read as ^0(ψ0 ∧ ^1(ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ^n−1ψn−1))...) and as ^′0(ψ′0 ∧ ^′1(ψ′1 ∧ ... ∧
^′n−1ψ
′
n−1))...), then, for all i ∈ n, ^i = ^′i and ψi = ψ′i .
The following two propositions, together with Proposition 6.9, will let us use IRR
maximal consistent sets:
Proposition 6.3. For every Γ ⊆ L, and p ∈ Φ, if Γ is consistent and, for every ϕ ∈ Γ, p
does not occur in ϕ, then Γ ∪ {Hp ∧ N¬p} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose Γ∪{Hp∧N¬p} is inconsistent. Then, there is n ∈ N and γ0, γ1, ..., γn−1 ∈
Γ such that, if γ :=
∧
i∈n γi, then:
` Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ γ → ⊥.
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` Hp ∧ N¬p→ (γ → ⊥).
Then, by IRR rule, we have:
` γ → ⊥,
which is against the consistency of Γ. 
Proposition 6.4. (Lindenbaum Lemma for IRR maximal consistent sets [42, Lemma
7.7.6].) For every consistent Γ′ ⊆ L, if the cardinality of:
{p ∈ Φ | for every ϕ ∈ Γ′, p does not occur in ϕ}
is infinite, then there is an IRR maximal consistent set Γ such that Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
Proof. Assume that the cardinality of:
{p ∈ Φ | for every ϕ ∈ Γ′, p does not occur in ϕ}
is infinite. Define Γ0 := Γ′ ∪ {Hp ∧ N¬p}, for some propositional variable p such that,
for every ϕ ∈ Γ, p does not occur in ϕ (p is plainly existing by our assumption on the
cardinality of {p ∈ Φ | for every ϕ ∈ Γ, p does not occur in ϕ}). Then, by Proposition
6.3, Γ0 is consistent.
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Let (ψ0,m0), (ψ1,m1), ... be an enumeration of all pairs (ψi,mi) such that ψi is a
formula, and, if mi = 0, then there is no n ∈ N such that ψi can be read as ^1(ψ1 ∧
^2(ψ2 ∧ ... ∧ ^nψn))...), while if mi , 0, then ψi can be read as ^1(χ1 ∧ ^2(χ2 ∧
... ∧ ^miχmi ))...) (recall Remark 6.2). Moreover, we can assume that ψi is readable as
^1(χ1 ∧ ^2(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ^nχn))...) if and only if i is odd.
Assume that Γn was defined and that the cardinality of:
{p ∈ Φ | for every ϕ ∈ Γn, p does not occur in ϕ}
is infinite. Then, either Γn∪{ψn} or Γn∪{¬ψn} is consistent. If Γn∪{¬ψn} is consistent,
set Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {¬ψn}. Otherwise, if n is even, set Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {ψn}. If n is odd, ψn
can be read as ^1(χ1 ∧ ^2(χ2 ∧ ... ∧ ^mnχmn ))...). Since the cardinality of:
{p ∈ Φ | for every ϕ ∈ Γn, p does not occur in ϕ}
is infinite, there is q ∈ Φ such that, for every ϕ ∈ Γn∪{ψn}, q does not occur in ϕ. Denote
^1(χ1 ∧^2(χ2 ∧ ...∧^mn (Hq∧ N¬q∧ χmn ))...) by ψn(q). We show that Γn ∪ {ψn(q)} is
consistent. For, suppose not. Then, there is m ∈ N and γ0, γ1, ..., γm−1 ∈ Γn such that, if
we call γ the formula
∧
i∈m γi, then:
` ¬(γ ∧ ψn(q)).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` γ → 1(χ1 → 2(χ2 → ...→ mn¬(Hq ∧ N¬q ∧ χmn ))...).
Then, by Proposition 5.9, we have:
` Hq ∧ N¬q ∧ χmn → −mn (χmn−1 → −mn−1(χmn−2 → ...→ −1¬γ))...).
Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` Hq ∧ N¬q→ (χmn → −mn (χmn−1 → −mn−1(χmn−2 → ...→ −1¬γ))...).
Then, by IRR rule, we have:
` χmn → −mn (χmn−1 → −mn−1(χmn−2 → ...→ −1¬γ))...).
Then, by Proposition 5.9, we have:
` γ → 1(χ1 → 2(χ2 → ...→ mn¬χmn ))...).
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Then, by propositional logic, we have:
` ¬(γ ∧ ψn),
which is against the consistency of Γn∪{ψn}. Then, Γn∪{ψn(q)} is consistent as desired.
Also, one can easily prove that ` ψn(q) → ψn. Then, Γn ∪ {ψn(q)} ∪ {ψn} is consistent
as well. Define Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {ψn(q)} ∪ {ψn}. Define Γ := ⋃n∈N Γn.
Plainly, Γ is a maximal consistent set. As for being IRR, by construction, there is
p ∈ Φ such that Hp ∧ N¬p ∈ Γ0 ⊆ Γ. Then, Condition 1 of Definition 6.1 is satisfied.
Moreover, let ϕ be a formula of Γ such that ϕ can be read as ^0(ψ0 ∧ ^1(ψ1 ∧ ... ∧
^mψm))...) for some m ∈ N. Then, ϕ occurs in the enumeration as (ψn,m) for some odd
n ∈ N. Then, Γn∪{¬ψn} is not consistent. Otherwise, by construction, ¬ψn ∈ Γn+1 ⊆ Γ.
Then, ψn ∧ ¬ψn ∈ Γ, a contradiction of the consistency of Γ. Then, by construction,
ψn ∧ ψn(q) ∈ Γn+1 for some q ∈ Φ not occurring in ψn. Then, Condition 2 of Definition
6.1 is satisfied. 
Let us define relations between IRR maximal consistent sets, like those of canonical
models (see Section 2.5), for G, H, and N respectively:
Definition 6.5. For every two IRR maximal consistent sets Γ,∆, define:
• Γ ≺ ∆ provided, for every ϕ ∈ L, Gϕ ∈ Γ implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
• Γ  ∆ provided, for every ϕ ∈ L, Hϕ ∈ Γ implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
• Γ ∼ ∆ provided, for every ϕ ∈ L, Nϕ ∈ Γ implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
As L is normal in {G,H,N}, a straightforward adaption of Proposition 2.2 yields:
Proposition 6.6. For every two maximal consistent sets Γ,∆, and  ∈ {G,H,N} (and
^ abbreviating ¬¬), the following conditions are equivalent:
• For every ϕ ∈ L, ϕ ∈ Γ implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
• For every ϕ ∈ L, ϕ ∈ ∆ implies ^ϕ ∈ Γ.
Moreover, by Axioms 2d (p → H f p) and 2e (p → GPp), one can easily prove that 
is the inverse ≺−1:= {(a, b) | (b, a) ∈ ≺} of ≺:
Proposition 6.7. For every two maximal consistent sets Γ,∆, the following conditions
are equivalent:
1. For every ϕ ∈ L, Gϕ ∈ Γ implies ϕ ∈ ∆.
2. For every ϕ ∈ L, Hϕ ∈ ∆ implies ϕ ∈ Γ.
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Remark 6.8. Definitions like Definition 6.5, and propositions like Propositions 6.6
and 6.7 are common in Modal Logic, especially in completeness proofs when building
(variations of) the canonical model. Therefore, we will use Definition 6.5 and Propo-
sitions 6.6 and 6.7 without mentioning.
We now prove the adaption of the Existence Lemma (Proposition 2.5(3)) to IRR
sets:
Proposition 6.9. (Existence Lemma for IRR maximal consistent sets [42, Lemma
7.7.6].) For every ϕ ∈ L, and IRR maximal consistent set Γ, if fϕ ∈ Γ (Pϕ ∈ Γ,
Mϕ ∈ Γ, respectively), then there is an IRR maximal consistent set ∆ such that Γ ≺ ∆
(Γ  ∆, Γ ∼ ∆, resp.) and ϕ ∈ ∆.
Proof. By definition of IRR set, there is p ∈ Φ such that:
f (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ. (6.3)
We show that {Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ} ∪ {ψ |Gψ ∈ Γ} is consistent. Indeed, suppose it is not.
Then, since {ψ |Gψ ∈ Γ} is closed under conjunction, there is Gψ ∈ Γ such that:
` ¬(Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ).
Then, by generalization for G, we have:
` G¬(Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ). (6.4)
However, by (6.3), and choice of ψ, we have:
f (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ. (6.5)
Facts (6.4) and (6.5) are against the consistency of Γ. Then, {Hp∧N¬p∧ϕ}∪{ψ |Gψ ∈
Γ} is consistent as desired. Define ∆0 := {Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ} ∪ {ψ |Gψ ∈ Γ}.
For the n + 1 case, we proceed as in Proposition 6.4, but, if ∆n ∪ {¬ψn} is not
consistent and n is odd, we need to make sure that there is a propositional variable q
such that q does not occur in ψn and ∆n ∪ {ψn(q)} is consistent. But first let us prove
that:
f (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn) ∈ Γ. (6.6)
For, suppose not. Then, we have:
G¬(Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn) ∈ Γ.
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Then:
¬(Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn) ∈ ∆0 ⊆ ∆n.
This is against the consistency of ∆n ∪ {ψn} and (6.6) is proved.
We are now ready to prove that there is a propositional variable q such that q does
not occur in ψn and ∆n ∪ {ψn(q)} is consistent. By (6.6), since Γ is IRR, we have:
f (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn(q)) ∈ Γ (6.7)
for some q not occurring in:
f (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn).
Then, q is not occurring in ψn. Suppose ∆n ∪ {ψn(q)} is inconsistent. Then, there is
Gψ ∈ Γ such that:
` ¬(Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn(q)).
Then, by generalization for G, we have:
¬ f (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn(q)) ∈ Γ. (6.8)
However, by (6.7) and Gψ ∈ Γ, we have:
f (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ ∧
∧
(∆n − ∆0) ∧ ψn(q)) ∈ Γ. (6.9)
Facts (6.8) and (6.9) are a contradiction. Then, ∆n ∪ {ψn(q)} is consistent and q as
desired. Define ∆ :=
⋃
n∈N ∆n. One can easily show that ∆ is as desired.
The cases in which Pϕ ∈ Γ or Mϕ ∈ Γ are similar. 
We now prove some propositions about the structure of the set of all IRR maximal
consistent sets, equipped with the relations ≺ and ∼ defined above. These propositions
are important to prove Proposition 6.22 about the structure of the Kripke frame that
will be defined in Section 6.2. In proving Propositions 6.10, 6.11, and 6.15, the fact
that IRR maximal consistent sets contain names is crucial.
Proposition 6.10. ([42, Lemma 7.7.7].) ≺ ∩ ∼ = ∅. That is, there are no two IRR
maximal consistent sets that are at the same time ≺-related and ∼-related.
Proof. Suppose ≺ ∩ ∼ , ∅. Then, there are two IRR maximal consistent sets Γ, ∆
such that Γ ≺ ∆ and Γ ∼ ∆. However, since ∆ is an IRR set, there is p ∈ Φ such that
Hp∧N¬p ∈ ∆. Then, by definition of ≺ and ∼, we have p ∈ Γ and ¬p ∈ Γ, against the
consistency of Γ. 
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Proposition 6.11. ([42, Lemma 7.7.9].) For every IRR maximal consistent set Γ, ∆,
and ∆′, if Γ ≺ ∆ and ∆ ∼ ∆′, then there is an IRR maximal consistent set Γ′ such that
Γ ∼ Γ′ and Γ′ ≺ ∆′.
Γ Γ′
∆ ∆′
∼
≺ ≺
∼
Figure 6.1: There is Γ′ such that Γ ∼ Γ′ and Γ′ ≺ ∆′
Proof. Since Γ is an IRR maximal consistent set, there is p ∈ Φ such that Hp∧N¬p ∈
Γ. Then, since Γ ≺ ∆ and ∆ ∼ ∆′, we have MP(Hp ∧ N¬p) ∈ ∆′. Then, by Axiom
2r (MPp → PMp), we have PM(Hp ∧ N¬p) ∈ ∆′. Then, by Proposition 6.9, there
is an IRR maximal consistent set Γ′ ≺ ∆′ such that M(Hp ∧ N¬p) ∈ Γ′. We prove
that Γ ∼ Γ′. Indeed, suppose Nϕ ∈ Γ. Then, by Axiom 2s (Hp ∧ N¬p ∧ Nq →
GNH(M(Hp ∧ N¬p) → q)), we have GNH(M(Hp ∧ N¬p) → ϕ) ∈ Γ. Then, since
Γ ≺ ∆ and ∆ ∼ ∆′, we have M(Hp∧N¬p)→ ϕ ∈ Γ′. Then, since M(Hp∧N¬p) ∈ Γ′,
we have ϕ ∈ Γ′. 
Proposition 6.12. ([42, Lemma 7.7.8].) ≺ is a transitive, serial and downward linear
relation on the set of IRR maximal consistent sets.
Proof. Transitivity follows, by classical work, from Axiom 2g (Gp→ GGp). Seriality
follows from Proposition 5.7(3) (` Gp → f p) (which is obtained combining Axioms
2i (Gp→ F p) and 2j (Gp→ gp), and yields ` f>) and Proposition 6.9.
Let us show that ≺ is downward linear. For, suppose not. Then, there are IRR
maximal consistent sets Γ, ∆1 and ∆2 such that ∆1,∆2 ≺ Γ, ∆1 , ∆2, ∆1 ⊀ ∆2 and
∆2 ⊀ ∆1. Then, there are χ1, χ2 and χ3 such that χ1 ∈ ∆1, χ1 < ∆2, χ2 ∈ ∆1, fχ2 < ∆2,
χ3 ∈ ∆1 and Pχ3 < ∆2. Let ϕ be ∧3i=1 χi. Then, ϕ ∈ ∆1. Then, we have f Pϕ ∈ ∆2.
Then, by Axiom 2k (Hp∧p∧Gp→ GHp), we have Pϕ∨ϕ∨ fϕ ∈ ∆2. If Pϕ ∈ ∆2, then
we have Pχ3 ∈ ∆2, a contradiction. If ϕ ∈ ∆2, then we have χ1 ∈ ∆2, a contradiction.
If fϕ ∈ ∆2, then we have fχ2 ∈ ∆2, a contradiction. 
Proposition 6.13. ([42, Lemma 7.7.8].) ∼ is an equivalence relation over the set of
IRR maximal consistent sets.
Proof. By classical work, using Axiom 2p (N p → p) for reflexivity, 2q (p → NMp)
for symmetry, 2o (N p→ NN p) for transitivity. 
Remark 6.14. Propositions 6.10 and 6.13 imply that ≺ is irreflexive.
Proposition 6.15. (Cf. [20, Lemma 3.7].) For every ϕ ∈ L, and IRR maximal consis-
tent sets Γ,∆, if Γ ≺ ∆, Fϕ ∈ Γ, and ¬(ϕ ∨ Fϕ) ∈ ∆, then there exists an IRR maximal
consistent set Θ such that Γ ≺ Θ ≺ ∆ and ϕ ∈ Θ.
52
Fϕ ∈ Γ
Θ 3 ϕ
¬(ϕ ∨ Fϕ) ∈ ∆
≺
≺
≺
Figure 6.2: There is Θ such that Γ ≺ Θ ≺ ∆ and ϕ ∈ Θ
Proof. Since Γ is an IRR maximal consistent set, there is p ∈ Φ, such that Hp ∧
N¬p ∈ Γ. Then, by Axiom 2p, we have Hp ∧ ¬p ∈ Γ. Then, since Γ ≺ ∆, we have
P(Hp∧¬p∧ Fϕ) ∈ ∆. Then, by Proposition 5.8 (` P(p∧ Fq)→ P(Pp∧ q)∨ q∨ Fq)
we have P(P(Hp ∧ ¬p) ∧ ϕ) ∈ ∆. Then, by Proposition 6.9, there is an IRR maximal
consistent set Θ such that Θ ≺ ∆ and P(Hp ∧ ¬p) ∧ ϕ ∈ Θ. Then, by Proposition 6.12,
we have Γ ≺ Θ or Γ = Θ or Γ  Θ. If Θ = Γ, then, since Hp ∈ Γ and P¬p ∈ Θ, we
obtain a contradiction. If Θ ≺ Γ, then, since P¬p ∈ Θ, by Proposition 6.9, there is an
IRR maximal consistent set Ξ such that Ξ ≺ Θ and ¬p ∈ Ξ. Then, since Ξ ≺ Θ ≺ Γ and
≺ is transitive (Proposition 6.12), we have ¬p ∈ Ξ ≺ Γ, against Hp ∈ Γ. Then Γ ≺ Θ.

6.2 Kripke Frame
Recall that a Kripke frame for L is a tuple (W,R0,R1,R2) such that W is a nonempty set
and R0,R1 and R2 are (possibly empty) binary relations on W associated, respectively,
to the operators G,H and N. If we present a Kripke frame for L as triple (W,R, S )
we are implicitly assuming that R is the relation associated to G, R−1 is the relation
associated to H, and S is the relation associated to N.
In this section, for every IRR maximal consistent set Γ, we define a Kripke frame
for L associated to Γ. This Kripke frame has, as domain, a set of arbitrary points and,
as relations, a relation R associated to G (and implicitly R−1 associated to H) and a
relation S associated to N. It is related to the set of all IRR maximal consistent sets
by means of a function C, named, as in [20], ‘chronicle’. More precisely, C associates
each point to an IRR maximal consistent set, and for every couple of points x, y, if xRy
(respectively, xS y) then C(x) ≺ C(y) (respectively, C(x) ∼ C(y)).
The reason why we consider this Kripke frame, instead of the Kripke frame given
by the set of all IRR maximal consistent sets together with ≺ and ∼, is that the structure
needed to perform the construction of Section 6.3, which will produce a model for Γ,
is slightly different from the structure of the frame given by the set of all IRR maximal
consistent sets together with ≺ and ∼.
In particular, we want that whenever some gϕ belongs to C(x) for some point x,
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then there is an history h passing through x such that, for every y ∈ h with xRy, we
have ϕ ∈ C(y) (Proposition 6.22(8)). This property will be important to prove the g-
case of Proposition 6.41, which is a variant of the Truth Lemma (Proposition 2.5(1))
adapted to the present context. Also, we want no history to be completely S -related to
any other history (Corollary 6.31). This last property will be important to define the
indistinguishability function of the model that will be built in Section 6.3.
We build the Kripke frame of this section following the construction in [20]. There,
Peircean Logic is considered. Here, we also have the Ockhamist operator N. Therefore,
in addition to treating the G, F and H-cases (Propositions 6.18, 6.19 and 6.20), treated
also in [20, Lemmas 3.9, 3.10, 3.12], we also have to treat the N-case (Proposition
6.21).
Definition 6.16. A chronicle on a Kripke frame F = (W,R, S ) is a function C assigning
to each w ∈ W an IRR maximal consistent set in such a way that, for every w, v ∈ W,
wRv implies C(w) ≺ C(v), and wS v implies C(w) ∼ C(v).
Definition 6.17. Consider the following conditions over a chronicle C on a linear order
I = (I,R) (a linear order (I,R) can be viewed as a Kripke frame (I,R, ∅)):
1. For every formula ψ, and every i, j ∈ I such that iR j, Pψ ∈ C( j) and ψ, Pψ < C(i),
there is k ∈ I such that iRk, kR j and ψ ∈ C(k).
2. For every formula ψ, and every i, j ∈ I such that iR j, Fψ ∈ C(i) and ψ, Fψ < C( j),
there is k ∈ I such that iRk, kR j and ψ ∈ C(k).
3. For every formula ψ, and every i ∈ I such that Pψ ∈ C(i), there is j ∈ I such that
jRi and ψ ∈ C( j).
4. For every formula ψ, and every i ∈ I such that Fψ ∈ C(i), there is j ∈ I such that
iR j and ψ ∈ C( j).
If C satisfies 1, 2, 3, it is called historic. If C satisfies 1, 2, 4, it is called prophetic. If C
satisfies 1, 2, 3, 4, it is called perfect.
The following are intermediate propositions important to prove Proposition 6.22.
All of them, from Proposition 6.18 to Proposition 6.21, follow a similar pattern. A
linear order I and a chronicle C on I satisfying some of the requirements of Definition
6.17 must be defined. Note that these requirements are existential. With the exception
of Proposition 6.18, in which a simpler construction suffices, for all the other proposi-
tions, I and C are defined inductively. At step 0, a linear order I0 and a chronicle C0
on I0 are defined. At step n + 1, the satisfaction by In and Cn of a particular instance
of the desired requirements is checked. If such an instance is not satisfied, the missing
elements are added and the chronicle on these new elements defined. The resulting
linear order and chronicle define In+1 and Cn+1. I is then defined as the union of all
the In and C as the union of all the Cn.
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Proposition 6.18. (Cf. [20, Lemma 3.9].) For every IRR maximal consistent set Γ,
there is a linear order I = (I,R), and a historic chronicle C on I such that I has a
greatest element, say i, with C(i) = Γ.
i 7→ Γ
Figure 6.3: I has a greatest element i such that C(i) = Γ
Proof. Define:
I := {∆ |∆ IRR maximal consistent set ∧ ∆  Γ},
R := ≺I,
I := (I,R),
C := idI .
I is a linear order by definition, Remark 6.14 and Proposition 6.12. C is plainly a
chronicle. Points 1 and 3 of Definition 6.17 follow from definition and Proposition 6.9.
Point 2 of Definition 6.17 follows from definition and Proposition 6.15. 
Proposition 6.19. ([20, Lemma 3.10].) For every formula ψ, and IRR maximal consis-
tent set Γ such that fψ ∈ Γ, there is a linear order I = (I,R) and a prophetic chronicle
C on I such that I has a smallest element, say i, with C(i) = Γ, and there is j ∈ I such
that iR j and ψ ∈ C( j).
i 7→ Γ 3 fψ
j 7→ C( j) 3 ψ
Figure 6.4: I has a smallest element i st C(i) = Γ and there is j ∈ I st iR j and ψ ∈ C( j)
Proof. Step 0. By Proposition 6.9, there is ∆ such that Γ ≺ ∆ and ψ ∈ ∆. Consider
new objects i, j and define I0 := (I0,R0), where I0 := {i, j}, R0 = {(i, j)}, and C0 :=
{(i,Γ), ( j,∆)}.
Let ϕ1, ϕ2, ... be an enumeration of all the formulas of the form Pψ or Fψ such that
every ϕ in the list occurs infinitely many times in the list.
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Step n+1. Suppose ϕn+1 is Fψ. List the elements of In in Rn order: (i =)i1, i2, ..., iM .
Consider i1. If Fψ < Cn(i1) or Fψ ∨ ψ ∈ Cn(i2), go to i2. Otherwise, by Proposition
6.15, there is an IRR maximal consistent set Θ, with Cn(i1) ≺ Θ ≺ Cn(i2) and ψ ∈ Θ.
Add an element i′1 between i1 and i2 to In, and (i
′
1,Θ) to Cn. Go to i2. Proceed in this
way till iM is reached. If Fψ < Cn(iM), stop. Otherwise, by Axiom 2j (Gp → gp) and
Proposition 6.9, there is an IRR maximal consistent set ∆ such that Cn(iM) ≺ ∆ and
ψ ∈ ∆. Add an element i′M after iM to In, and (i′M ,∆) to Cn. Call the resulting structure
In+1 = (In+1,Rn+1), and the resulting chronicle Cn+1.
Suppose ϕn+1 is Pψ. List the elements of In in Rn order: (i =)i1, i2, ..., iM . Consider
iM . If Pψ < Cn(iM) or Pψ ∨ ψ ∈ Cn(iM−1), go to iM−1. Otherwise, by Proposition
6.9 and downward linearity of ≺, there is an IRR maximal consistent set ∆ such that
Cn(iM−1) ≺ ∆ ≺ Cn(iM) and ψ ∈ ∆. Add an element i′M between iM and iM−1 to In,
and (i′M ,∆) to Cn. Go to iM−1. Proceed in this way till i1 is reached and stop, without
adding any new object after i1. Call the resulting structure In+1 = (In+1,Rn+1), and the
resulting chronicle Cn+1.
Define I = (I,R) as the union of all the In, and C as the union of all the Cn. Plainly
I is linear and C is a chronicle on I.
Let us check that C is prophetic. Let us begin with Condition 1 of Definition 6.17.
Suppose that there is a formula ψ and elements i, j ∈ I such that iR j, Pψ ∈ C( j)
and ψ, Pψ < C(i). Then, there is n ∈ N such that ψ is ϕn and there are elements
i′, j′ ∈ In such that iRri′, i′R j′, and j′Rr j (recall that Rr denotes the reflexive closure
of R), {k ∈ In | i′RnkRn j′} = ∅, Pψ ∈ Cn( j′) and ψ, Pψ < Cn(i′). Then, by construction,
there is k ∈ In+1 such that i′Rn+1k, kRn+1 j′ and ψ ∈ Cn+1(k). Then, by construction,
k ∈ I, iRk, kR j and ψ ∈ C(k). With a specular argument, we can prove Condition 2 of
Definition 6.17.
Let us check Condition 4 of Definition 6.17. Suppose that there is a formula ψ and
an element i ∈ I such that Fψ ∈ C(i). Then, there is n ∈ N such that ψ is ϕn and i ∈ In.
If there is j ∈ In such that iRn j and ψ, Fψ < Cn( j) then, by construction, j ∈ I, iR j and
ψ, Fψ < C( j). Then, by condition 2 of Definition 6.17, there is k ∈ I such that iRk and
ψ ∈ k. Otherwise, Fψ belongs to the greates element iM of In. Then, by construction,
there is j ∈ In+1 such that iRrn+1iMRn+1 j and ψ ∈ j. Then, by construction, j ∈ I, iR j
and ψ ∈ j. Then C is a prophetic chronicle on I as desired.
All other properties required on I and C are plain. 
Proposition 6.20. ([20, Lemma 3.12].) For every ψ ∈ L, and IRR maximal consistent
set Γ such that gψ ∈ Γ, there exists a linear order I = (I,R) and a prophetic chronicle
C on I such that I has a smallest element, say i, with C(i) = Γ, and for all j, with iR j,
ψ ∈ C( j).
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i 7→ Γ 3 gψ
j 7→ C( j) 3 ψ
j 7→ C( j) 3 ψ
Figure 6.5: I has a smallest element i st C(i) = Γ and for all j with iR j, ψ ∈ C( j)
Proof. Consider the case in which ψ is Hχ, for some formula χ. Proceed as in Propo-
sition 6.19, with only the following modifications:
1. At step 0, use Axioms 2h (FF p → F p) and 2i (Gp → F p) to find an IRR
maximal consistent set ∆, with Γ ≺ ∆ and gHχ ∈ ∆.
2. At each step n > 0, if zM,n is the greatest element of In, assure that gHχ ∈
Cn(zM,n), proceeding as follows:
• According to the proof of Proposition 6.19, the greatest element of In+1
is different from the greatest element of In only when ϕn is Fϑ, for some
formula ϑ, and Fϑ ∈ Cn(zM,n). Now, if Fϑ ∧ gHχ ∈ Cn(zM,n), by Axiom
2h (FF p → F p) and Proposition 5.7(6) (` F p ∧ gq → f (p ∧ q)), we have
f (ϑ ∧ gHχ) ∈ Cn(zM,n). Then, by Proposition 6.9, there is ∆ such that
Cn(zM,n) ≺ ∆ and ϑ ∧ gHχ ∈ ∆. Then, if we define Cn+1(zM,n+1) := ∆, we
have gHχ ∈ Cn+1(zM,n+1) as desired.
In the end, by Axiom 2i (Gp → F p), for every i ∈ I, there is j ∈ I, with iR j and
gHχ ∈ C( j). Then, f gHχ ∈ C(i). Applying Proposition 5.7.4 (` f gp → f p) and
Axiom 2e (p→ GPp), we have χ ∈ C(i).
Suppose ψ is an arbitrary formula. Since Γ is an IRR maximal consistent set, there
is p ∈ Φ such that Hp ∧ ¬p ∈ Γ. Then, using Proposition 5.7(9) (` Hp ∧ gq →
gH(P¬p → q)), we have gH(P¬p → ψ) ∈ Γ. Then, there exists a linear order I =
(I,R) and a prophetic chronicle C on I such that I has a smallest element, say i, with
C(i) = Γ, and, for every element j ∈ I, P¬p → ψ ∈ C( j). Therefore, as ¬p ∈ C(i), for
every j ∈ I such that iR j, we have ψ ∈ C( j). 
Proposition 6.21. For every ψ ∈ L, linear order I = (I,R) with a greatest element,
say i, and historic chronicle C on I such that Mψ ∈ C(i), there exists a linear order
I′ = (I′,R′), with a greatest element, say i′, and a historic chronicle C′ on I′ such that
ψ ∈ C′(i′) and, for all j ∈ I there is j′ ∈ I′, with C( j) ∼ C′( j′), and for all j′ ∈ I′ there
is j ∈ I, with C′( j′) ∼ C( j).
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iMψ ∈ ∆ 7 → i′ 7→ C′(i′) 3 ψ
Figure 6.6: Proposition 6.21
Proof. By Proposition 6.9, there is an IRR maximal consistent set Γ such that C(i) ∼ Γ
and ψ ∈ Γ. Consider a new object i′ and define I′ = {i′} and C′(i′) = Γ. For every j ∈ I
such that jRi, by Proposition 6.11, there is Γ j such that C( j) ∼ Γ j and Γ j ≺ Γ. Then,
for every j ∈ I such that jRi, add a new object j′ to I′ and define C′( j′) = Γ j. Finally,
for every j′, k′ ∈ I′, define j′R′k′ if and only if C′( j′) ≺ C′(k′).
Define I′ := (I′,R′). By definition of R′ and irreflexivity, transitivity and down-
ward linearity of ≺, we have that I′ is linear. Moreover, C′ is a chronicle on I′. Let
us prove that C′ is a historic chronicle. Consider an arbitrary formula ψ and an arbi-
trary j′ ∈ I′ such that Pψ ∈ C′( j′). Then, by Proposition 6.9, there is Γ′ such that
Γ′ ≺ C′( j′) and ψ ∈ Γ′. Then, by Proposition 6.11, there is Γ such that Γ ≺ C( j) and
Γ ∼ Γ′. Since Γ is IRR, we have Hp ∧ N¬p ∈ Γ for some propositional variable p.
Then, P(Hp ∧ N¬p) ∈ C( j). Then, there is k ∈ I such that kR j and Hp ∧ N¬p ∈ C(k).
Then, by downward linearity of ≺, we have Γ = C(k). Then, there is k′ ∈ I′ such that
Γ ∼ C(k′). Then, by downward linearity of ≺ and ≺ ∩ ∼ = ∅, we have Γ′ = C′(k′).
Similarly, given an arbitrary ψ and arbitrary j′, l′ ∈ I′ such that l′R′ j′, Pψ ∈ C′( j′)
and ψ, Pψ < C′(l′), there is k′ ∈ I′, with l′R′k′, k′R′ j′ and ψ ∈ C′(k′); given an arbitrary
formula ψ and arbitrary j′, l′ ∈ I′, with j′R′l′, Fψ ∈ C′( j′) and ψ, Fψ < C′(l′), there is
k′ ∈ I′, with j′R′k′, k′R′l′ and ψ ∈ C′(k′). 
The following proposition shows how to build, for every IRR maximal consistent
set Γ, the desired Kripke frame. Again, some existential requirements must be satisfied,
an inductive construction will be done, and, at each step, the missing part of the frame
and the associated part of the chronicle will be added by means of Propositions 6.18-
6.21.
Proposition 6.22. For every IRR maximal consistent set Γ, there is a Kripke frame
F = (W,R, S ) and a chronicle C on F such that:
1. R is transitive, downward linear and serial.
2. S is an equivalence relation.
3. R ∩ S = ∅.
4. For every w, v, v′ ∈ W, if wRv and vS v′, then there is w′ such that wS w′ and
w′Rv′.
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5. There is w ∈ W such that C(w) = Γ.
6. For every w ∈ W, there is h ∈ Hw such that Ch is a perfect chronicle (Ch
denotes C restricted to h).
7. For every w ∈ W, and ψ ∈ L, if fψ ∈ C(w), then there is h ∈ Hw such that Ch is
a perfect chronicle, and there is v ∈ h such that wRv and ψ ∈ C(v).
8. For every w ∈ W, and ψ ∈ L, if gψ ∈ C(w), then there is h ∈ Hw such that Ch is
a perfect chronicle, and, for every v ∈ h such that wRv, we have ψ ∈ C(v).
9. For every w ∈ W, and ψ ∈ L, if Mψ ∈ C(w), then there is v ∈ W such that wS v
and ψ ∈ C(v).
Proof. Let Γ be an arbitrary IRR maximal consistent set.
Step 0. By Proposition 6.18, there exists a Kripke frame F = (I,R, S ) and a historic
chronicle C on F such that S = ∅, (I,R) is a linear order with a greatest element, say i,
and C(i) = Γ. Define F0 := F and C0 := C.
i 7→ Γ
Figure 6.7: Step 0
Step n+1. Consider every pair (w, ϕ) such that w ∈ Wn −Wn−1 and ϕ is a formula
in Cn(w) of the form fψ, gψ or Mψ.
Suppose ϕ is fψ. By Proposition 6.19, there exists a Kripke frame F(w,ϕ) = (I,R, S )
and a prophetic chronicle C(w,ϕ) on F(w,ϕ) such that S = ∅, (I,R) is a linear order with a
smallest element, say i, C(w,ϕ)(i) = Cn(w), and there is j ∈ I with iR j and ψ ∈ C(w,ϕ)( j).
We can assume i = w and I − {i} disjoint from Wn.
Suppose ϕ is gψ. By Proposition 6.20, there exists a Kripke frame F(w,ϕ) = (I,R, S )
and a prophetic chronicle C(w,ϕ) on F(w,ϕ) such that S = ∅, (I,R) is a linear order with a
smallest element, say i, C(w,ϕ)(i) = Cn(w), and for every j with iR j, ψ ∈ C(w,ϕ)( j). We
can assume i = w and I − {i} disjoint from Wn.
Suppose ϕ is Mψ. Assume that, if Iw denote {v ∈ Wn | vRrn w} (recall that Rrn denotes
the reflexive closure of Rn), then CnIw is historic on Iw (*). Then, by Proposition
6.21, there exists a Kripke frame F(w,ϕ) = (I,R, S ) and a historic chronicle C(w,ϕ) on
F(w,ϕ) such that S = ∅, (I,R) is a linear order with a greatest element, say i, such that
ψ ∈ C(w,ϕ)(i), and, for every v ∈ Iw, there is j ∈ I with Cn(v) ∼ C(w,ϕ)( j) and, for every
j ∈ I, there is v ∈ Iw with Cn(v) ∼ C(w,ϕ)( j). We can assume I disjoint from Wn.
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All the F(w,ϕ) − {w} can be assumed disjoint. Let F 0n+1 := (Wn+1,R0n+1, S n) be the
union of Fn and all the F(w,ϕ), and Cn+1 the union of Cn and all the C(w,ϕ). For every
F(w,ϕ) = (I,R, S ), with ϕ of the form Mψ, for every i ∈ I, for every i′ ∈ Iw with
C(w,ϕ)(i′) ∼ Cn(i), add (i′, i) and (i, i′) to S n, obtaining S 0n+1. (See Figure 6.8.)
Mϕ ∈ Cn(w) 7 →w 7→ C(w,Mϕ)( j) 3 ϕj
7→ Cn(v) 3 fψv
ψ ∈ C(v, fψ)( j) 7 →j 7→ Cn(u) 3 gχu
7→ C(u,gχ)( j) 3 ψj
7→ C(u,gχ)( j) 3 ψj
Figure 6.8: Step n + 1
Close R0n+1 under transitivity and S
0
n+1 under reflexivity and transitivity, obtaining
Rn+1 and S n+1. Let F be the union of all the Fn and C the union of all the Cn. It is easy
to prove that assumption (∗) holds at step 0 and that, if assumption (∗) holds at step n,
then it holds at step n + 1. Properties 1-8 easily follow.
A bit of commentary about Properties 6, 7 and 8. To obtain Properties 6, 7 and
8, we “concatenate” linear orders I such that I has a greatest element and a historic
chronicle defined on it together with linear orders I′ such that I′ has a smallest element
and a prophetic chronicle defined on it, identifying the greatest element of I with the
smallest element of I′. A bit of thought shows that by doing this we obtain linear
orders with prefect chronicles defined on them. 
6.3 Model
In the previous section, for every IRR maximal consistent set Γ, we defined a Kripke
frame associated to Γ. In this section, given an arbitrary IRR maximal consistent set
Γ, following [42, Section 7.7, pp. 299–306], we turn the associated Kripke frame F =
(W,R, S ) into a model for Γ.
This is done by quotienting over S (S is an equivalence relation). The idea un-
derlying this construction is the following. Points of the Kripke frame F represent
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indistinguishability equivalence classes, and they are S -related only if they refer to the
same point in time. Then, we define a bundle, an indistinguishability function, and an
evaluation on the resulting frame, and we prove that the resulting model satisfies Γ.
Let Γ be an arbitrary IRR maximal consistent set, and F = (W,R, S ) and C the
Kripke frame and the chronicle associated to Γ provided by Proposition 6.22.
Definition 6.23. For every w ∈ W, define w := {v ∈ W |wS v}, and W := {w |w ∈
W}. That is w is the equivalence class of w with respect to S and W is the set of the
equivalence classes with respect to S of all the elements of W. For every w, v ∈ W,
define wRv if and only if there are w′ ∈ w and v′ ∈ v such that w′Rv′. From now on,
if we invoke an element w ∈ W, we are implicitly stating the existence of an element
w ∈ W such that w := {v ∈ W |wS v}.
Remark 6.24. By Proposition 6.22(4), given w, v ∈ W, with wRv, there is w′ ∈ w
such that w′Rv.
Proposition 6.25. R is an irreflexive, transitive, downward linear and serial binary
relation over W.
Proof. Given any w ∈W, suppose wRw. Then, by Remark 6.24, there is w′ ∈ w with
w′Rw. This contradicts R ∩ S = ∅. Then, R is irreflexive. Transitivity and downward
linearity easily follow from Remark 6.24 and the same properties for R. Seriality for R
easily follows from seriality for R. 
Definition 6.26. For every h ∈ HF , define h := {w |w ∈ h}. Plainly h is a history of
(W,R).
Now we prove that there is no history h such that all its points are S -related to some
other history (Corollary 6.31). This property will be important to define the indistin-
guishability function I (Definition 6.34).
Definition 6.27. Given w ∈ W, define the date of birth of w, dob(w), as the natural
number n such that w has been introduced at step n in the construction of F . Given
w,w′ ∈ W such that wS w′, define the date of birth of the relation S between w and w′,
dob(S ,w,w′) as the natural number n such that w and w′ have been S -related at step n.
Proposition 6.28. For every distinct w,w′ ∈ W, if wS w′ and dob(S ,w,w′) = n, then:
1. Either, for every v ∈ W such that vRrw, we have dob(v) = n (recall that Rr
denotes the reflexive closure of R);
2. Or, for every v′ ∈ W such that v′Rrw′, we have dob(v′) = n.
Proof. According to the construction, there are three ways in which w and w′ may have
been S -related:
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1. There is v such that: wRrv, dob(v) = n − 1, and Mψ ∈ C(v) for some formula
ψ. Then, a new element v′, together with w′, has been introduced at step n to
answer (v,Mψ). In this case, the thesis plainly follows.
2. There is v′ such that: w′Rrv′, dob(v′) = n − 1, and Mψ ∈ C(v′) for some formula
ψ. Then, a new element v, together with w, has been introduced at step n to
answer (v′,Mψ). In this case, thesis plainly follows.
3. w and w′ have been S -related by doing the transitive closure of S 0n. Then, by
definition of transitive closure, there is m ∈ N and x1, x2, ..., xm ∈ Wn such that
w = x0S 0n x1S
0
n...S
0
n xm+1 = w
′ and, for every distinct i, j ∈ {0, 1, ...,m + 1}, we
have xi , x j. Observe that S 0n \ S n−1 always relates an element whose dob is
n − 1 to an element whose dob is n. Then, there is i ∈ {0, 1, ...,m + 1} such that
dob(xi) = n. Otherwise, since S n−1 is transitive, we have wS n−1w′, a contradic-
tion of dob(S ,w,w′) = n. Observe that, by construction, such an xi has been
S 0n-related to one and only one element v. Then, either w or w
′ must be xi. Oth-
erwise, we have S 0n(xi) = {xi−1, xi+1}, a contradiction of S 0n(xi) being a singleton.
Assume, without loss of generality, that w is xi. Then, w has been S -related to
an object different than w, namely w′, at the same step in which w has been in-
troduced. Then, by construction, there must be v ∈ Wn such that wRrv and v has
been introduced at step n to answer (v′,Mψ) for some v′ ∈ Wn−1 and formula ψ.
Then, thesis plainly follows. 
Corollary 6.29. For every distinct w,w′, v ∈ W such that wS w′, dob(S ,w,w′) = n, and
wRv, if there is v′ ∈ W such that w′Rv′ and vS v′, then we have dob(v) ≤ n.
Proof. Assume dob(v) > n. Then, dob(S , v, v′) > n. Then, by Proposition 6.28, either
dob(w) > n or dob(w′) > n, a contradiction of dob(S ,w,w′) = n. 
Proposition 6.30. For every n ∈ N, and upward endless h1 ∈ HFn , there is no h2 ∈
HF \ {h1} such that, for every w1 ∈ h1, there is w2 ∈ h2 with w1S nw2.
Proof. By induction on n ∈ N. If n = 0, it is easy since there is no upward endless
h1 ∈ HF0 . Consider n > 0 and assume the thesis for every k < n. Consider an upward
endless h1 ∈ HFn . If h1 ∈ HFn−1 , then the thesis follows by inductive hypothesis.
If h1 ∈ HFn \ HFn−1 , then, since h1 is upward endless, there is w1 ∈ h1 such that
{v1 ∈ h1 |w1Rrv1} has been introduced at step n answering (w1, ϕ) for some formula ϕ
of the form either fψ or gψ. Then, the thesis follows by the fact that, by construction,
for every v ∈ {v1 ∈ h1 |w1Rrv1}, we have S n(v) = {v}. 
Corollary 6.31. For every h1 ∈ HF , there is no h2 ∈ HF \ {h1} such that, for every
w1 ∈ h1, there is w2 ∈ h2 with w1S w2. Then, h 7→ h, for h ∈ HF , is injective.
62
Proof. Suppose not. Consider h1 ∈ HF and h2 ∈ HF \ {h1} such that for every w1 ∈ h1
there is w2 ∈ h2, with w1S w2. Consider w1 ∈ h1 and w2 ∈ h2 such that w1S w2. Let
dob(S ,w1,w2) = n. Consider an arbitrary v1 ∈ h1 with w1Rv1. By assumptions, there is
v2 ∈ h2 such that w2Rv2 and v1S v2. Then, by Corollary 6.29, we have dob(v1), dob(v2)
and dob(S , v1, v2) ≤ n. Then, h1 ∈ HFn and for all w1 ∈ h1 there is w2 ∈ h2 such that
w1S nw2. This contradicts Proposition 6.30. 
Now, we define the bundle B over (W,R):
Definition 6.32. Define B as the set of all h such that Ch is perfect.
Proposition 6.33. B is a bundle over (W,R).
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6.22(6). 
Now, we define the indistinguishability function I over (W,R, B):
Definition 6.34. Given w ∈ W, h1,h2 ∈ Bw, define h1Iwh2 if and only if h1 ∩ w =
h2 ∩ w. Define I(w) := Iw.
Observe that this is a good definition by Corollary 6.31.
Proposition 6.35. I is an indistinguishability function over (W,R, B).
Proof. Plainly, I is a function, and, for every w ∈ W, Iw is an equivalence relation on
Bw. Consider arbitrary v,w ∈ W such that vRw, and arbitrary h1,h2 ∈ Bw such that
h1Iwh2. Consider an arbitrary w′ ∈ h1 ∩ w, and an arbitrary v′ ∈ h1 ∩ v. Then, since
h1Iwh2, we have w′ ∈ h2. Moreover, by linearity of h1, v′ and w′ must be comparable.
If w′Rrv′, possibly applying Proposition 6.22(4), we would contradict R∩ S = ∅. Then
v′Rw′. Then, since w′ ∈ h2, R is downward linear and h2 is an history, we have v′ ∈ h2.
Then, by arbitrariness of v′, we have h1 ∩ v ⊆ h2 ∩ v. In the same way, we have
h2 ∩ v ⊆ h1 ∩ v. Then, h1 ∩ v = h2 ∩ v. Then, by definition of Iv, we have h1Ivh2. 
Now, we define an evaluation V ′ over (W,R, B, I) (Definition 6.38).
Definition 6.36. For every w ∈ W, define piw := {h ∈ B | h ∩ w = {w}}.
Proposition 6.37. For every w ∈ W, for every pi ∈ Πw, there is a unique w′ ∈ w such
that pi = piw′ .
Proof. Since R ∩ S = ∅, for every w ∈W, for every h ∈ Bw, there is (a unique) w′ ∈ w
such that h ∩ w = {w′}. Then, for every w ∈ W, and pi ∈ Πw, by definition of Iw, there
is a unique w′ ∈ w such that pi = piw′ . 
Then, we can define V ′ as follows:
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Definition 6.38. For every p ∈ Φ, define:
V ′(p) := {(w, piw′ ) ∈ P(
⋃
w∈W
({w} × Πw)) | p ∈ C(w′)}.
Now, we define the model N :
Definition 6.39. Define N := (W,R, B, I,V ′).
Proposition 6.40. N = (W,R, B, I,V ′) is a model.
Proof. It follows from the previous results. 
We now prove that N is as desired:
Proposition 6.41. For every ϕ ∈ L, and w ∈ W, we have ϕ ∈ C(w) if and only if
N , (w, piw) |= ϕ. In particular, N satisfies Γ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. Easy if ϕ is >, p, ¬ψ or ψ ∧ χ for some
propositional variable p and formulas ψ and χ.
Suppose ϕ is Hψ and Hψ ∈ C(w). Take an arbitrary h ∈ piw, and an arbitrary v ∈ h
such that vRw. Then, there is v′ ∈ v such that v′ ∈ h and v′Rw. Then, since C is
a chronicle, we have C(v′) ≺ C(w). Then, we have ψ ∈ C(v′). Then, by inductive
hypothesis, we haveN , (v, piv′ ) |= ψ. Then, since piv′ = [h]Iv , we haveN , (v, [h]Iv ) |= ψ.
Then, by arbitrariness of h and v, we have N , (w, piw) |= Hψ. Suppose Hψ < C(w).
Then, by Proposition 6.22(6), there is h ∈ Hw such that Ch is perfect. Then, there is
v ∈ h such that vRw and ψ < C(v). Then, by inductive hypothesis, we haveN , (v, piv) 6|=
ψ. Then, since piv = [h]Iv , we have N , (v, [h]Iv ) 6|= ψ. Then, we have N , (w, piw) 6|= Hψ.
Suppose ϕ is Gψ and Gψ ∈ C(w). Take an arbitrary h ∈ piw, and an arbitrary v ∈ h
such that wRv. Then, there is v′ ∈ v such that v′ ∈ h and wRv′. Then, since C is
a chronicle, we have C(w) ≺ C(v′). Then, we have ψ ∈ C(v′). Then, by inductive
hypothesis, we haveN , (v, piv′ ) |= ψ. Then, since piv′ = [h]Iv , we haveN , (v, [h]Iv ) |= ψ.
Then, by arbitrariness of h and v, we have N , (w, piw) |= Gψ. Suppose Gψ < C(w).
Then, by Proposition 6.22(7), there is h ∈ Hw such that Ch is perfect and there is v ∈ h
such that wRv and ψ < C(v). Then, by inductive hypothesis, we have N , (v, piv) 6|= ψ.
Then, since piv = [h]Iv , we have N , (v, [h]Iv ) 6|= ψ. Then, N , (w, piw) 6|= Gψ.
Suppose ϕ is Fψ and Fψ ∈ C(w). Consider an arbitrary h ∈ piw. Then, by definition,
Ch is perfect. Then, there is v ∈ h such that wRv and ψ ∈ C(v). Then, by inductive
hypothesis, we have N , (v, piv) |= ψ. Then, since piv = [h]Iv , we have N , (v, [h]Iv ) |= ψ.
Then, by arbitrariness of h, we have N , (w, piw) |= Fψ. Suppose Fψ < C(w). Then, by
Proposition 6.22(8), there is h ∈ Hw such that Ch is perfect and, for all v ∈ h with
wRv, we have ψ < C(v). Then, by inductive hypothesis, we have N , (v, piv) 6|= ψ. Then,
since piv = [h]Iv , we have N , (v, [h]Iv ) 6|= ψ. Then, we have N , (w, piw) 6|= Fψ.
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Suppose ϕ is Nψ and Nψ ∈ C(w). Take an arbitrary pi ∈ Πw. Then, by Proposition
6.37, we have pi = piw′ for some w′ ∈ w. Then, since C is a chronicle, we have
C(w) ∼ C(w′). Then, we have ψ ∈ C(w′). Then, by inductive hypothesis, we have
N , (w, piw′ ) |= ψ. Then, we have N , (w, pi) |= ψ. Then, by arbitrariness of pi, we have
N , (w, piw) |= Nψ. Suppose Nψ < C(w). Then, by Proposition 6.22(9), there is w′ ∈ w
such that ψ < C(w′). Then, by inductive hypothesis, we have N , (w, piw′ ) 6|= ψ. Then,
we have N , (w, piw) 6|= Nψ.
Then, since by Proposition 6.22, there is w ∈ F such that C(w) = Γ, we have that
N satisfies Γ as desired. 
6.4 Completeness
At this point, for every IRR maximal consistent set, we are able to produce a model
that satisfies it. Nonetheless, to prove the completeness of L with respect of LM and the
strong completeness of LM, we want to be able to do it for every consistent set. The
problem is that not every consistent set can be extended to an IRR maximal consistent
set. Therefore, we cannot apply the construction introduced above.
A consistent set Γ can be extended to an IRR maximal consistent set only if the
number of propositional variables not occurring among the formulas in Γ is infinite.
However, if we index the set Φ of propositional variables and we double the indexes
of the propositional variables pi ∈ Γ (that is, pi 7→ p2i), the resulting set #Γ is such
that the number of propositional variables not occurring among the formulas in #Γ is
infinite. Moreover, it can be proved that, if Γ is consistent, then #Γ is consistent as well.
Therefore, #Γ can be extended to an IRR maximal consistent set Γ∗. Then, we are able
to build a model for Γ∗. This model, by a slight modification of the evaluation function,
can be turned into a model for Γ. And then, the completeness of L with respect of LM
and the strong completeness of LM follow.
Definition 6.42. Let p1, p2, ... be an enumeration without repetition of Φ. Given a
formula ϕ, let #ϕ denote the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every occurrence
of every propositional variable pi with p2i. Given a subset Γ ⊆ L, let #Γ be the set
obtained from Γ by replacing every ϕ ∈ Γ with #ϕ. Given a subset Γ ⊆ L, call Γ−1 the
set obtained from Γ as follows: first discard every ϕ ∈ Γ wherein some propositional
variable indexed with an odd number occurs; then replace every remaining #ϕ with ϕ.
Proposition 6.43. Given a subset Γ ⊆ L, if Γ is consistent, then #Γ is consistent. Then,
by Proposition 6.1, there is an IRR maximal consistent set Γ∗, with #Γ ⊆ Γ∗.
Proof. Observe that, since uniform substitution is among the inference rules, the def-
inition of derivation given in Definition 5.3 is equivalent to the following: for every
ϕ ∈ L, call a derivation of ϕ every sequence ϕ0, ..., ϕn such that n ∈ N, ϕn = ϕ, and,
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for every i ≤ n, ϕ is either the substitution instance of an axiom or is obtained from
ϕ0, ..., ϕi−1 by the application of an inference rule. In the reset of the proof we use this
definition of derivation.
Suppose #Γ is inconsistent. Then, there are #γ1, #γ2, ..., #γn ∈ #Γ such that `
¬∧ni=1 #γi. Consider any derivation of ¬∧ni=1 #γi. Since such a derivation is finite,
there is a bijective function s : Φ → Φ such that, for every propositional variable
p with odd index occurring in the derivation, s(p) has an even index and it does
not occur in the derivation. Consider the sequence of formulas obtained from the
derivation of ¬∧ni=1 #γi by replacing every propositional variable p with odd index
by s(p). Then, this sequence is of the form #ϕ1, #ϕ2, ..., #ϕn, and #ϕ1, #ϕ2, ..., #ϕn is a
derivation of ¬∧ni=1 #γi. Then, ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn is a derivation of ¬∧ni=1 γi. Then, since
γ1, γ2, ..., γn ∈ Γ, we have that Γ is inconsistent, a contradiction. 
Fix an arbitrary consistent set Γ. Let Γ be fixed from Definition 6.44 to Proposition
6.46.
Definition 6.44. Let N = (W,R, B, I,V ′) be the model of Definition 6.23 for Γ∗. For
every p ∈ Φ, define
V(p) := {(w, piw′ ) ∈ P(
⋃
w∈W
({w} × Πw)) | p ∈ C(w′)−1}.
Define the modelM = (W,R, B, I,V) and call it model for Γ.
Proposition 6.45. For every ϕ ∈ L, w ∈W, and pi ∈ Πw, we haveM, (w, pi) |= ϕ if and
only if N , (w, pi) |= #ϕ.
Proof. Easy induction on the complexity of ϕ. 
Proposition 6.46. For every ϕ ∈ L, and w ∈ W, if ϕ ∈ C(w)−1, thenM, (w, piw) |= ϕ.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary ϕ ∈ C(w)−1. Then, #ϕ ∈ C(w). Then, Propositions 6.41
and 6.45 implyM, (w, piw) |= ϕ. 
Proposition 6.47. For every consistent set Γ, there is a model T = (T, <, B, I,V) and
a pair (t, pi) ∈ ⋃t∈T ({t} × Πt) such that T , (t, pi) |= Γ.
Proof. Consider the modelM = (W,R, B, I,V) for Γ. According to the construction,
there is w ∈W such that Γ ⊆ C(w)−1. Therefore, Proposition 6.46 yieldsM, (w, piw) |=
Γ. 
Theorem 6.48. L is sound and complete with respect to LM. Moreover, LM is strongly
complete.
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Proof. Soundness of L with respect to LM. As usual, it suffices to prove that every
axiom in Λ is valid and that the deductive rules preserve validities. This is easily
doable. In particular, we use seriality to prove the validity of Axiom 2i (Gp → F p),
the indistinguishability condition to prove the validity of Axioms 2f (Hp→ HHp), 2g
(Gp→ GGp), 2k (Hp∧p∧Gp→ GHp) and 2l (Hp∧p∧gp→ gHp), both seriality and
the indistinguishability condition to prove the validity of Axiom 2m (FGp → GF p),
and irreflexivity to prove that the IRR rule preserves validity.
Completeness of L with respect to LM, and strong completeness of LM. As men-
tioned at the beginning of Chapter 6, Proposition 6.47 together with the soundness of
L with respect to LM, yields the completeness of L with respect to LM, and the strong
completeness of LM. 
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Chapter 7
Future works
In this chapter we present a number of open problems:
1. Is there an axiomatization of LM without a form of the IRR rule?
As highlighted in Section 6.1, the IRR rule is used to get structural properties
of the Kripke Frames of Section 6.2, namely Propositions 6.10 and 6.11. These
properties seem unavoidable, as they guarantee that what we obtain, by quoti-
enting over S in Section 6.3, is a tree. Then, an axiomatization without a form
of the IRR rule seems to need additional axioms to get these properties. Since
the axiomatization of this paper is a mix of the axiomatizations with IRR rule
of the Peircean and bundled Ockhamist logics, would it be useful to mix the ax-
iomatizations without IRR rule for Peircean and bundled Ockhamist logics of,
respectively, [101] and [100]?
2. Is there an axiomatization of the logic of unbundled I-trees?
First consider the following example showing the crucial role of bundles in our
construction. Consider the formula γ = NG(N p → M f N p) → Mg(N p →
f N p). With a bit of work, one can show that γ < LM. Consider a formula
equivalent to ¬γ such as NG(N p → M f N p) ∧ NF(N p ∧ GM¬p). Since we
proved that L is sound and complete with respect to LM, we know that such
a formula is consistent. Then, there is an IRR complete consistent theory Γ
containing NG(N p→ M f N p) ∧ NF(N p ∧GM¬p).
Then, the construction of Section 6.2 produces the following situation, where
straight lines denote R and waved lines S :
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wN p
N p
h1 h2 h3
Figure 7.1: Construction of Section 6.2 for the formula ¬γ
with C(w) = Γ. When quotienting over S , we obtain a new history, say h∞
(straight lines denoting R):
w
h1
h2
h3
h∞
Figure 7.2: When quotienting over S we obtain a new history h∞
Without a bundle we would have to consider h∞ as well. Surely, for all v and
h ∈ Hv, if N p ∈ v, then we would define (v, [h]v) ∈ V(p). Then, N , (w, [h∞]) |=
g(N p→ f N p).
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G(N p→ FN p)
w
h1 N p
h2 N p
h3
h∞
Figure 7.3: N , (w, [h∞]) |= g(N p→ f N p)
ThenN , (w, piw) |= Mg(N p→ f N p). However, since NF(N p∧GM¬p) ∈ C(w),
we would contradict Proposition 6.41.
Now, let VT be the set of all validities of the class of all unbundled I-trees. With
a bit of work one can show that γ ∈ VT . Moreover, since an unbundled I-tree can
be seen as a bundled I-tree where the bundle select all the histories, LM ⊆ VT .
Therefore, LM ⊂ VT (recall that ⊂ denotes proper inclusion). This suggests the
need of new axioms and rules to get the missing validities (for example γ). But
what are these new axioms and rules? In [79, 80], formulas similar to γ have been
used to highlight similar issues concerning the axiomatization of the Ockhamist
Logic of unbundled trees. In [80], adding an axiom schema to obtain certain
validities on the flavor of γ yields an axiomatization of the Ockhamist Logic of
unbundled trees. This suggests to try adding a similar axiom schema.
3. What is the complexity of LM?
In [44], the mosaic technique is used to improve the complexity upper bound
for bundled Ockhamist Logic, obtaining 2EXPTIME. We believe that this proof
can be adapted to the present context, obtaining 3EXPTIME. Is this also a lower
bound?
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Part II
On Temporal Logic with
derivative operator
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Chapter 8
Introduction
In the seminal [71] by McKinsey and Tarski, the authors implicitly defined a topo-
logical semantics for the modal operator : ϕ is satisfied at a point x provided ϕ is
satisfied at all y ∈ O for some open set O containing x. They proved that under this
interpretation the modal logic of any separable dense-in-itself metric space is S4.
In [83] Scott proposed the following ‘present progressive’ semantics for the opera-
tor  interpreted on linear orders: ϕ is satisfied at a point x provided ϕ is satisfied at
all y ∈ I for some open interval I containing x. This is nothing else than the topological
semantics with respect to the interval topology (of which the basic open sets are the
open intervals).
Following Scott’s suggestion, Shehtman put together the temporal operators G,H
and the operator  and finitely axiomatized the logic of this language interpreted on Q
[86]. Hodkinson finitely axiomatized the logic of this language interpreted on R [53].
8.1 Content of Part II
In Part II, we consider the coderivative operator [d] instead of the operator , together
with the temporal operators G and H. The semantics of [d] is as follows: [d]ϕ is
satisfied at a point x provided ϕ is satisfied at all y ∈ I \ {x} for some open interval
I containing x. We show that the logic of this language interpreted on R is PSPACE-
complete, it is neither strongly nor Kripke complete (and consequently that it fails the
finite model property), and it is finitely axiomatizable.
The proofs of these results are mainly adapted from [53] with some modifications.
We will use a notation close to that used in [53]. We strongly advise to read [53]. More-
over, when showing the finite axiomatizability of our logic, we will borrow techniques
also from [85] and [52]. We will highlight every borrowing when occurring.
In Chapter 9 a number of preliminary definitions and results are given. In Chapter
10 the modal language G,H, [d] interpreted on R is considered. In Section 11.1 we
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study the complexity of the validity problem for this language interpreted on R. In
Section 11.2 we prove that the logic of this language interpreted on R is not strongly
complete. In Section 11.3 we provide a finite set of axioms for this logic. In Section
11.4 we prove that the axioms are sound. In Section 11.5 we prove that this logic is not
Kripke complete (and consequently that it fails the finite model property). Finally, in
Chapter 12 we prove that the axioms are complete.
The content of Part II is based on the following paper:
[46] Alberto Gatto. On the Priorean temporal logic with [d] on the real line. Journal
of Logic and Computation, 26(3):1019–1041, 2016.
8.2 Related Works
In this section we illustrate some related works.
8.2.1 Coderivative operator [d]
The semantics of the coderivative operator [d] on topological spaces is generalized to
the following definition: a formula [d]ϕ is true at a point x provided ϕ is satisfied at all
y ∈ O \ {x} for some open set O containing x.
The coderivative operator is strictly more expressive than the  operator and, for
every formula ϕ, ϕ is equivalent to [d]ϕ ∧ ϕ. Modal logics with only the coderiva-
tive operator (call them d-logics) have long been of interest. Let us list a number of
significant results on d-logics.
Logics with the coderivative operator, although already suggested by McKinsey
and Tarski in [71, 1944], have been studied firstly by Esakia and the ‘Georgian School’
from the 1970s. In [30, 1976] and [32, 2001], Esakia proved that wK4 := K +
〈d〉〈d〉p → p ∨ 〈d〉p is the d-logic of the class of all topological spaces. In [30, 1976]
and [32, 2001], Esakia proved that K4 is the d-logic of the class of all Td spaces. In
[31, 1981], Esakia proved that the d-logic of the class of all scattered spaces is GL. We
could not access [30, 1976], [32, 2001], or [31, 1981], but their results are cited, for
example, by Esakia himself in [33], and by Kudinov and Shehtman in [64].
In [3, 1987], [1, 1988] and [15, 1990], Abashidze and Blass gave a complete de-
scription of the d-logics of ordinals with the interval topology. We have that K + [d]⊥
is the d-logic of any finite ordinal with the interval topology, that GL + [d]n⊥ is the
logic of any ordinal ωn−1 ≤ α < ωn for n ≤ 1, and that GL is the d-logic of any ordinal
α ≥ ωω. Again, we could not access [2, 3, 1987] or [1, 1988], but their results are cited
by Kudinov and Shehtman in [64].
In [85, 1990], Shehtman proved that the d-logic of any dense-in-itself 0-dimensional
separable metric space, for example Q, is KD4. Another proof of this result for Q was
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given by Lucero-Bryan in [69, 2011]. In [85, 1990], Shehtman proved that, for all
n ≥ 2, the d-logic of Rn is KD4G1:=KD4 + [d](p ∨ ¬p) → [d]p ∨ [d]¬p (with
ϕ abbreviating ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ). Another proof of this result is given by Kudinov and She-
htman in [64, 2014]. In [85, 1990] Shehtman conjectured that the d-logic of R is
KD4G2 := KD4 + [d](
∨
i∈3 ϕi) → ∨i∈3[d]¬ϕi (where ϕi is pi ∧ ∧ j∈3\{i} ¬p j, with
p0, p1, p2 distinct propositional variables). Shehtman then proved this conjecture in
[88, 2000]. Another proof of this was given by Lucero-Bryan in [70, 2011]. In [88,
2000], Shehtman proved that the d-logic of the class of all 0-dimensional separable
metric spaces is K4, and that the d-logic of any dense-in itself separable metric space
is KD4. Again, we could not access [88, 2000] but its results are cited by Kudinov and
Shehtman in [64].
In [8, 2010], G. Bezhanishvili, Esakia and Gabelaia proved that the d-logic of
the class of all Stone spaces is K4, that so is the d-logic of the class of all compact
Hausdorff spaces, that the d-logic of the class of all weakly scattered Stone spaces is
K4G = K4 + ¬[d]⊥ → 〈d〉[d]⊥, and that so is the d-logic of the class of all weakly
scattered compact Hausdorff spaces.
In [11, 2011], Bezhanishvili, Esakia and Gabelaia showed p ∧ 〈d〉(q ∧ 〈d〉p) →
〈d〉p ∨ 〈d〉(q ∧ 〈d〉q) d-defines T0, and that the d-logic of the class of all T0-spaces is
wK4 + p ∧ 〈d〉(q ∧ 〈d〉p) → 〈d〉p ∨ 〈d〉(q ∧ 〈d〉q), strictly between wK4 and K4; they
showed that this logic is also the logic of the class of all spectral spaces, and enjoy the
finite model property; finally they showed that the separation axioms T1, T2, T3 and T4
are not d-definable.
As mentioned, in [88, 2000], Shehtman showed that the d-logic of R is KD4G2.
Another proof of this result has been given by Lucero-Bryan in [70, 2011]. In this latter
paper, 〈d〉 is also considered together the universal ∀ modality. ∀ϕ holds provided ϕ
holds everywhere. It is shown that KD4Gn.UC has the finite model property, and that
KD4G2.UC is the resulting logic of the real line. Axioms G1, G2 and, more generally,
for all natural numbers n ≥ 2, axioms:
Gn := [d](
∨
i∈(n+1)
ϕni )→
∨
i∈(n+1)
[d]¬ϕni ,
where ϕni is pi ∧
∧
j∈(n+1)\{i} ¬p j, with p0, p1..., pn distinct propositional variables, have
been introduced by Shehtman in [85, 1990] where he showed that a transitive Kripke
frame validates G1 if and only if it is locally 1-connected. Again in [70, 2011], Lucero-
Bryan showed that, for all natural numbers n ≥ 2, a transitive Kripke frame validates Gn
if and only if it is locally n-connected (see §9.2 for the definition of n-connectedness).
In this part, we will use Axiom G2. Axiom C := ∀(p ∨ ¬p) → ∀p ∨ ∀¬p defines
connected spaces (observe that C can be expressed by  and ∀ already, and see [87]
for a proof with [d] replaced by ).
In [10, 2012], G. Bezhanishvili and Lucero-Bryan proved that every extension of
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K4 by a set of variable-free axioms is a d-logic of some subspace of Q. This gives a
continuum of d-logics of countable metric spaces.
In [62, 2013], Kudinov augmented the language with the difference operator [,].
For all formulas ϕ, [,]ϕ holds at x provided for all y , x we have that ϕ holds at y. He
showed that the logic of the resulting language interpreted on R has the finite model
property but no finite axiomatization. Note that the G and H operators considered in
this paper can be seen as a ‘splitting’ of the difference operator, with, for all formulas ϕ,
Gϕ meaning ‘ϕ holds everywhere after’ and Hϕ meaning ‘ϕ holds everywhere before’,
so that [,]ϕ is equivalent to Hϕ ∧Gϕ.
In [64, 2014], Kudinov and Shehtman axiomatized the logic with 〈d〉 and [,] of
the class of all spaces, of the class of all T1 spaces, of the class of all dense-in-
themselves spaces, of any 0-dimensional dense-in-itself separable metric space, and
of Rn for n ≥ 2. They also proved that the d-logic of the class of all trivial spaces is
DL := wK4 + 〈d〉[d]p → p, and that DL is not the logic of any trivial space. In [63,
2010] Kudinov and Shapirovsky proved that the d-logic of any infinite trivial space is
not finitely axiomatizable. We could not access [63, 2010], but its results are cited by
Kudinov and Shehtman in [64, 2014].
The d-logics of special types of spaces are also studied in [7, 2005] by G. Bezhanishvili,
Esakia and Gabelaia, and in [69, 2011] by Lucero-Bryan. They include submaximal,
perfectly disconnected, maximal, weakly scattered and some others.
8.2.2 G,H on the real numbers
Interest in the logic of the temporal language G,H interpreted on R has been shown by
Bull in [18, 1968] in which an axiomatization is provided. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this seems to be the first axiomatization of this logic. In [84, 1970], Segerberg
gave a different proof.
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Chapter 9
Preliminaries
In this chapter we give some preliminary definitions and results. They will be used
throughout the rest of Part II.
9.1 Clusters
In this section we introduce the mathematical structures called ‘clusters’. They are
substructures of relational structures and they satisfy certain properties. They will play
a pervasive role in Chapter 12.
For every tuple A = (A,R), where A is a set and R a binary relation on A, an
R-cluster (of A) is a non-empty subset of A, ⊆-maximal among those subsets C of
A such that for every two a, b ∈ C we have aRb. An element a ∈ A is said to be
R-q-maximal provided, for every b ∈ A, aRb implies bRa. An R-cluster is said to be
maximal provided every a ∈ C is R-q-maximal. It is straightforward to check that:
Proposition 9.1. 1. If R is transitive and a ∈ A is R-reflexive, then C(a) := {b ∈
A | aRbRa} is the only R-cluster ofA containing a.
2. If a ∈ A is also R-q-maximal then C(a) is a maximal R-cluster ofA.
A has the Zorn Property (with respect to R) provided for every a ∈ A, there is b ∈ A
with aRb and b is R-q-maximal.
9.2 Connectedness
In this section we introduce the notions of ‘connectedness’ and, for every n ∈ N, of
‘local n-connectedness’. These properties apply to relational structures, in particular
to clusters. Clusters that are connected and locally 2-connected will be important in
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Chapter 12, in particular in the construction of Section 12.3.
Consider a tupleA = (A,R), where A is a set and R a binary relation on A. Consider
two elements a, b ∈ A. Call an R-path (between a, b) every finite sequence a0, a1, ..., an
of elements of A such that a = a0, b = an and, for every i = 0, 1, ..., n, we have aiRrai+1
(recall that Rr denotes the reflexive closure of R). Define R˜ := R∪R−1. A is connected
provided for every two elements a, b ∈ A, there is an R˜-path between a and b. A subset
of A is called a connected component ofA provided it is ⊆-maximal among the subsets
B of A such that (B,RB) is connected. Observe that a subset of A is a connected
component if and only if it is connected and R˜-generated. For all natural numbers
n ≥ 2,A is said to be locally n-connected provided for every a ∈ A, (R(a),RR(a)) has
at most n connected components.
Example 9.2. Consider the infinite binary tree T 2 := (<N2,⊂) of Example 4.3. T 2
is connected and, for every n > 1, locally n-connected. However, T 2 is not locally
1-connected.
()
(0) (1)
(0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
Figure 9.1: Infinite binary tree T 2
9.3 Filtrations
In this section, we introduce the notion of ‘filtration’. This notion will be used to define
the modelM2 in Section 12.2.3.
Definition 9.3. For every Kripke modelM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V), w, v ∈ W, and Ψ ⊆ LΦ,τ,
define:
1. w ≡M
Ψ
v provided, for every ϕ ∈ Ψ, we haveM,w |= ϕ if and only ifM, v |= ϕ.
2. For every i ∈ I, wRiΨv provided, for every iϕ ∈ Ψ, ifM,w |= iϕ thenM, v |=
ϕ.
Definition 9.4. For every two Kripke modelsM = (W, {Ri}i∈I ,V) andM′ = (W ′, {R′i}i∈I ,
V ′), Ψ ⊆ LΦ,τ closed under taking subformulas, and h : W → W ′ a surjective map,M′
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is called a filtration ofM through (Ψ, h) provided, for every w, v ∈ W, and i ∈ I, the
following conditions hold:
1. For every p ∈ Φ ∩ Ψ, we have V ′(p) = h(V(p)).
2. h(w) = h(v) implies w ≡M
Ψ
v.
3i. wRiv implies h(w)R′ih(v).
4i. h(w)R′ih(v) implies wRiΨv.
Proposition 9.5. (Filtration Lemma.) IfM′ = (W ′, {R′i}i∈I ,V ′) is a filtration ofM =
(W, {Ri}i∈I ,V) through (Ψ, h), then, for every ϕ ∈ Ψ, and w ∈ W, we haveM,w |= ϕ if
and only ifM′, h(w) |= ϕ.
Proof. See [86, Lemma 3.2]. 
78
Chapter 10
Language and semantics
Let Φ be a countably infinite set, and τ := {G,H, [d]}. Throughout Part II, we will work
with the language L := LΦ,τ. Let F := ¬G¬, P := ¬H¬, and 〈d〉 := ¬[d]¬. For every
ϕ ∈ L, let ϕ := ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ, and _ϕ := ¬¬ϕ.
10.1 Semantics
Let (R, <) denote the real line with the usual order. We may refer to (R, <) by just
saying R. In this section we define how L will be interpreted on R. Call a model every
tuple (R,V) such that V : Φ → P(R) is a function called evaluation. Let R be the
class of all models. For every R = (R,V) ∈ R, x ∈ R, and ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, define R, x |= ϕ
recursively as follows:
• R, x |= > always.
• R, x |= p provided p ∈ V(x).
• R, x |= ¬ϕ provided not R, x |= ϕ.
• R, x |= ϕ ∧ ψ provided R, x |= ϕ and R, x |= ψ.
• R, x |= Gϕ provided, for every y > x, R, y |= ϕ.
• R, x |= Hϕ provided, for every y < x, R, y |= ϕ.
• R, x |= [d]ϕ provided there are y, z ∈ R such that y < x < z and, for every
t ∈ (y, z) \ {x}, R, t |= ϕ.
Additionally, we report the semantics of the modal operator  of [53] as follows:
• R, x |= ϕ provided there are y, z ∈ R such that y < x < z and for every t ∈ (y, z),
R, t |= ϕ.
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Observe that  differs from [d] inasmuch as  quantifies also on the point at which the
formula is evaluated, whereas [d] ignores such a point. Observe that, for every ϕ ∈ L,
R ∈ R, and x ∈ R, we have R, x |= ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ if and only if R, x |= ϕ if and only if
R, x |= ϕ. In fact, L is strictly more expressive than the language of [53].
Analogously to Section 2.3, for every R ∈ R, and ϕ ∈ L, we say that R satisfies ϕ
provided there is x ∈ R such that R, x |= ϕ.
We say that ϕ is satisfiable provided there is a model satisfying ϕ, and that ϕ is
valid provided ¬ϕ is not satisfiable. Let LR be the set of all valid formulas. LR is a
normal modal logic (see Section 2.4).
For every model R, and Γ ⊆ L, we say that R satisfies Γ provided there is x ∈ R
such that, for every γ ∈ Γ, we have R, x |= γ. We say that Γ is satisfiable provided there
is a model satisfying Γ.
For every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, we say that Γ semantically entails ϕ, notation Γ |= ϕ,
provided, for every model R, and x ∈ R, if, for every γ ∈ Γ, R, x |= γ, then R, x |= ϕ.
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Chapter 11
Study of LR
In this and the following chapter, we study LR. In Section 11.1, we study the complexity
of the problem of deciding membership to LR - that is, the validity problem for L on R.
In Section 11.2, we prove that LR lacks strong completeness. In Section 11.3, we give
a finite set Λd of axioms. In Section 11.4, we prove that the smallest normal modal
logic Ld containing Λ is sound with respect to LR - that is, Ld ⊆ LR. In Section 11.5, we
prove that LR lacks Kripke completeness. In Chapter 12, we prove that Ld is complete
with respect to LR - i.e. Ld ⊇ LR. And then, that Λd axiomatizes Ld - that is, Ld = LR.
11.1 Complexity of LR
In this section we study the complexity of the problem of deciding membership to LR -
that is, the validity problem for L on R. More precisely, we prove that:
Theorem 11.1. (Cf. [53, Theorem 4.1].) The validity problem for L on R is PSPACE-
complete.
We follow the proof of [53, Theorem 4.1]. Let us introduce the operators U (Until) and
S (Since) of [55]. For every R = (R,V) ∈ R, x ∈ R, and ϕ, ψ ∈ LΦ,τ, define:
• R, x |= U(ϕ, ψ) provided there is y such that x < y, R, y |= ϕ, and, for every
z ∈ (x, y), R, z |= ψ.
• R, x |= S (ϕ, ψ) provided there is y such that x > y, R, y |= ϕ, and, for every
z ∈ (y, x), R, z |= ψ.
In [53, Theorem 4.1], they use the fact that ψ can be expressed by S (>, ψ) ∧ ψ ∧
U(>, ψ), whereas here we use the fact that [d]ψ can be expressed by S (>, ψ)∧U(>, ψ).
Also, for every ϕ ∈ L, let ∀ϕ be the abbreviation for ϕ ∧ ¬U(¬ϕ,>) ∧ ¬S (¬ϕ,>).
Observe that, for every ψ ∈ L, every model R, and every x ∈ R, we have that R, x |= ∀ψ
if and only if, for every y ∈ R, R, y |= ψ.
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Fix ϕ ∈ L. For every ψ ≤ ϕ, introduce a new propositional atom qψ and define the
formula ψ̂ recursively as follows:
1. >̂ := ∀q>;
2. p̂ := ∀(qp ↔ p);
3. ¬̂χ := ∀(q¬χ ↔ ¬qχ);
4. χ̂ ∧ ζ := ∀(qχ∧ζ ↔ qχ ∧ qζ);
5. F̂χ := ∀(qFχ ↔ U(qχ,>));
6. P̂χ := ∀(qPχ ↔ S (qχ,>));
7. [̂d]χ := ∀(q[d]χ ↔ U(>, qχ) ∧ S (>, qχ)).
For every ψ ≤ ϕ, define:
ψ∗ :=
∧
χ≤ψ
χ̂ ∧ qψ. (11.1)
In (11.1) we translate a formula ψ ∈ L into a brand new propositional atom qψ
conjuncted with the recursive definition of the representation qχ of every subformula
χ ≤ ψ. This recursive definition set qχ to hold exactly where χ holds. Because of this,
we can prove by induction that:
Proposition 11.2. ϕ is satisfiable on R if and only if ϕ∗ is satisfiable on R.
Proof. First a preliminary lemma:
Lemma 11.3. For every evaluation function V : Φ∪{qψ |ψ ≤ ϕ} → P(R), the following
statements are equivalent:
1. For every ψ ≤ ϕ, and every x ∈ R, we have (R,V), x |= qψ if and only if
(R,V), x |= ψ.
2. For every ψ ≤ ϕ, and every x ∈ R, we have (R,V), x |= ψ̂.
Proof. We begin by proving that 1 implies 2. We report the most interesting cases.
Assume that ψ is p ∈ Φ. By 1, for every x ∈ R, we have (R,V), x |= ∀(qp ↔ p). We
conclude by observing that p̂ is ∀(qp ↔ p).
Assume that ψ is ¬χ. Consider an arbitrary x. Suppose that (R,V), x |= q¬χ. By
1, this is equivalent to (R,V), x |= ¬qχ. Then, (R,V), x |= q¬χ ↔ ¬qχ. Then, by
arbitrariness of x, for every x ∈ R, we have (R,V), x |= ∀(q¬χ ↔ ¬qχ). We conclude
by observing that ¬̂χ is ∀(q¬χ ↔ ¬qχ).
Assume that ψ is [d]χ. Consider an arbitrary x. Suppose that (R,V), x |= q[d]χ. By
1, this is equivalent to (R,V), x |= [d]χ. By semantics, this is equivalent to (R,V), x |=
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U(>, χ) ∧ S (>, χ). By 1, this is equivalent to (R,V), x |= U(>, qχ) ∧ S (>, qχ). Then,
(R,V), x |= q[d]χ ↔ U(>, qχ) ∧ S (>, qχ). Then, by arbitrariness of x, for every x ∈ R,
we have (R,V), x |= ∀(q[d]χ ↔ U(>, qχ) ∧ S (>, qχ)). We conclude by observing that
[̂d]χ is ∀(q[d]χ ↔ U(>, qχ) ∧ S (>, qχ)).
We now prove, by induction on the complexity of ψ, that 2 implies 1. We report
the most interesting cases. Assume that ψ is p ∈ Φ. Consider an arbitrary x. By 2,
(R,V), x |= qp is equivalent to (R,V), x |= p.
Assume that ψ is ¬χ. Consider an arbitrary x. By 2, (R,V), x |= q¬χ is equivalent
to (R,V), x |= ¬qχ. And, by inductive hypothesis, (R,V), x |= ¬qχ is equivalent to
(R,V), x |= ¬χ.
Assume that ψ is [d]χ. Consider an arbitrary x. By 2, (R,V), x |= q[d]χ is equiv-
alent to (R,V), x |= U(>, qχ) ∧ S (>, qχ). Now, by inductive hypothesis, (R,V), x |=
U(>, qχ)∧ S (>, qχ) is equivalent to (R,V), x |= U(>, χ)∧ S (>, χ). And, by semantics,
(R,V), x |= U(>, χ) ∧ S (>, χ) is equivalent to (R,V), x |= [d]χ. 
Now, let us prove that ϕ is satisfiable on R if and only if ϕ∗ is satisfiable on R.
Assume that ϕ is satisfiable on R. Then there is an evaluation function V : Φ → P(R)
and x ∈ R such that (R,V), x |= ϕ. Define an evaluation function V ′ : Φ ∪ {qψ |ψ ≤
ϕ} → P(R) as follows:
1. For every p ∈ Φ, define V ′(p) := V(p).
2. For every qχ ∈ {qψ |ψ ≤ ϕ}, define V ′(qχ) := {y ∈ R | (R,V), y |= χ}.
Observe that V ′ satisfies Condition 1 of Lemma 11.3. Then, by Lemma 11.3, (R,V ′), x |=∧
ψ≤ϕ ψ̂. Moreover, by definition of V ′, we have (R,V ′), x |= qϕ. We conclude by ob-
serving that ϕ∗ is
∧
ψ≤ϕ ψ̂ ∧ qϕ.
Assume that ϕ∗ is satisfiable on R. Then there is an evaluation function V : Φ ∪
{qψ |ψ ≤ χ} → P(R) and x ∈ R such that (R,V), x |= ϕ∗. By definition of ϕ∗, we have
that (R,V), x |= qϕ and V satisfies Condition 2 of Lemma 11.3. Then, by Lemma 11.3,
(R,V), x |= ϕ. Then, (R,VΦ), x |= ϕ. 
Observe that L could be translated into L{U,S } in a perhaps more intuitive way - that
is, noting that any Fχ ∈ L can be expressed by U(χ,>) ∈ L{U,S }, and any [d]χ ∈ L
can be expressed by U(>, χ)∧ S (>, χ) ∈ L{U,S }. The reason why we use the translation
given by (11.1) is that we want to prove that:
Proposition 11.4. ϕ∗ is constructible from ϕ in polynomial time in the length of ϕ.
Observe that, if instead of using the translation given by (11.1), we translated L into
L{U,S } expressing, for example, any [d]ψ ∈ L by U(>, ψ)∧S (>, ψ), we would have that,
for certain formulas in L, the translation would run in more than polynomial time. For
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example, consider:
ψ = [d]...[d]︸   ︷︷   ︸
n times
p
for some p ∈ Φ. A bit of thought shows that, by expressing every [d]ψ ∈ L by U(>, ψ)∧
S (>, ψ), we would obtain a formula with 2n occurrences of p.
Sketch of the proof of Proposition 11.4. Let n be the length of ϕ. By classical argu-
ments, we can represent ϕ in a convenient Turing machine as a string of length polyno-
mial in n. For every subformula ψ of ϕ, write a string representing ψ̂. By definition of ψ̂,
ψ̂ has length polynomial in the length of ϕ. By classical arguments, we can represent
ψ̂ as a string with length polynomial in n. Then, we can write such a representation
in polynomial time in n. The number of subformulas of ϕ is also polynomial in n.
Then, we can write the representation of all ψ̂ in polynomial time in n. Now, it is just a
matter of representing the conjunction of all the ψ̂ and qϕ. Again, this can be done in
polynomial time in n. We conclude that ϕ∗ can be written in polynomial time in n. 
Now, by Propositions 11.2 and 11.4, the satisfiability problem for L on R reduces
to the satisfiability problem for L{U,S } onR. The latter has been shown to be PSPACE in
[81]. Then, the satisfiability problem for L onR is PSPACE. Then, the validity problem
for L on R is PSPACE as well.
Similarly, given ϕ ∈ LΦ,{}, we can define a formula ϕ∗ ∈ L such that ϕ is satisfiable
on R if and only if ϕ∗ is satisfiable on R, and ϕ∗ is constructible from ϕ in polynomial
time. More precisely, introduce a new propositional atom qψ for each subformula ψ of
ϕ and define the formula ψ̂ as follows, where ∀ψ is the abbreviation for ψ ∧Gψ ∧ Hψ:
1. >̂ := ∀q>;
2. p̂ := ∀(qp ↔ p) for every p ∈ Φ;
3. ¬̂ψ := ∀(q¬ψ ↔ ¬qψ);
4. ψ̂ ∧ χ := ∀(qψ∧χ ↔ qψ ∧ qχ);
5. ̂ψ := ∀(qψ ↔ qψ ∧ [d]qψ).
Then, the satisfiability problem for LΦ,{} on R is reducible to the satisfiability problem
for L on R. Then, the validity problem for LΦ,{} on R reduces to the validity problem
for L on R. Then, since the former is PSPACE-hard (for, the set of all valid formulas
of LΦ,{} is S4 [71] and S4 is PSPACE-hard [13, Chapter 6]), the latter is PSPACE-hard
as well.
In conclusion, the validity problem for L on R is PSPACE-complete, proving The-
orem 11.1
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11.2 Lack of strong completeness for LR
In this section we study the strong completeness of LR. We say that LR is strongly
complete provided for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, we have that Γ |= ϕ implies Γ `LR ϕ (see
Section 2.4 for the definition of `LR ). More precisely, we prove that:
Theorem 11.5. (Cf. [53, Theorem 4.2].) LR is not strongly complete.
Proof. We follow the proof of [53, Theorem 4.2]. Consider the following set of for-
mulas:
Σ := {p,
F(r ∧G¬r),
G(r ∨ Fr → p ∨ q),
F(¬p ∧ F(¬q ∧ F(¬p ∧ F(... ∧ Fr ))...)︸︷︷︸
n brackets
| for each natural n ≥ 1}.
It can easily be proved that every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable on R. We show that
Σ is not satisfiable on R. Suppose by contradiction that Σ is satisfiable in some model
(R,V). Then, without loss of generality, we can assume that Σ is satisfiable at 0 and
r ∧ G¬r at 1. Then, by the first and third formulas, for every x ∈ [0, 1], there is an
open interval Ix containing x and such that Ix ⊆ V(p) or Ix ⊆ V(q). By the Heine-Borel
Theorem, [0, 1] is compact. Then, there exists n ∈ N and x0, ..., xn−1 ∈ [0, 1] such
that [0, 1] ⊆ ⋃i∈n Ixi . By the last set of formulas, there are y0, ..., yn ∈ [0, 1] such that
y0 < y1 < ... < yn and yi < V(p) if i is even and yi < V(q) if i is odd. Then, by the
pigeonhole principle, there exist i, j ∈ n such that yi, yi+1 ∈ Ix j . Now, Ix j ⊆ V(p) or
Ix j ⊆ V(q), a contradiction.
Assume by contradiction that LR is strongly complete. The non satisfiability of Σ
on R yields Σ |= ⊥. Then, by strong completeness of LR, we get Σ `LR ⊥. Then, by
definition, there are σ0, ...σn−1 ∈ Σ such that `LR ∧i∈n σi → ⊥. Then, by definition of
LR, we have that
∧
i∈n σi → ⊥ is valid on R. But this is against the finite satisfiability
of Σ on R. 
11.3 Axioms for LR
In this section we present a finite set Λd of axioms. In Section 11.4, we prove that
the smallest normal modal logic Ld containing Λd is sound with respect to LR (that
is, Ld ⊆ LR). In Chapter 12, we prove that Ld is complete with respect to LR (that is,
Ld ⊇ LR). Then, we obtain that Λd axiomatizes Ld (that is, Ld = LR).
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Let p, q be distinct propositional variables, p0, p1, p2 be distinct propositional vari-
ables, and, for every i ∈ 3, ϕi be pi ∧∧ j∈{0,1,2}\{i} ¬p j. Consider the following set Λd of
formulas.
1. All propositional tautologies.
2. Axioms for G and H (dense linear order without endpoints):
(a) G(p→ q)→ (Gp→ Gq) normality;
(b) Gp→ GGp transitivity: ∀xyz(x @ y ∧ y @ z→ x @ z);
(c) GGp→ Gp density: ∀xy(x @ y→ ∃z(x @ z @ y));
(d) p→ GPp ∀xy(x @ y→ y A x);
(e) FPp→ p ∨ F p ∨ Pp ∀xyz(x @ y ∧ y A z→ x = z ∨ x @ z ∨ x A z).
3. Axioms for [d]:
(a) [d](p→ q)→ ([d]p→ [d]q) normality;
(b) [d]p→ [d][d]p transitivity: ∀xyz(xRy ∧ yRz→ xRz).
4. Shehtman’s ‘special axioms’ adapted for [d] (cf. [86, pp. 257-258]).
(a) Hp ∧Gp→ [d]p ∀xy(xRy→ x A y ∨ x @ y);
(b) Gp→ G[d]p ∀xyz(x @ y ∧ yRz→ x @ z);
(c) p ∧Gp ∧ [d]p→ [d]Gp ∀xyz(xRy ∧ y @ z→ x v z ∨ xRz);
(d) [d]p→ F p seriality: ∀x∃y(x @ y ∧ xRy).
5. F(p ∧ Fq) ∧ F(¬p ∧ Fq)→ F(_p ∧ _¬p ∧ Fq).
6. Shehtman’s Axiom G2: [d](
∨
i∈3 ϕi)→ ∨i∈3[d]¬ϕi.
7. All mirror images of the above axioms (swap G with H and F with P; and @with
A in the first order formulas on the right of the axioms).
The first order formulas on the right of the axioms are their Sahlqvist correspondents.
Given a formula ϕ with a Sahlqvist correspondent ψ, a Kripke frame validates ϕ if and
only if it validates ψ (see [13, Chapter 3]).
Comparison with axioms in [53, §3.1]: our axioms for G and H are the same as
in [53, §3.1]. And so are our first two axioms for [d] (normality and transitivity) with
respect to [53, §3.1]’s axioms for . However, unlike in [53, §3.1], we do not have a
reflexivity axiom for [d]. Indeed, because of the semantics of [d], such an axiom would
not be sound on R. Also, our Shehtman’s Axioms 4a and 4c are slightly different from
the respective Shehtman’s axioms in [53, §3.1]. Again, this difference are due to the
different semantics of [d] and  on R. Then, we have Axiom 5, which is equivalent to
86
the respective axiom F(p ∧ Fq) ∧ F(¬p ∧ Fq) → F(^p ∧ ^¬p ∧ Fq) in [53, §3.1].
Again, observe that, if we took F(p ∧ Fq) ∧ F(¬p ∧ Fq)→ F(〈d〉p ∧ 〈d〉¬p ∧ Fq) as
Axiom 5, we would obtain an axiom which is not sound on R. Finally, unlike in [53,
§3.1], we also have Axiom 6. Axiom 6 will be used in Section 12.2.3.
Let Ld be the smallest normal logic containing Λd (plainly existing). We will show
that Ld is sound (Ld ⊆ LR) and complete (Ld ⊇ LR) with respect to LR. Then, LR is
axiomatized by Λd (LR = Ld). But first observe:
Proposition 11.6. If we replace  with , the axioms of [53, §3.1] belong to Ld and
the inference rules of [53, §3.1] preserve membership of Ld.
Proof. The axioms of [53] in which  does not occur belong to Λd. Axiom 5 of [53]
belongs to Λd with  replaced by . The inference rules of [53], except for the  case
of generalization, plainly preserve membership to Ld. As for the remaining axioms of
[53], consider, for example, p→ p. We want to prove that p→ p ∈ Ld - that
is:
p ∧ [d]p→ p ∧ [d]p ∧ [d](p ∧ [d]p) ∈ Ld.
By our Axiom 3b, [d]p → [d][d]p ∈ Ld. Then, p ∧ [d]p → p ∧ [d]p ∧ [d][d]p ∈ Ld.
Moreover, since L is a normal modal logic, [d]ϕ ∧ [d]ψ → [d](ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ Ld. Then,
p ∧ [d]p → p ∧ [d]p ∧ [d](p ∧ [d]p) ∈ Ld, as desired. Similar arguments yield the
remaining axioms. As for the  case of generalization, suppose that ϕ ∈ Ld. Then, by
our generalization, [d]ϕ ∈ Ld. Then ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ ∈ Ld, as desired. 
Corollary 11.7. The following formulas belong to Ld:
1. F> and P>.
2. G¬p ∧ HF p→ _p.
3. The Prior Axiom Fq ∧ FG¬q→ F(G¬q ∧ HFq), and its mirror image.
Proof. The formulas F>, P>, G¬p ∧ HF p → _p, the Prior Axiom, and its mirror
image belong to the logic L of [53]. Then, by Proposition 11.6, they belong to Ld. In
proving that the Prior Axiom belongs to L, Axiom 5, with_ replaced by^, is used. 
11.4 Soundness of Ld
Proposition 11.8. Ld is sound with respect to R.
Proof. Except perhaps for Axiom 6, it can easily be proved that all other axioms of
Λd are valid on R. Let us prove that Axiom 6 is valid on R. We proceed as in [85,
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Lemma 31]. Suppose by contradiction that it is not. Then, its negation: [d](
∨
i∈2 ϕi)∧∧
i∈2[d]ϕi is satisfiable on R. Then, there is a model R, and x ∈ R such that:
R, x |= [d](
∨
i∈3
ϕi), (11.2)
R, x |=
∧
i∈3
〈d〉ϕi. (11.3)
For every ϕ ∈ L, let ||ϕ|| := {y ∈ R | (R,V), y |= ϕ}. For every A ⊆ R, call an
interior point of A every a ∈ A such that there is an open interval I (that is, an interval
of the form (x, y) for some reals x < y) such that a ∈ I and I ⊆ A. Let int(A) :=
{a ∈ A | a interior point of A}. Observe that, by semantics, for every ϕ ∈ L, we have
||ϕ|| = int(||ϕ||). Then, by (11.2), there is an open interval I such that x ∈ I and
I \{x} ⊆ ⋃i∈3 int(||ϕi||). Moreover, by (11.3), for every i ∈ 3, we have (I \{x})∩||ϕi|| , ∅.
Finally, by definition of the formulas ϕi, for every pair of distinct i, j ∈ 3, we have
int(||ϕi||) ∩ int(||ϕ j||) = ∅. Then, {int(||ϕi||) ∩ (I \ {x}) | i ∈ 3} is a partition of I \ {x} into
three non empty open sets. But this is a contradiction, since, for every open interval I
of R, and x ∈ I, I \ {x} can be partitioned in at most two non empty open sets (this is
nothing else than local 2-connectedness in topological settings).
In conclusion, all axioms of Λd are valid on R. Moreover, observe that modus
ponens, uniform substitution and generalization preserve validity on R. Soundness,
then, easily follows. 
11.5 Lack of Kripke completeness for LR
In this section we prove that LR is not Kripke complete. Recall that a modal logic L is
Kripke complete (respectively, has the finite model property) provided there is a class
K of (resp. finite) Kripke frames such that L is equal to the set of all formulas that are
valid in every Kripke frame in K.
A Kripke frame (for L) is of the form (W,@,A,R) (see Section 2.3). @ interprets
G, A interprets H, and R interprets [d]. When we present a Kripke frame as (W,@,R),
that is, omitting A, we tacitly assume A defined as @−1. For example, if we consider
a Kripke frame F = (W,@,A,R) that validates all the axioms of Λd, then by Axiom
2d, we have that A is @−1, so it is convenient to present F as (W,@,R). Moreover, by
Axiom 2b, we have that @ is transitive. However, unlike in [53], @ is not necessarily
reflexive. Given a binary relation @ on a set W, define v as the reflexive closure of @.
Let us begin with the following preliminary proposition:
Proposition 11.9. (Cf. [53, Lemma 4.3].) Let F = (W,@,R) be a Kripke frame that
validates all the axioms of Λd. Let w, u, x ∈ W be such that w @ u, w @ x, and ¬(x @ u).
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Then, there exists y ∈ W such that w @ y, ¬(y @ u), and yRru.
Proof. We follow the proof of [53, Lemma 4.3]. Consider an evaluation V on F such
that h(p) = {u} and letM = (W,@,R,V). Since ¬(x @ u), we haveM, x |= G¬p. Then,
since w @ {u, x}, we have M,w |= F p ∧ FG¬p. Now, F validates all the axioms of
Λd, and frame-validities are preserved by modus ponens, generalization, and uniform
substitution. Then, since, by Corollary 11.7(3), the Prior Axiom belongs to Ld, we have
that the Prior Axiom is valid on F . Then,M,w |= F(G¬p ∧ HF p). Then, there exists
y ∈ W such that:
M, y |= G¬p ∧ HF p. (11.4)
Then, ¬(y @ u). Moreover, by (11.4) and Corollary 11.7(2), we have M, y |= _p.
Then, by definition of V , we have yRru. 
We are now ready to prove:
Proposition 11.10. (Cf. [53, Lemma 4.4].) LR is not Kripke complete, hence it does
not have the finite model property either.
Proof. We follow the proof of [53, Lemma 4.4]. As the reader may confirm, it is
sufficient to find a formula satisfiable onR and not satisfiable on any Kripke model such
that its underlying frame validates all axioms of Λd. Consider the following formula,
where a and b are propositional variables:
ϑ = H¬a ∧ H¬b ∧ ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ _a ∧ _b ∧G¬(_a ∧ _b) ∧ FG¬a.
Consider an arbitrary evaluation function V : Φ → R such that V(a) = {1/2n | n ∈ N}
and V(b) = {2/3n | n ∈ N}. Plainly (R,V), 0 |= ϑ. Then, ϑ is satisfiable on R.
Consider an arbitrary Kripke modelM = (W,@,R,V) such that its underlying frame
validates the axioms in Λd. Suppose by contradiction that there is w ∈ W such that
M,w |= ϑ. Then,M,w |= _a ∧ _b. Then, there exist u, v ∈ Rr(w) such thatM, u |= a
and M, v |= b. Then, by Axiom 4a if w , u, we have u A w or u v w. Now, since
M,w |= H¬a ∧ ¬a, we have ¬(u v w). Then, we have u A w. Then, since wRrv, by
Axiom 4b if w , v, we have u A v. Similarly, we have u @ v. SinceM,w |= FG¬a,
there exists x ∈ W such that w @ x andM, x |= G¬a. Then, sinceM, u |= a, we have
¬(x @ u). Then, by Proposition 11.9, there exists y ∈ W such that w @ y, ¬(y @ u) and
yRru. Now, since u @ v, by Axiom 4c, we have yRrv ∨ y @ v.
If yRrv, then u, v ∈ Rr(y). Then M, y |= _a ∧ _b. Then, since w @ y, we have
M,w |= F(_a∧_b), a contradiction becauseM,w |= ϑ and G¬(_a∧_b) is a conjunct
of ϑ. If instead we have y @ v, then, since v @ u, we have y @ u, again a contradiction
since ¬(y @ u). 
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Chapter 12
Completeness of Ld
In this chapter we prove that Ld is complete with respect to LR (LR ⊆ Ld). To prove the
completeness of Ld, it is sufficient to show that:
Every Ld-consistent formula ϕ is satisfiable on R. (12.1)
For, consider an arbitrary formula ϕ such that ϕ < Ld. Then, ¬ϕ is Ld-consistent. Then,
by (12.1), ¬ϕ is satisfiable on R. Then, ϕ < LR. Then, by contraposition, LR ⊆ Ld as
desired.
Given an Ld-consistent formula ϕ we might try to produce a finite Kripke model
satisfying ϕ whose frame (W,@,R) is of the following form:
C0 @ u0 @ C1 @ u1 @ ... @ uk−1 @ Ck,
with Ci @-clusters, ui @-irreflexive points and R(ui) = Ci ∪Ci+1.
u0
C0
u1
C1
... uk−1
Ck
Figure 12.1: C0 @ u0 @ C1 @ u1 @ ... @ uk−1 @ Ck
If we require that the @-clusters are connected and locally 2-connected (with respect
to R) then it would be ‘fairly simple’ to build a model on R satisfying ϕ (cf. §12.3).
However, for certain formulas, such a model does not exist. Consider for example
ϑ of the previous section, and suppose that ϑ holds at some world w of such a model.
Since _a∧_b∧G¬(_a∧_b) is a conjunct of ϑ, then w is @-irreflexive. Then, w = ui
for some i < k. Then, since H¬a ∧ H¬b ∧ ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ _a ∧ _b is a conjunct of ϑ, we
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have that a and b are true at some points in Ci+1. Then, since FG¬a is a conjunct of ϑ,
we have Ci+1 , Ck. Then, i + 1 < k and ui+1 is defined. Then, _a ∧ _b is satisfied at
ui+1. This is a contradiction, since ϑ holds at w = ui, and G¬(_a∧_b) is a conjunct of
ϑ.
Then, we consider Kripke models as described above, but we allow @-clusters with
no @-irreflexive points in between, and we require that every two such clusters contain
‘similar’ points (see Definition 12.2(5)). For the moment, call these models ‘well-
behaved’ (see Definition 12.2).
We show that every Ld-consistent formula ϕ is satisfied in a ‘well-behaved’ model.
Then we show that every ‘well-behaved’ model can be turned into a model on R satis-
fying ϕ. The latter result is achieved by using ‘similar’ points to fulfil the ‘gap’ between
@-clusters with no @-irreflexive points in between.
12.1 Ψ-linked models
Let us define what ‘well-behaved’ means for a Kripke model (Definition 12.2). But
first let us give the following preliminary definition:
Definition 12.1. 1. For every set A, and binary relation R on A, R is said to be
prelinear provided, for every a, b ∈ A, we have aRrb or bRa.
2. For every set A, subset B ⊆ A, c ∈ A, and binary relation R on A, define cRB
provided, for every b ∈ B, we have cRb; define BRc provided, for every b ∈ B,
we have bRc.
3. For every Kripke frame F = (W,@,R), an ordered pair (C,D) of @-clusters of F
is called adjacent provided C , D and {u ∈ W |C @ u @ D} = C ∪ D.
4. For every set of formulas Ψ, define BΨ as the set of formulas in Ψ of the form
Gψ, Hψ or [d]ψ.
Definition 12.2. Let Ψ be a set of formulas. We say that a Kripke modelM = (W,@
,R,V) is Ψ-linked provided:
1. W is finite.
2. The frame ofM validates all the axioms of Λd except possibly Axioms 5 and 6.
3. @ is prelinear.
4. For every @-cluster C ⊆ W, (C,RC) is connected and locally 2-connected.
5. For every pair of adjacent @-clusters (C,D), there are R-reflexive points c ∈ C
and d ∈ D such that c ≡MBΨ d (recall that ≡MBΨ was defined in Definition 9.3(2)).
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c ≡MBΨ d
Figure 12.2: Definition 12.2(5)
Ψ-linked models have their frame validating Shehtman’s axioms. This implies a num-
ber of properties of their structure:
Proposition 12.3. (Cf. [53, Lemma 5.5].) Let F = (W,@,R) be a Kripke frame that
validates all the axioms of Λd except possibly Axioms 5 and 6. Let w ∈ W. Then:
1. Every @-cluster in F is an R-generated subset of W.
2. If w is @-reflexive, then R(w) is a subset of the @-cluster {v ∈ W |w @ v @ w}.
3. If w is @-irreflexive, then there are disjoint @-clusters λ(w), ρ(w) such that:
(a) λ(w) @ w @ ρ(w).
(b) R(w) = λ(w) ∪ ρ(w).
(c) For every v ∈ W, we have v @ w if and only if v @ λ(w), and w @ v if and
only if ρ(w) @ v.
w
λ(w) ρ(w)
Figure 12.3: Definition 12.3(3)
Proof. 1. Let C ⊆ W be a @-cluster and let w ∈ C. Then, by Proposition 9.1(1), we
have C = {v ∈ W |w @ v @ w}. Then, by Axiom 4b, C is R-generated.
2. Assume that w is @-reflexive. Then, by Proposition 9.1(1), w belongs to the
@-cluster C = {v ∈ W |w @ v @ w}. By 1, C is R-generated. Then, R(w) ⊆ C.
3. Suppose that w is @-irreflexive. Let:
λ(w) := R(w) ∩ {u ∈ W | u @ w},
ρ(w) := R(w) ∩ {u ∈ W |w @ u}.
By Axiom 4d and its mirror image, we have λ(w) , ∅ and ρ(w) , ∅. As w is @-
irreflexive and, by Axiom 3b, @ is transitive, we also have that λ(w) ∩ ρ(w) = ∅.
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We show that λ(w) is a @-cluster. Consider t ∈ W and u ∈ λ(w). Then, by Axiom
4b and transitivity of @, we have:
t @ w if and only if t @ u. (12.2)
Since λ(w) , ∅, there exists u ∈ λ(w). By (12.2), u is @-reflexive (just take t = u in
(12.2)). Then, by Proposition 9.1(1), the set U := {v ∈ W | u @ v @ u} is a @-cluster. We
show that λ(w) = U. By (12.2), for every t, v ∈ λ(w), we have t @ v. Then λ(w) ⊆ U.
Let us prove that U ⊆ λ(w). Let t ∈ U be arbitrary. Since u @ w, by transitivity of @, we
have t @ w. We also have wRu and u @ t. Then, by Axiom 4c, we have w v t or wRt. If
w @ t, then, since t @ w and @ is transitive, we have w @ w: against the @-irreflexivity
of w. If w = t, then, since t @ w, we have w @ w: again against the assumption that
w is @-irreflexive. Then, wRt. We already have t @ w, so t ∈ λ(w). Then, since t was
arbitrary, we have U ⊆ λ(w) from which λ(w) = U and λ(w) is a @-cluster. Similarly,
we can show that ρ(w) is a cluster as well.
Point (a) follows from the definition of λ(w) and ρ(w). As for point (b), by Axiom
4a, we have R(w) \ {w} = λ(w) ∪ ρ(w). Again by Axiom 4a, if w were R-reflexive then
w would be @-reflexive, against the assumption that w is @-irreflexive. Then w is not
R-reflexive and R(w) = λ(w) ∪ ρ(w) as desired. Point (c) for λ(w) follows from (12.2).
Similarly, we can prove point (c) for ρ(w). 
Comparison with the proof of [53, Lemma 5.5]: The proof is as in [53, Lemma 5.5]
with the following two slight differences in the proof of point (3):
(a) In [53, Lemma 5.5], their axiom 4a (Hp ∧ p ∧ Gp → p) together with the
reflexivity of their R is invoked to obtain R(w) = λ(w)∪ {w} ∪ ρ(w). In our proof,
since our R might be not reflexive, our axiom 4a yields R(w) \ {w} = λ(w)∪ρ(w).
(b) In [53, Lemma 5.5], their axiom 4c (Gp∧ p→ Gp) is invoked to obtain that,
for a certain point t @ w: w @ t or wRt. Our axiom 4c yields the additional case
in which w = t.
We can think of 〈d〉ϕ as expressing the existence of points satisfying ϕ arbitrarily
near:
Remark 12.4. If F = (W,@,R) is a Kripke frame validating all the axioms of Λd
except possibly Axioms 5 and 6, then, as the reader may confirm, by Proposition 12.3,
F validates the following formula:
¬p ∧G¬p→ (HF p↔ 〈d〉p),
and its mirror image.
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Proposition 12.3 tells us that the frame (W,@,R) of a Ψ-linked model M is the
union of finitely many @-clusters C0 @ C1 @ ... @ Ck and irreflexive points ui, for
i ∈ I ⊆ {0, 1, ..., k − 1}, such that Ci = λ(ui) @ ui @ ρ(ui) = Ci+1. There are no
consecutive @-irreflexive points. However we may have two consecutive @-clusters
with no @-irreflexive points in between. When this happens the two @-clusters are
linked by two R-reflexive ≡MBΨ-equivalent points.
12.2 Satisfiability on a Ψ-linked model
Given an Ld-consistent formula ϕ0, let us show that ϕ0 is satisfiable on a Ψ-linked
model, for Ψ an arbitrary finite set containing Pϕ0, closed under negation and closed
under subformulas. The construction, which follows closely that of [53, §6], is in five
steps, delivering five Kripke modelsM0,M1, ...,M4 withM4 a Ψ-linked model.
With the first three models M0-M2, we build a (potentially infinite) model (M2)
such that for every of its @-clusters C we have that (C,RC) is connected and locally
2-connected (plus some other properties).
However, as we are looking for a Ψ-linked model, we would need the model itself to
be finite, not only its @-clusters, plus some other properties (for example, the presence
of ‘similar’ points when needed). We achieve this by following [53, §6.4] and turning
M2 first intoM3 and then intoM4: the desired Ψ-linked model.
The main differences between the construction of [53, §6] and ours are the def-
inition of M0 and the filtration by which M2 is obtained. In [53, §6.1], M0 is the
canonical model for the smallest normal modal logic containing the axioms of [53,
§3.1]. Here, we replace Φ (which is countably infinite) with one of its finite subsets
with enough propositional variables to write the axioms of Λd and ϕ0. Then, we de-
fine M0 as the canonical model for the smallest normal modal logic in the resulting
language containing Λd.
We do this because we follow the construction of [85, §3]. There, it is shown that
KD4G1 has the finite model property. The result is achieved by replacing the set of
propositional variables with a suitable one of its finite subsets and then by filtrating the
resulting canonical model into a finite model whose frame validates KD4G1.
We follow this construction because what we are trying to get is similar: we want
to turn the canonical model into a model (M2) whose @-clusters are finite and locally
2-connected (with respect to R which is already serial and transitive) – that is, a model
whose @-clusters are finite and validating KD4G2.
As it is shown in [70, §5.1], the filtration of [85, §3] can straightforwardly be
adapted to prove that also KD4G2 has the finite model property. Then, we adapt our
filtration (which then becomes different from that of [53, §6.3.1]) in the same way, with
the only further requirement that two points are related by the filtration only if they lie
in the same @-cluster. This is because, unlike in [85, §3] and [70, §5.1], we have to take
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into account also the operators G and H, which we do not want to lose in the process
of filtration. As a result, instead of obtaining a finite model with its frame validating
KD4G2 we obtain a model (M2) whose @-clusters are finite and validating KD4G2.
12.2.1 ModelM0
Let {pi | i ∈ N} be an enumeration of Φ without repetition. For every k ∈ N, let Φk :=
{pi | i ∈ k}, Lk := LΦk ,τ and Lkd := Ld ∩ Lk. Lkd is a normal modal logic in Lk.
Consider k ∈ N such that Λd ∪ {ϕ0} ⊆ Lk. Define M0 = (W0,@0,R0,V0) as the
canonical model for Lkd in L
k.
Since ϕ0 is Ld-consistent, ϕ0 is Lkd-consistent as well. Then, there is Γ0 ∈ W0 with
ϕ0 ∈ Γ0. Moreover:
Proposition 12.5. 1. The frame underlyingM0 validates all the axioms of Λd, ex-
cept possibly Axioms 5 and 6.
2. M0 enjoys the Zorn Property with respect to R0 (cf. [85, Lemma 5]).
Proof. 1. By Sahlqvist Completeness Theorem. 2. We follow [85, Lemma 5]. For
every Γ,∆ ∈ W0, define:
Γ  ∆ if and only if (ΓR0∆ ∧ ¬(∆R0Γ)) ∨ Γ = ∆.
By Proposition 12.5(1), R0 is transitive. Then, for all Γ ∈ W0, we have that (R0(Γ),R0(Γ))
is a partial order.
Since we want to apply the Zorn Lemma, we show that, for every Γ ∈ W0, every
linear subset of (R0(Γ),R0(Γ)) has an upper bound in R0(Γ). Fix an arbitrary Γ ∈ W0
and an arbitrary linear subset Z of (R0(Γ),R0(Γ)). If Z has a maximum, say ∆, then
∆ is an upper bound for Z in R0(Γ). Suppose that Z has no maximum, and define:
S :=
⋃
∆∈Z
{ϕ | [d]ϕ ∈ ∆}.
We show that S is Lkd-consistent. For, consider ϕ0, ..., ϕn−1 ∈ S . Then, for every i =
0, ..., n−1, [d]ϕ ∈ ∆i for some ∆i ∈ Z. Since Z is linear, we can suppose, without loss of
generality, that ∆0  ...  ∆n−1. Since Z has no maximum, we have R0(∆n−1) , ∅. For,
otherwise, for every ∆i ∈ Z, we would have ∆i  ∆n−1, against the fact that Z has no
maximum in R0(Γ). Then, we can pick ∆ ∈ R0(∆n−1). Due to the transitivity of R0, for
every i = 0, ..., n−1, we have ∆iR0∆. Then, by definition of R0, for every i = 0, ..., n−1,
we have ϕi ∈ ∆. Then, by Ld-consistency of ∆, we have not `Ld
∧n−1
i=0 ϕi → ⊥. Then,
by definition of Lkd, we have not `Lkd
∧n−1
i=0 ϕi → ⊥. Then, S is Lkd-consistent as desired.
Then, by the Lindenbaum Lemma, S ⊆ Θ for some Θ ∈ W0. We show that Θ is an
upper bound for Z in R0(Γ). For, by definition of R0 and Θ, we have ∆R0Θ for every
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∆ ∈ Z. Then, by transitivity of R0, we have Θ ∈ R0(Γ). Moreover, suppose that ΘR0∆0
for some ∆0 ∈ Z. Then, by transitivity of R0, for every ∆ ∈ Z, we have ∆R0∆0, against
the fact that Z has no maximum. Then, for every ∆ ∈ Z, we have ∆R0Θ and ¬(ΘR0∆).
Then, by definition of , for every ∆ ∈ Z, we have ∆  Θ. Therefore, Θ is an upper
bound for Z in (R0(Γ),R0(Γ)).
By Zorn Lemma, (R0(Γ),R0(Γ)) admits a maximal element, say ∆. We show
that ∆ is R0-q-maximal. For, suppose that ∆R0Θ for some Θ ∈ W0 with ∆ , Θ. By
transitivity of R0, we have Θ ∈ R0(Γ). Then, as ∆ is maximal in (R0(Γ),R0(Γ)), we
have ¬(∆  Θ). Then, by definition of , we have ΘR0∆, as desired. 
12.2.2 ModelM1
LetM1 = (W1,@1,R1,V1) be the submodel ofM0 generated by {Γ0}.
Proposition 12.6. 1. The frame ofM1 validates all the axioms of Λd except pos-
sibly 5 and 6.
2. @1 is prelinear.
3. The frame ofM1 enjoys the Zorn Property with respect to R1.
4. M1,Γ0 |= ϕ0.
5. There are @1-clusters C+∞,C−∞ ⊆ W1 such that for every Γ ∈ W1, C−∞ @1 Γ @1
C+∞ (cf. [53, Lemma 6.4]).
Proof. 1 comes from Proposition 2.1(1). As for 2, consider Γ,∆ ∈ W1. SinceM1 is the
submodel ofM0 generated by Γ0, there is a (@0 ∪A0 ∪R0)-path from Γ0 to Γ, and from
Γ0 to ∆. Then, by transitivity of @0 and possibly using Axioms 2e and 4a, we obtain
that Γ v0 ∆ ∨ ∆ @0 Γ. Then, by definition of @1, we have Γ v1 ∆ ∨ ∆ @1 Γ. 3 comes
from Proposition 12.5(2) and definition ofM1. 4 comes from Proposition 2.1(2).
As for 5, we follow [53, Lemma 6.4]. Define Λ0 := {Pϕ |ϕ is satisfied inM1}. We
show that Λ0 is consistent. For, suppose that there is n ∈ N and formulas ϕ0, ..., ϕn−1
satisfied inM1 at ∆0, ...,∆n−1 respectively. By prelinearity and transitivity of @1, there
is i ∈ n such that, for all j ∈ n, we have ∆ j v1 ∆i. Now, by Corollary 11.7(1), F> ∈ ∆i.
Then, there is Γ ∈ M1 with ∆i @1 Γ. Then, ∆0, ...,∆n−1 @1 Γ. Then, Pϕ0, ..., Pϕn−1 ∈ Γ,
proving the consistency of Λ0. By Lindenbaum Lemma, there is Λ ∈ W0 with Λ0 ⊆ Λ.
Consider an arbitrary Γ ∈ W1. Then, by definition of Λ0, we have that if ϕ ∈ Γ, then
Pϕ ∈ Λ0 ⊆ Λ. Then, Γ @0 Λ. Then, by arbitrariness of Γ and definition ofM1, we have
Λ ∈ W1 and, for every Γ ∈ W1, Γ @1 Λ. In particular, Λ @1 Λ. Then, by Proposition
9.1(1), Λ lies in a @1-cluster, say C+∞, ofM1. By definition of C+∞ and transitivity of
@1, we have W1 @ C+∞. By a similar argument we obtain C−∞. 
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Clusters ofM1
Let us now state some results that come from [85, §2, 3]. These results aim to produce
a formula ξ that says, given two points lying in the same @1-cluster, that they see the
same R1-q-maximal points. To obtain ξ, we use the finitary methods of [85, §2, 3].
The use of finitary methods is made possible by the restriction of the infinite Φ to the
finite Φk. The formula ξ will have a relevant role in the study of the @2-clusters ofM2,
in particular in proving their connectedness and local 2-connectedness. But first let us
prove a preliminary proposition:
Proposition 12.7. For every R1-q-maximal point Γ ∈ W1:
1. Γ is R1-reflexive.
2. Γ is contained in a maximal R1-cluster C.
3. R1(Γ) = Rr1(Γ) = C.
Proof. 1. Let Γ be as per thesis. Since, by Axiom 4d, R1 is serial, and, by Axiom
3b, R1 is transitive, the definition of R1-q-maximality yields that Γ is R1-reflexive. 2.
By 1 and Proposition 9.1(1,2), Γ is contained in a maximal R1-cluster C. 3. Plainly
C ⊆ R1(Γ). Consider ∆ ∈ R1(Γ). Then, by definition of R1-q-maximality, we have
∆R1Γ. Then ∆ ∈ C. Then, R1(Γ) ⊆ C. Then, we have R1(Γ) = C. Then, by 1, we also
have Rr1(Γ) = C. 
For every Γ ∈ W1 and C ⊆ W1, define:
M(Γ) := {D ⊆ R1(Γ) |D is a maximal R1-cluster ofM1},
ε(Γ) := {p ∈ Φk | p ∈ Γ},
δ(C) := {ε(Γ) |Γ ∈ C},
γ(Γ) := {δ(D) |D ∈ M(Γ)}.
Proposition 12.8. (Cf. [85, Lemma 7].) For every @1-cluster C, and maximal R1-
clusters D, E ⊆ C, if δ(D) = δ(E), then D = E.
Proof. We follow [85, Lemma 7]. However, we have to remember that our language,
unlike the language in [85, Lemma 7], has also temporal operators G and H.
We begin by showing that, for all Γ ∈ D and ∆ ∈ E, if ε(Γ) = ε(∆), then Γ = ∆.
For, we can prove by induction on ϕ ∈ Lk that ϕ ∈ Γ if and only if ϕ ∈ ∆. Indeed, the
propositional case is given by ε(Γ) = ε(∆). The temporal cases (G,H), not present in
[85, Lemma 7], follow from the fact that, since Γ,∆ ∈ C, then, for every Θ ∈ W1, we
have Γ @1 Θ if and only if ∆ @1 Θ, and Γ A1 Θ if and only if ∆ A1 Θ. As for the
[d]-case, suppose that [d]ϕ ∈ Γ. Then, for every Γ′ ∈ D we have ϕ ∈ Γ′ (∗). Consider
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∆′ ∈ R0(∆). SinceM1 is a generated submodel ofM0, we have ∆′ ∈ R1(∆). Since E is
a maximal R1-cluster, by Proposition 12.7(3), we have ∆′ ∈ E. By δ(D) = δ(E), there
is Γ′ ∈ D with ε(Γ′) = ε(∆′). By (∗), we have ϕ ∈ Γ′. By inductive hypothesis, we have
ϕ ∈ ∆′. By arbitrariness of ∆′ ∈ R0(∆), we have [d]ϕ ∈ ∆. We can similarly prove that
[d]ϕ ∈ ∆ implies [d]ϕ ∈ Γ.
We now prove that D = E. Consider Γ ∈ D. By δ(D) = δ(E), there is ∆ ∈ E with
ε(Γ) = ε(∆). By our claim, Γ = ∆. So Γ ∈ E, proving D ⊆ E. We can similarly prove
that E ⊆ D, obtaining D = E as desired. 
For every t ⊆ Φk, let:
q(t) :=
∧
p∈t
p ∧
∧
p∈Φk\t
¬p,
and, for every Γ ∈ W1, let q(Γ) := q(ε(Γ)). For every T ⊆ P(Φk), let:
α(T ) :=
∧
t∈T
_q(t) ∧
∧
t∈P(Φk)\T
¬_q(t),
and, for every maximal R1-cluster C of M1, let α(C) := α(δ(C)). For every T ⊆
P(P(Φk)), let:
ξ(T) :=
∧
T∈T
_α(T ) ∧
∧
T∈P(P(Φk))\T
¬_α(T ),
and, for every Γ ∈ W1, let ξ(Γ) := ξ(γ(Γ)). Since Φk is finite, q(t), α(T ) and ξ(T) are all
formulas in Lk. From Proposition 12.8 we obtain:
Proposition 12.9. 1. For every @1-cluster C, the set of all maximal R1-clusters in-
cluded in C is finite (cf. [85, Lemma 8]).
2. For every @1-cluster C, maximal R1-cluster D ⊆ C and R1-q-maximal Γ ∈ C, we
have thatM1,Γ |= α(D) if and only if Γ ∈ D (cf. [85, Lemma 9]).
3. For every @1-cluster C, maximal R1-cluster D ⊆ C and Γ ∈ C, we have that
M1,Γ |= _α(D) if and only if D ∈ M(Γ) (cf. [85, Lemma 10]).
4. For every @1-cluster C, and Γ,∆ ∈ C, we have thatM1,Γ |= ξ(∆) if and only if
M(Γ) = M(∆).
Proof. 1. Since Φk is finite, given a @1-cluster C, we have that {ε(Γ) |Γ ∈ C} is finite.
Then, {δ(D) |D ⊆ C ∧ D a maximal R1-cluster} is finite as well. Thesis follows from
Proposition 12.8.
2. Let C,D and Γ be as per thesis. By Proposition 12.7(2), Γ belongs to a max-
imal R1-clusters, say E. Assume M1,Γ |= α(D). Then, by definition of α, we have
δ(Rr1(Γ)) = δ(D). Now, by Proposition 12.7(3), we have R
r
1(Γ) = E. Then, we have
δ(D) = δ(E). Then, by Proposition 12.8, we have D = E. Then, Γ ∈ D. Conversely,
assume that Γ ∈ D. Then, since D is an R1-cluster, by Proposition 9.1(1), we have
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D = E. Then, by Proposition 12.7(3), Rr1(Γ) = D. Then, by definition of α, we have
M1,Γ |= α(D).
3. Let C,D and Γ be as per thesis (observe that, unlike in 2, we are not requiring Γ to
be R1-q-maximal). Assume thatM1,Γ |= _α(D). Then, there is ∆ ∈ Rr1(Γ) such that
M1,∆ |= α(D). Now, by Proposition 12.6(4), there is a R1-q-maximal Θ ∈ R1(∆).
Then, as M1,∆ |= α(D), we have M1,Θ |= α(D). Now, by transitivity of R1, we
have Θ ∈ R1(Γ). Then, by Proposition 12.3(1), we have Θ ∈ C. Then, by 2, we have
Θ ∈ D. Therefore D ∈ M(Γ). Conversely, assume that D ∈ M(Γ). Then, there is
∆ ∈ D∩ Rr1(Γ). Now, by Proposition 12.7(3), we have Rr1(∆) = D. Then, by 2, we have
M1,∆ |= α(D). Then, as ∆ ∈ Rr1(Γ), we haveM1,∆ |= _α(D). As for 4, it plainly
follows from 3. 
12.2.3 ModelM2
Following [85, §3], we define M2 by filtrating M1. The filtration is the same as in
[85, §3, formula 36], with the exception that ours is relativized to @1-clusters. More
formally, define the following equivalence relation onM1:
Γ ∼ ∆ provided Γ = ∆ ∨ (Γ ≡M1
Ψ
∆ ∧ Γ @1 ∆ ∧ Γ A1 ∆ ∧ M(Γ) = M(∆)).
Observe that Γ ∼ ∆ provided either Γ and ∆ are equal or they agree on Ψ, belong to the
same @1-cluster and see the same maximal R1-clusters through R1. Define:
1. W2 as the set of all ∼-equivalence classes, with h the projection function.
2. For every Γ,∆ ∈ W1, h(Γ) @2 h(∆) provided Γ @1 ∆.
3. For every Γ,∆ ∈ W1, h(Γ)R′2h(∆) provided there is Γ′ ∈ h(Γ) and ∆′ ∈ h(∆) such
that Γ′R1∆′.
4. R2 as the transitive closure of R′2.
5. For every p ∈ Φk, V2(p) :=
 h(V1(p)) if p ∈ Φk ∩ Ψ,∅ otherwise.
6. M2 := (W2,R2,@2,V2).
Observe that @2 is well-defined. For, suppose that h(Γ) @2 h(∆) and Γ′ ∈ h(Γ) and
∆′ ∈ h(∆). By definition of @2, we have Γ @1 ∆, and, by definition of ∼, we have
Γ′ v1 Γ and ∆ v1 ∆′. Then, since @1 is transitive, we have Γ′ @1 ∆′.
Remark 12.10. Given a subset C ofM1, define C/∼ := {h(Γ) |Γ ∈ C}. The definition
of @2 yields that: for every @2-cluster C of M2, ⋃C is a @1-cluster of M1; and for
every @1-cluster C ofM1, C/∼ is a @2-cluster ofM2.
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Proposition 12.11. M2 is a filtration of M1 through (Ψ, h) (cf. [86, Lemma 3.3]).
Then, by Filtration Lemma 9.5, we haveM2, h(Γ0) |= ϕ0.
Proof. We need to prove points 1, 2, 3 (cases F, P and [d]), and 4 (cases F, P and [d])
of Definition 9.4. We follow the proof of [86, Lemma 3.3] with the only exception of
point 4 (case [d]). This point requires a slight modification due to the fact that our R1
might be not reflexive.
Consider Γ,∆ ∈ W1. Point 1 plainly follows from the definition of V2. Point 2
plainly follows from the definition of ∼. Point 3 (cases F, P and [d]) plainly follows
from the definitions of @2 (for cases F, P) and of ∼ (for case [d]). Point 4 (cases F, P)
plainly follows from the definition of @2.
The most interesting case is Point 4 (case [d]). Consider Γ,∆ ∈ W1. Assume
h(Γ)R2h(∆). We would like ΓR1Ψ∆. Consider [d]ϕ ∈ Ψ and supposeM1,Γ |= [d]ϕ. By
definition of R2 as the transitive closure of R′2, there are Γ0 = Γ,Γ1, ...,Γn = ∆ such that
h(Γi)R′2h(Γi+1) for all i = 0, 1, ..., n − 1. SupposeM1,Γi |= [d]ϕ for some i < n. Now,
since h(Γi)R′2h(Γi+1), we have Γ
′
iR1Γ
′
i+1 for some Γ
′
i ∈ h(Γi) and Γ′i+1 ∈ h(Γi+1). Then,
since, by definition of ∼, Γi ≡M1Ψ Γ′i , we have M1,Γ′i |= [d]ϕ. Then, since Γ′iR1Γ′i+1,
and by transitivity of @1, we haveM1,Γ′i+1 |= ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ. Then, since, by definition of
∼, Γi+1 ≡M1Ψ Γ′i+1, we have M1,Γi+1 |= ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ. Therefore, by induction, we have
M1,Γn |= ϕ. Therefore, since Γn = ∆, we obtain ΓR1Ψ∆ as desired. 
Remark 12.12. Similar arguments show that the frame of M2 validates Shehtman’s
special axioms of group 4 (cf. [86, Lemma 3.3]). Transitivity of @1 implies transitivity
of @2. Similarly for the other axioms of group 2. R2 being a transitive closure is
obviously transitive. Therefore the frame of M2 validates all axioms of Λd except
possibly 5 and 6.
Remark 12.13. By definition of @2 and Filtration Lemma 9.5, a simple induction
shows that for every formula ϕ formed from formulas in Ψ using only boolean and
temporal operators and every Γ ∈ W1,M1,Γ |= ϕ if and only ifM2, h(Γ) |= ϕ.
Clusters ofM2
Let us focus on the @2-clusters of M2 and prove that they are finite, connected and
locally 2-connected (with respect to R2). Consider Γ ∈ W1 and define:
χΓ =
∧
ϕ∈Ψ∩Γ
ϕ ∧
∧
ϕ∈Ψ\Γ
¬ϕ ∧ ξ(Γ).
Remark 12.14. For every @1-cluster C of M1 and Γ,∆ ∈ C, observe that ∆ satisfies
the first two conjuncts of χΓ if and only if Γ and ∆ satisfy the same formulas in Ψ. By
Proposition 12.9(4), ∆ satisfies the third conjunct of χΓ if and only if ∆ sees the same
maximal R1-clusters as Γ. Then, by definition of ∼, ∆ satisfies χΓ if and only if ∆ ∼ Γ.
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For every w ∈ W2, define χw as χΓ for an arbitrary Γ ∈ w. The formula χ will let us use
Axiom 5 to prove connectedness, and Axiom 6 (G2) to prove local 2-connectedness of
the @2-clusters ofM2:
Proposition 12.15. For every @2-cluster C ofM2, the following facts hold:
1. C is finite (cf. [53, Lemma 6.9]).
2. (C,R2C) is connected (cf. [53, Lemma 6.12]).
3. (C,R2C) is locally 2-connected (cf. [85, Theorem 15] and [70, Lemma 5.20]).
Proof. 1. This is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of [53, Lemma 6.9]. Observe
that for all @2-clusters C of M2, for all Γ,∆ ∈ ⋃C, we have that Γ ∼ ∆ provided
Ψ ∩ Γ = Ψ ∩ ∆ and M(Γ) = M(∆). Then thesis follows by the fact that both Ψ and, by
Proposition 12.9(1), the number of maximal R1-clusters in
⋃
C are finite.
2. This is an adaption of the proof of [53, Lemma 6.12]. Suppose that C = X ∪ Y
for some X,Y non-empty, disjoint, R2-generated subsets of C. Let:
α :=
∨
w∈X
χw.
By Remark 12.14, for every Γ ∈ ⋃ X, we have:
α ∈ Γ if and only if Γ ∈
⋃
X.
Choose an arbitrary Γ ∈ ⋃C and let:
∆0 := {_α,_¬α} ∪ {Fγ, Pγ | γ ∈ Γ}.
We show that ∆0 is consistent. Since Γ is closed under conjunction, it suffices to show
that, for an arbitrary γ ∈ Γ, we have that δ := _α∧_¬α∧Fγ∧Pγ is consistent. Choose
any ΓX ∈ ⋃ X and ΓY ∈ ⋃ Y . By Remark 12.10, ⋃C is a @1 cluster ofM1. Then, we
have Γ @1 ΓX @1 Γ and Γ @1 ΓY @1 Γ. Then, α ∧ Fγ ∈ ΓX and ¬α ∧ Fγ ∈ ΓY . Then,
F(α ∧ Fγ) ∧ F(¬α ∧ Fγ) ∈ Γ. Then, by Axiom 5, we have F(_α ∧ ¬_α ∧ Fγ) ∈ Γ.
Now, by Axiom 2d, we also have GPγ ∈ Γ. Then, Fδ ∈ Γ. If δ is Lkd-inconsistent, then
¬δ,G¬δ ∈ Lkd from which G¬δ ∈ Γ, against the consistency of Γ.
Since ∆0 is consistent, by Lindendaum Lemma, there is ∆ ∈ W0 such that ∆0 ⊆ ∆.
By Definition of ∆0, we have Γ @0 ∆ @0 Γ. Then, sinceM1 is a generated submodel
ofM0, we have ∆ ∈ M1 and Γ @1 ∆ @1 Γ. Then, by Propositions 9.1(1) and 12.10,
we have ∆ ∈ ⋃C. Since _α,_¬α ∈ ∆, we can find ∆X ,∆Y ∈ Rr0(∆) with α ∈ ∆X
and ¬α ∈ ∆Y . Since M1 is a generated submodel of M0, we have ∆X ,∆Y ∈ Rr1(∆).
Since, by Proposition 12.3(1),
⋃
C is R1-generated, we have ∆X ,∆Y ∈ ⋃C. Then,
since α ∈ ∆X and ¬α ∈ ∆Y , we have h(∆X) ∈ X and h(∆Y ) ∈ Y . Then, there is a R˜r2-path
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between h(∆X) ∈ X and h(∆Y ) ∈ Y , contradicting the fact that X and Y are disjoint and
R2-generated.
Comparison with the proof of [53, Lemma 6.12]: Since our filtration is partially
different from that in [53, Lemma 6.12], we use our formulas χw to define α :=∨
w∈X χw. Moreover, when in [53, Lemma 6.12] they use their connectedness axiom
F(p ∧ Fq) ∧ F(¬p ∧ Fq) → F(^p ∧ ^¬p ∧ Fq), we use our connectedness ax-
iom, Axiom 5, F(p ∧ Fq) ∧ F(¬p ∧ Fq) → F(_p ∧ _¬p ∧ Fq). Indeed, recall that
F(p ∧ Fq) ∧ F(¬p ∧ Fq)→ F(〈d〉p ∧ 〈d〉¬p ∧ Fq) is not sound on R. Then, when in
[53, Lemma 6.12] they define ∆0 as {^α,^¬α} ∪ {Fγ, Pγ | γ ∈ Γ}, we need to define
∆0 as {_α,_¬α} ∪ {Fγ, Pγ | γ ∈ Γ}. Because of this, when in [53, Lemma 6.12] they
obtain a R˜2-path between X and Y , we instead obtain an R˜r2-path between X and Y .
3. This is an adaption of the proof of [85, Theorem 15] (the proof of [70, Lemma
5.20] is a similar adaption). In [85, Theorem 15] they prove that a certain filtration
enjoys Axiom G1, whereas we prove that the @2-clusters of our filtration M2 enjoys
Axiom G2 (that is our Axiom 6). The idea behind the two proofs is the same.
Consider an arbitrary h(Γ) ∈ C. Observe that, by Proposition 12.3(1), we have
R2(h(Γ)) ⊆ C. Suppose for contradiction that R2(h(Γ)) can be partitioned into three non
empty R˜2-generated sets X1, X2 and X3. For i = 1, 2, 3 define:
βi :=
∨
w∈Xi
χw and ηi := βi ∧
∧
j∈{1,2,3}\{i}
¬β j.
By Remark 12.14, for each ∆ ∈ ⋃C, we have βi ∈ ∆ if and only if h(∆) ∈ Xi, from
which we have ηi ∈ ∆ if and only if h(∆) ∈ Xi. Consider any ∆ ∈ R0(Γ). SinceM1 is a
generated subset ofM0, we have ∆ ∈ R1(Γ). Then, h(∆) ∈ R2(h(Γ)). Then, there is i ∈
{1, 2, 3} such that h(∆) ∈ Xi. Then, ηi ∈ ∆. Moreover, consider any Θ ∈ R0(∆). Since
M1 is a generated subset ofM0, we have Θ ∈ R1(∆). Then, h(Θ) ∈ R2(h(∆)). Since Xi
is R˜2-generated h(Θ) ∈ Xi. Then, ηi ∈ Θ. Then, ηi ∈ ∆. Then, ∨i=1,2,3 ηi ∈ ∆. Then,
[d](
∨
i=1,2,3 ηi) ∈ Γ. Then, by Axiom 6, ∨i=1,2,3[d]¬ηi ∈ Γ.
Consider any i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, w ∈ Xi and ∆ ∈ w. By Proposition 12.6.3 there is Θ
R-q-maximal such that ∆R1Θ. Then, h(∆)R2h(Θ). Since Xi is R˜2-generated h(Θ) ∈ Xi.
Then, ηi ∈ Θ. Moreover h(Γ)R2h(Θ).
Lemma 12.16. ΓR1Θ.
Proof. Since h(Γ)R2h(Θ), there are n ∈ N and v0, v1, ..., vn ∈ W2 with v0 = h(Γ),
vn = h(Θ) and viR′2vi+1. Consider Γn ∈ vn. Then, Γn ∼ Θ. Then, M(Γn) = M(Θ). Now,
since Θ is R1-q-maximal, by Proposition 12.7(1), ΘR1Θ. Then, since M(Γn) = M(Θ),
we have ΓnR1Θ. Consider Γi ∈ vi and assume Γi+1R1Θ for some Γi+1 ∈ vi+1. Since
viR′2vi+1, we have Γ
′
iR1Γ
′
i+1 for some Γ
′
i ∈ vi and Γ′i+1 ∈ vi+1. Then, Γi ∼ Γ′i and
Γi+1 ∼ Γ′i+1. Then, M(Γi) = M(Γ′i) and M(Γi+1) = M(Γ′i+1). Then, again since Θ is
R1-q-maximal and Γi+1R1Θ, we have Γ′i+1R1Θ. Then, since Γ
′
iR1Γ
′
i+1, we have Γ
′
iR1Θ,
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from which, again by R1-q-maximality of Θ, we have ΓiR1Θ. Therefore, by induction,
we have ΓR1Θ. 
Then 〈d〉ηi ∈ Γ. Therefore by arbitrariness of i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have ∧i=1,2,3〈d〉ηi ∈ Γ,
against
∨
i=1,2,3[d]¬ηi ∈ Γ. 
‘Similar’ points inM2
Following [53, §6.3.5] we turn M2 into a Ψ-linked model M4 (passing through the
modelM3). Let us introduce some preliminary definitions:
Definition 12.17. 1. For B ⊆ BΨ, define
βB :=
∧
ϕ∈B
ϕ ∧
∧
ϕ∈BΨ\B
¬ϕ.
2. For every Kripke modelM and w ∈ M, define τM(w) := {ϕ ∈ BΨ |M,w |= ϕ}
(we drop the subscript whereM is understood).
Given an element w of a Kripke modelM, we think of τM(w) as the ‘type’ of w inM.
Plainly:
Proposition 12.18. (Cf. [53, Lemma 6.14].)
1. For every Kripke modelM and w ∈ M, we have that τ(w) is the unique subset
B of BΨ such thatM,w |= βB.
2. For every Γ ∈ W1, τM1 (Γ) is the unique subset B of BΨ such that βB ∈ Γ.
Moreover, τM1 (Γ) = Γ ∩ BΨ.
3. For every Kripke model M and c, d ∈ M, we have that c ≡MBΨ d if and only if
τM(c) = τM(d).
Then, as observed in [53, Section 6.3.5], to show that two @-clusters C,D contain
similar points it suffices to find R2-reflexive points c ∈ C and d ∈ D with the same type
- that is, satisfying the same formula βB for some B ⊆ BΨ. We use the Prior Axiom
and the Zorn Property to do this. However, the Prior Axiom delivers a @2-irreflexive
point satisfying βB, whereas we want a R2-reflexive point in a @2-cluster. So instead
of βB we use βB. Then, the Prior Axiom will deliver a @2-irreflexive point satisfying
βB, and we will use the Zorn Property to find a @2-reflexive point satisfying βB. Let
us call ‘links’ the R2-reflexive points inM2 that satisfy βB.
There is a second complication. We do not know that the βB-instance of the Prior
Axiom is valid inM2. Moreover, the point should also lie in a certain temporal range.
To apply the Prior Axiom to obtain a point satisfying βB in the right temporal range
we will work inM1 where the Prior Axiom is valid and @1 is defined by formulas.
103
There is a final complication. Since the Filtration Lemma 9.5 does not apply to βB,
even if we find a point Γ ∈ M1 satisfying βB, we do not know if the ∼-representative
of Γ inM2, namely h(Γ) ∈ M2, satisfies βB. Then, with this definition of ‘links’ we
cannot guarantee that adjacent clusters contain ‘similar’ points. Then, in the formal
definition of ‘link’, we work directly inM1:
Definition 12.19. An element w ∈ W2 is said to be a link provided it is R2-reflexive
and there is Γ ∈ w with βB ∈ Γ for some B ⊆ BΨ.
Proposition 12.20. (Cf. [53, Lemma 6.17].) Let B ⊆ BΨ and w an R2-reflexive point
in W2. Then, βB ∈ ⋃ w if and only if w is a link and τ(w) = B.
Proof. Let B and w be as per thesis. Suppose that βB ∈ Γ ∈ w. Then, by definition,
w is a link. Moreover, βB ∈ Γ. Then, by Proposition 12.11, M2,w |= βB. Then, by
definition, τ(w) = B. Conversely, suppose that w is a link and τ(w) = B. Then, by
definition, βB′ ∈ ⋃ w for some B′ ⊆ BΨ. Then, by the first part, τ(w) = B′. Then,
B′ = B. Then, βB ∈ ⋃ w. 
Links are rather common:
Proposition 12.21. Every @2-cluster C ofM2 contains a link.
Proof. By Zorn Property
⋃
C contains an R1-q-maximal Γ. By Proposition 12.7(1),
Γ is R1-reflexive. Then, h(Γ) is R2-reflexive. For every ∆ ∈ R1(Γ), the fact that both
Γ and ∆ belong to the @1-cluster C yields that @1(Γ) is equal to @1(∆) and that A1(Γ)
is equal to A1(∆), whereas R1-q-maximality of Γ yields that R1(Γ) is equal to R1(∆).
Then, τ(Γ) = τ(∆). Then, βτ(Γ) ∈ ∆ and βτ(Γ) ∈ Γ. Then, h(Γ) is a link. 
Let us count the number of ‘types’ of links between two @2-clusters.
Definition 12.22. For C,D two @2-clusters ofM2 with C @2 D, define:
#(C,D) := |{τ(w) |w ∈ W2 is a link and C @2 w @2 D}|.
As observed in [53, §6.3.5], given two adjacent @2-clusters C,D ofM2, if #(C,D) = 1,
since by Proposition 12.21 both C and D admit links c ∈ C and d ∈ D, we have
τ(c) = τ(d) - that is, we have found ‘similar’ points. This suggests to use induction on
#(C,D) to find ‘similar’ points in more general situations. We will do so in Proposition
12.25 using the following proposition in the inductive step.
Proposition 12.23. (Cf. [53, Lemma 6.20].) For every @2-cluster C ofM2, and w ∈ W2
such that C @2 w < C, there is a @2-irreflexive u ∈ M2 such that:
1. C @2 u v2 w.
2. There are R2-reflexive points c ∈ C and d ∈ λ(u) with c ≡M2BΨ d.
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3. If w is @2-irreflexive and u @2 w, then #(ρ(u), λ(w)) < #(C, λ(w)).
The mirror image holds as well.
Proof. 1. By Proposition 12.21, there exists a link c ∈ C. Define B := τ(c). Then, by
Proposition 12.20, there is Γ ∈ c with βB ∈ Γ. Consider an arbitrary ∆ ∈ w. Then,
since C @2 w < C, we have Γ @1 ∆ and ¬(∆ @1 Γ). Then, since ¬(∆ @1 Γ), there exists
a formula γ such that:
γ ∈ Γ and G¬γ ∈ ∆. (12.3)
Then, we have γ ∧ βB ∈ Γ and G¬(γ ∧ βB) ∈ ∆.
Now, by Proposition 12.10, Γ is in the @1-cluster
⋃
C. Then, we have Γ @1 {Γ,∆}.
Then, we have F(γ ∧ βB) ∧ FG¬(γ ∧ βB) ∈ Γ. Moreover, by Corollary 11.7(3), the
Prior Axiom is in Lkd. Then, F(G¬(γ∧βB)∧HF(γ∧βB)) is in Γ. Then, there exists
Θ ∈ W1 such that Θ A1 Γ and:
G¬(γ ∧ βB) ∧ HF(γ ∧ βB) ∈ Θ. (12.4)
Then, by (12.4), we have that Θ is @1-irreflexive. Define u := h(Θ). Then, by definition
of @2, we have that u is @2-irreflexive. Moreover, since Γ @1 Θ, again by definition of
@2, we have C @2 u. Furthermore, since HFγ ∈ Θ and G¬γ ∈ ∆, we have ¬(∆ @1 Θ).
Then, by prelinearity of v1, we have Θ v1 ∆. Then, again by definition of @2, we have
u v2 w.
2. By (12.4) and Corollary 11.7(2), we have _(γ ∧ βB) ∈ Θ. Then, there exists
Θ′ ∈ W1 such that Θ′ ∈ Rr1(Θ) and γ ∧ βB ∈ Θ′. Two cases are given:
(a) Θ = Θ′. By the mirror image of Axiom 4d, there exists Ξ ∈ W1 such that
Ξ ∈ R1(Θ) and Ξ @1 Θ. Then, by Axiom 3b, since βB ∈ Θ, we have βB ∈ Ξ.
(Observe that we need βB rather than βB to get βB ∈ Ξ from the fact that βB
is in the @1-irreflexive Θ.)
(b) Θ , Θ′. By (12.4), we have ¬(Θ @1 Θ′). Then, by prelinearity of @1, we
have Θ′ @1 Θ. Define Ξ := Θ′. Then, for the same reasons as above, we have
βB ∈ Ξ.
In both cases we obtain Ξ ∈ W1 such that Ξ ∈ λ(Θ) with βB ∈ Ξ. By Zorn Prop-
erty, there is an R1-q-maximal Ξ′ ∈ R1(Ξ). Then, by remark 12.7, Ξ′ is R1-reflexive.
Moreover, by Axiom 3b, since βB ∈ Ξ, we have βB ∈ Ξ′ as well. (Observe that
we need βB rather than βB to get βB in the R1-reflexive Ξ′ from the fact that βB is
in the possibly R1-irreflexive Ξ.) Finally, by Proposition 12.3(1), we have Ξ′ ∈ λ(Θ).
Define d := h(Ξ′). Then, by definition of @2 and R2, we have that d is R2-reflexive and
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d ∈ λ(u). Now, since βB ∈ Ξ′, by Proposition 12.20, τ(d) = B. Then, since B = τ(c),
we have τ(c) = τ(d). Then, c ≡M2BΨ d.
3. Suppose that w is @2-irreflexive and u @2 w. Then, by definition of @2, ∆ is
@1-irreflexive. Then, we can also assume Hγ ∈ ∆. Indeed, since ∆ is @1-irreflexive,
there is δ such that ¬δ ∧ Hδ ∈ ∆. Define γ := Hδ. We want:
• Hγ ∈ ∆. Now, by definition of δ, we have Hδ ∈ ∆. Then, by the mirror image of
Axiom 2b, we have HHδ ∈ ∆. That is, we have Hγ ∈ ∆ as desired.
• γ ∈ Γ. Now, by the previous item, we have Hγ ∈ ∆. Moreover, we have Γ @1 ∆.
Then, we have γ ∈ Γ, as desired.
• G¬γ ∈ ∆. Now, by definition of δ, we have ¬δ ∈ ∆. Then, by Axiom 2d, we have
GP¬δ ∈ ∆. Then, we have G¬Hδ ∈ ∆. That is, we have G¬γ ∈ ∆ as desired.
Moreover, by (12.4), we have G¬(γ ∧ βB) ∈ Θ. Then, for every Σ ∈ W1 with
Θ @1 Σ @1 ∆, we have βB < Σ. Then, since h(Θ) = u and h(∆) = w, by Proposition
12.20, there is no link v with τ(v) = B and u @2 v @2 w. Then, we have:
{τ(v) | v ∈ W2 is a link, ρ(u) @2 v @2 λ(w)} ⊆
{τ(v) | v ∈ W2 is a link, C @2 v @2 λ(w)}\{B}.
Then, since there is a link v of type B with C @2 v @ λ(w), for example v = c, we have
#(ρ(u), λ(w)) < #(C, λ(w)). 
Comparison with the proof of [53, Lemma 6.20]: The two proofs are identical
except for the fact that we want an R2-reflexive point d in λ(u). The R2-reflexivity of d
is obtained by using the fact thatM1 enjoys the Zorn Property.
Definition 12.24. For every submodelM = (W,@,R,V) ofM2, we say that:
1. M is good provided it is finite, R2-generated and every @-cluster ofM is a @2-
cluster ofM2.
2. M is perfect if it is good and every pair (C,D) of adjacent @-clusters contains
R-reflexive points c ∈ C and d ∈ D with c ≡M2BΨ d (observe that the equivalence
between c and d is with respect toM2).
Proposition 12.25. (Cf. [53, Lemma 6.22].) For every good submodelM ofM2, there
exists a perfect submodelM∗ ofM2 such thatM ⊆M∗.
Proof. For every good submodel M = (W,@,R,V) of M2, define a defect as a pair
of adjacent @-clusters (C,D) with no R-reflexive points c ∈ C and d ∈ D such that
c ≡M2BΨ d. Let:
d(M) := Σ{#(C,D) | (C,D) a defect ofM}.
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Observe that d(M) ≥ 0. Moreover, since M is finite, we have that d(M) is finite as
well.
Consider an arbitrary good submodel M = (W,@,R,V) of M2. Among the good
submodels M∗ = (W∗,@∗,R∗,V∗) such that M ⊆ M∗ ⊆ M2, consider a model M∗
such that d(M∗) is as small as possible.
Now, by Proposition 12.21, if (C,D) is a defect in M∗ then d(M∗) > 0. Then, if
d(M∗) = 0, we would have that M∗ has no defect. Then, M∗ would be perfect as
desired. We show that d(M∗) = 0.
Assume, by contradiction, that d(M∗) > 0. Then, there exists a defect (C,D)
in M∗. Consider an arbitrary w ∈ D. Then, since M∗ ⊆ M2, we have C v2 w and
¬(w @2 C). Then, we can apply Proposition 12.23 to (C,w). Let u ∈ M2 be as provided
by Proposition 12.23 applied to (C,w). Observe that since C and D are adjacent inM∗,
then u < M∗. Let N be the submodel ofM2 given byM∗ together with Rr(u). Let @
denote @2 N . Then, we have:
{v ∈ N |C @ v @ D} = C ∪ λ(u) ∪ {u} ∪ ρ(u) ∪ D. (12.5)
(Shown in @-order, reading from left to right.) Now, N is plainly good. Moreover,
M ⊆ N ⊆ M2. Then, by definition ofM∗, we have d(N) ≥ d(M∗). Now, outside the
range between C and D shown in (12.5),M∗ andN shares the same defects and their #-
values. (Recall that # is calculated with respect toM2). Then, by (12.5), the remaining
potential defects in N are (C, λ(u)) and (ρ(u),D). Now, by Proposition 12.23, the
pair (C, λ(u)) is not a defect. Then, since d(N) ≥ d(M∗), we have that (ρ(u),D) is a
defect and #(ρ(u),D) ≥ #(C,D). Now, since C @2 ρ(u), for every t ∈ M2 such that
ρ(u) @2 t @2 D, we have C @2 t @2 D. Then, we have #(ρ(u),D) ≤ #(C,D) as well.
Then, #(ρ(u),D) = #(C,D). Then d(M∗) = d(N).
Now, u is irreflexive. Then, u @2 D and ¬(D v2 u). Then, we can apply the
mirror image of Proposition 12.23 to (u,D). Let v ∈ M2 be as provided by Proposition
12.23 applied to (u,D). Then, v is @2-irreflexive, and such that u v2 v @2 D and ρ(v)
and D contains R2-reflexive ≡M2BΨ-equivalent points. Now, since (ρ(u),D) is a defect in
N , ρ(u) and D do not contain R2-reflexive ≡M2BΨ-equivalent points. Then, u , v and
u @2 v @2 D. Let N ′ be the submodel ofM2 consisting of N together with Rr2(v). Let
@ denote @2 N ′. Then, we have:
{v ∈ N | ρ(u) @ v @ D} = ρ(u) ∪ λ(v) ∪ {v} ∪ ρ(v) ∪ D. (12.6)
(Again shown in @-order, reading from left to right.) Now, outside the range ρ(u) − D
shown in (12.6),N ′ andN have the same defects. Then, the possible defects inN ′ are
within the range between ρ(u) and D. Then, they are (ρ(u), λ(v)) and (ρ(v),D). Now, by
Proposition 12.23, we have that (ρ(v),D) is not a defect in N ′ and that #(ρ(u), λ(v)) <
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#(ρ(u),D). Then, we have d(N ′) < d(N) = d(M∗). Then, sinceN ′ is plainly good and
M ⊆ N ′ ⊆ M2, we obtain a contradiction of the minimality ofM∗. 
12.2.4 ModelsM3 andM4
Proceeding as in [53, §6.4], we extract, through a selective filtration, a good submodel
M3 ofM2 as follows:
1. Add C+∞/∼ and C−∞/∼ toM3.
2. For every ψ ∈ Ψ such that F¬ψ ∧ FGψ is satisfied in M2, by validity of Prior
Axiom inM1 and remark 12.13, there is w ∈ M2 satisfying Gψ ∧ HF¬ψ. Add
Rr2(w) = λ(w) ∪ {w} ∪ ρ(w) toM3.
3. Perform mirror image of 2.
M3 is plainly a nonempty good submodel of M2. Then, by Proposition 12.25, there
exists a perfect submodelM4 = (W4,@4,R4,V4) such thatM3 ⊆ M4. We prove that
the satisfiability of formulas in Ψ is preserved betweenM2 andM4:
Proposition 12.26. (Cf. [53, Lemma 6.23].) For every ϕ ∈ Ψ and w ∈ W4, we have
M4,w |= ϕ if and only ifM2,w |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ψ. If ψ is atomic, thesis follows by the
fact that M4 ⊆ M2. The boolean cases follow by induction and the closure of Ψ
under taking subformulas. The case [d]ψ follows by the fact thatM4 is a R2-generated
submodel ofM2.
The most interesting cases are Gψ and Hψ. Let us consider Gψ. ThatM2,w |= Gψ
impliesM4,w |= Gψ follows fromM4 ⊆ M2. Conversely, assume thatM2,w |= ¬Gψ.
ThenM2,w |= F¬ψ. Two cases are given:
1. M2,w |= GF¬ψ. Now, by Proposition 12.6(5), for every u ∈ C+∞/ ∼, we have
u A2 w Then, M2, u |= F¬ψ. Then, there is v ∈ W2 such that v A2 u and
M2, v |= ¬ψ. Again by Proposition 12.6(5), v ∈ C+∞/ ∼ as well. Then, by
definition of M3, we have v ∈ W3. Moreover, by transitivity of @2, we have
w @2 v.
2. M2,w |= F¬ψ ∧ FGψ. Then, by definition ofM3, there exists u ∈ W2 such that
M2, u |= Gψ ∧ HF¬ψ and Rr2(u) ⊆ W3. Now, if u v2 w, thenM2,w |= Gψ: a
contradiction of M2,w |= F¬ψ. Then, by prelinearity of @2, we have w @2 u.
Now, by Remark 12.4, Gψ∧HF¬ψ→ _¬ψ is valid inM2. Then,M2, u |= _¬ψ.
Then, there exists v ∈ Rr2(u) such thatM2, v |= ¬ψ. Now, by definition ofM3,
we have Rr2(u) ⊆ W3. Then, we have v ∈ W3. Moreover, as w @2 uRr2v, by Axiom
4b if u , v, we have w @2 v.
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In both cases, we obtain v ∈ W3 such that w @2 v and M2, v |= ¬ψ. Then, since
W3 ⊆ W4, we have v ∈ W4. Moreover, sinceM4 ⊆ M2, we have w @4 v. Finally, by
inductive hypothesis, we haveM4, v |= ¬ψ. Then,M4,w |= ¬Gψ. The case Hψ can be
proved similarly. 
Comparison with the proof of [53, Lemma 6.23]: The proof is the same as that of
[53, Lemma 6.23] with the only slight differences that we use Remark 12.4 instead of
[53, Lemma 3.3], and that when, for a point w ∈ W2, they refer to R2(w), we refer to
Rr2(w) instead. This is due to the fact that our R2 is generally not reflexive.
We now prove thatM4 is as desired:
Proposition 12.27. (Cf. [53, Lemma 6.24].) M4 is a Ψ-linked model satisfying ϕ0.
Proof. We follow the proof of [53, Lemma 6.24]. We show that conditions 1-5 of
Definition 12.2 hold.
1. W4 is plainly finite. 2. We show that the frame (W4,@4,R4) validates all the
axioms in Λd, excluding Axioms 5 and 6. Now, all the axioms in Λd, excluding Axioms
5 and 6, are valid in the frame of M2. Then, their first-order correspondents are true
in the frame ofM2. Now, the correspondents of these axioms, except 2c and 4d, are
universal first-order sentences. Then, since the frame of M4 is a substructure of the
frame ofM2, their truth is preserved in the frame ofM4. Moreover, the correspondent
of Axiom 4d is preserved by R2-generated subframes ofM2. Then, it remains true in
the frame of M4. Finally, the correspondent of Axiom 2c is density for @. Now, the
frame ofM4 consists of @4-clusters with possibly single @4-irreflexive points between
pairs of consecutive @4-clusters. Then, @4 is plainly dense.
3. Since M2 is prelinear and M4 ⊆ M2, we have that @4 is prelinear as well. 4.
Let C be a @4-cluster ofM4. Then, sinceM4 is good, C is a @2-cluster ofM2 as well.
Then, by Proposition 12.15, (C,R2C) is connected and locally 2-connected. Now,
since M4 ⊆ M2, we have (C,R2C) = (C,R4C). Then, (C,R4C) is connected and
locally 2-connected as well.
5. SinceM4 is perfect, for every pair (C,D) of adjacent @4-clusters, there are R4-
reflexive c ∈ C and d ∈ D such that c ≡M2BΨ d. Now, by Proposition 12.26, c ≡M4BΨ d.
Then,M4 is Ψ-linked.
We show that M4 satisfies ϕ0. By Proposition 12.11,M2 satisfies ϕ0. Consider an
arbitrary w ∈ C+∞/ ∼. Then, by Proposition 12.6(5) and definition of @2,M2,w |= Pϕ0.
Now, by definition of Ψ, we have Pϕ0 ∈ Ψ. Then, since w ∈ W4, by Proposition 12.26,
we haveM4,w |= Pϕ0. Then, ϕ0 is satisfied inM4. 
In fact, V4 has Φk as domain, but it is harmless to extend V4 to Φ by defining V4(p) = ∅
for every p ∈ Φ \ Φk.
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12.3 Satisfiability on R
In this section we show that if a formula is satisfiable on a Ψ-linked model, then it is
satisfiable on R (cf. [53, §7]).
Proposition 12.28. (Cf. [53, Theorem 7.11].) Given a set of formulas Ψ closed under
taking subformulas and such that ϕ ∈ Ψ, if ϕ is satisfiable on a Ψ-linked model, then ϕ
is satisfiable on R.
To prove Proposition 12.28 we closely follow [53, §7] with the only exception that we
use [52, Lemma 6.1] instead of [53, Lemma 7.10] (observe that the latter is in turn an
adaption of [52, Definition 4.1 and Lemma 4.2]).
We report and prove [52, Lemma 6.1] as Proposition 12.38. To prove it we need to
introduce the notions of ‘lexicographic sums of linear orders’, ‘lexicographic sums of
functions on linear orders’, and most importantly of ‘shuﬄes’. We do so in Sections
12.3.1, 12.3.2, 12.3.3.
12.3.1 Lexicographic sums of linear orders
In this section we define ‘lexicographic sums of linear orders’.
Given a tuple A = (A,R), if R is linear (see Chapter 4, Definition 4.1(3)) we say
that A is a linear order. An interval of A is a non-empty subset B of A such that
for every a, b, c ∈ A, if a, c ∈ B and aRbRc, then b ∈ B. Given a, b ∈ A, define
(a, b) := {c ∈ A | aRcRb}, [a, b) := {c ∈ A | aRrcRb}, (a, b] := {c ∈ A | aRcRrb}, [a, b] :=
{c ∈ A | aRrcRrb}, (−∞, a) := {c ∈ A | cRa} and (a,+∞) := {c ∈ A | aRc}.
Let J = (J, <J ) be a linear order and, for every j ∈ J, let I j = (I j, <I j ) be a linear
order as well. Define: ∑
j∈J
I j := (
∑
j∈J
I j, <)
where
∑
j∈J I j := {(i, j) | j ∈ J, i ∈ I j} and < is a binary relation on ∑ j∈J I j defined as
follows: (i, j) < (i′, j′) provided j <J j′ or ( j = j′ and i<I j i′).
∑
j∈J I j is a linear order.
If (J, <J ) = ({0, 1, ..., n}, <), we may write the sum as I0 + I1 + ... + In.
Example 12.29. Let J be 0, 1, I0 be i, ii, and I1 be ii, iii. Then, ∑ j∈J Ii = I0 + I1 is
(i, 0), (ii, 0), (ii, 1), (iii, 1)
(shown in order, reading from left to right).
Suppose that for each j ∈ J, I j is an interval of R. Then:
Proposition 12.30. Suppose one of the following conditions holds:
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1. J = {0, 1, ..., n} for some n ∈ N. I0 has no least and no greatest element, and, for
every j > 0, I j has a least and no greatest element.
2. (J, <J ) = (Z, <) and, for every j ∈ J, I j has no least element and has a greatest
element.
3. (J, <J ) = (R, <) and, for every j ∈ J, I j has a least and a greatest element, and,
for every irrational j, I j is a singleton.
Then,
∑
j∈J I j is isomorphic to (R, <), notation ∑ j∈J I j  R.
Sketch of the proof. It is well known that a linear order I is isomorphic to (R, <) if and
only if the following conditions hold:
• I is dense.
• I has no endpoints.
• I has a countable dense subset.
• I is Dedekind complete.
It is easy and we leave to the reader to check that the linear orders given by Points 1-3
satisfy these conditions (see [82] and [21] for further reading). 
When
∑
j∈J I j  (R, <), we may identify the two structures.
12.3.2 Lexicographic sums of functions on linear orders
In this section we define ‘lexicographic sums of functions on linear orders’.
Let A be a non empty set and, for every j ∈ J, f j : I j → A a function. Define∑
j∈J
f j :
∑
j∈J
I j → A
by (i, j) 7→ f j(i). If (J, <J ) = ({0, 1, ..., n}, <), we may write the sum as f0 + f1 + ...+ fn.
If I j is a singleton {x} and f j(x) = a, we may write the function f j as a. If g = ∑ j∈J f j,
define domg( f j) := {(i, j) | i ∈ I j}. In what follows, it may be convenient to identify f j
with gdomg( f j).
Example 12.31. Let J , I0 and I1 be as in Example 12.29. Consider a set A = {a, b}
and functions f0 : I0 → A defined by:
i 7→ a,
ii 7→ b,
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and f1 : I1 → A defined by:
ii 7→ a,
iii 7→ a.
Then
∑
j∈J f j = f0 + f1 is:
(i, 0) 7→ a, (ii, 0) 7→ b, (ii, 1) 7→ a, (iii, 1) 7→ a.
12.3.3 Shuﬄes
In this section we define a special case of lexicographic sum of functions on linear or-
ders, called ‘Shuﬄe’.
Let A be a non-empty set, and G a countable (possibly empty) set of functions
g : Kg → A such that Kg is an interval of R with a least and a greatest element. Let g0 :
Kg0 → A be a function such that Kg0 is a singleton interval of R. Let ϑ : R→ G∪ {g0}
be a function such that:
• ϑ−1(g0) = R \Q.
• For every g ∈ G, ϑ−1(g) is a dense subset of Q.
It is not difficult to prove that such a ϑ exists. Then, for every g ∈ G ∪ {g0}, we have
that ϑ−1(g) is a dense subset of R. Now, for every j ∈ R, define I j = Kϑ j and:
I :=
∑
j∈R
I j.
σ :
∑
j∈R
ϑ j : I → A.
Then, σ((i, j)) = (ϑ( j))(i) ∈ A.
We call σ-endpoint any element x ∈ I such that x = (i, j) with j ∈ R and i the least
or greatest element of I j.
Proposition 12.32. (Cf. [53, Lemma 7.3].) Let I and σ be defined as above. Then, for
every x, y, z ∈ R such that y < x < z and x a σ-endpoint, we have rngσ = σ((y, z) \ {x}).
Proof. We follow the proof of [53, Lemma 7.3]. That σ((y, z) \ {x}) ⊆ rngσ is trivial.
We show that rngσ = σ((y, z) \ {x}). Consider an arbitrary element a ∈ rngσ. Then,
there exist g ∈ G ∪ {g0} and k ∈ Ig such that g(k) = a. Suppose that x = (i, j) and that
i is the least element of I j. Now, y is of the form (i′, j′) for some j′ ∈ R and i′ ∈ I j′ .
Then, since y < x and x is the least element of I j, we have j′ < j. Now, ϑ−1(g) is
dense in R. Then, there exists j∗ ∈ ϑ−1(g) such that j′ < j∗ < j. Then, x , (k, j∗),
y < (k, j∗) < z, and a = σ((k, j∗)) ∈ σ((y, z) \ {x}). 
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As observed in [53, §7.3], by Proposition 12.30(3), we have (I, <)  (R, <). Then,
by choosing a suitable isomorphism, we car regard σ as a function σ : R → W. This
function depends on the choice of ϑ and of the isomorphism between (I, <) and (R, <).
However, for every choice of ϑ and of the isomorphism between (I, <) and (R, <), we
obtain the same result, modulo an order preserving automorphism of R. Then, we
let Shuﬄe(G; g0) denote a function σ : R → W for an arbitrary choice of ϑ and of
the isomorphism between (I, <) and (R, <). The elements of G ∪ {g0} are called the
ingredients of the shuﬄe.
Example 12.33. If W = {w, v, u}, then Shuﬄe{{w, v}; u} will be a map σ : R → W
such that σ−1(w) and σ−1(v) are two dense subsets of Q and they form a partition of Q,
whereas σ−1(u) = R \Q.
More generally, given two linear orders I1 = (I1, <1) and I2 = (I2, <2), a set A,
and two functions f1 : I1 → A and f2 : I2 → B, if there is an isomorphism i from I1 to
I2, and for every x ∈ I1 we have f1(x) = f2(i(x)), then we say that f1 is isomorphic to
f2, write f1  f2, and we may identify f1 with f2 ◦ i−1.
12.3.4 [d]: from Kripke models to R
In this section, we report and prove [52, Lemma 6.1] as Proposition 12.38. This is
a substantial proposition, closely related to Shehtman’s result that the d-logic of R
is KD4G2 [88]. Essentially, it enables to translate the semantics of the coderivative
operator from Kripke models to models on the reals. This proposition will be crucial in
proving the main Proposition 12.28, according to which if a formula is satisfiable on a
Ψ-linked model, then it is satisfiable on R, in Section 12.3.5. But first let us give some
preliminary definitions.
Definition 12.34. Given a tuple F = (W,R) such that W is a set and R is a binary
relation on W, a linear order (I, <), a function g : I → W, and an element x ∈ I, we say
that x is g-fair (with respect to F ) provided there are y, z ∈ I such that y < x < z and,
for all y′, z′ with y ≤ y′ < x < z′ ≤ z, we have g((y′, z′) \ {x}) = R(g(x)).
Our definition of fairness slightly differs from [53, Definition 7.7]: in our definition the
point to which the property of fairness refers is excluded, whereas in [53, Definition
7.7.] it is not. This reflects the difference between the semantics of [d] and of .
Remark 12.35. (Cf. [53, Remark 7.8].) If F is an R-generated subframe of a K4-frame
G = (W,R), (I, <) a linear order, and g a function from I to F , then a point in I is g-fair
with respect to F if and only if it is g-fair with respect to G.
Remark 12.36. (Cf. [53, Remark 7.9].) Fairness is a ‘local’ property: if g =
∑
j∈J f j,
j ∈ J, and x ∈ domg( f j) is in the interior of domg( f j) (that is, if x is not the least or
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greatest point of domg( f j)), then x is g-fair if and only if it is f j-fair. (Recall that we
identify f j with gdomg( f j).)
Definition 12.37. Consider a tuple F = (W,R) such that W is a finite set, R a transitive
binary relation on W, and F connected and locally 2-connected. For every w ∈ W,
define R•(w) := {v ∈ W |wRv ∧ ¬vRw}. For every w ∈ W, we say that w is a leaf
provided R•(w) = ∅. For every w ∈ W, define Ww := Rr(w) and Fw := (Ww,RWw).
Observe that Fw is a generated, connected and locally 2-connected subframe of F .
Proposition 12.38. (Cf. [53, Theorem 7.10] and [52, Lemma 6.1].) For every frame
F = (W,R) such that W is a finite set, R a serial and transitive binary relation on W,
and F is connected and locally 2-connected, there is a function gF : R→ W such that,
for every x ∈ R and v ∈ W:
1. x is gF -fair.
2. gF (−∞, x) = gF (x,+∞) = W.
3. If v is a leaf, then gFv is defined inductively and there are non-empty functions
gA, gB such that gF  gA + gFv + gB.
W
R
gF 
W
dom(gA)
](
R
Wv v
)[
dom(gB)
gA gFv gB
Figure 12.4: gF  gA + gFv + gB
Proof. By induction on |F |. Two cases are given:
(a) Suppose that there exists w ∈ W such that w is reflexive and F = Fw. Define:
gF := Shuﬄe({w + gFu + w | u ∈ R•(w)} ∪ {u | u ∈ C(w)}; w). (12.7)
Now, if u ∈ R•(w) then |Fu| < |Fw|. Then, by inductive hypothesis gFu is well
defined. Then, gF is well defined. We show that gF satisfies Points 1-3.
1. Suppose that x ∈ g−1F (u) and u ∈ R•(w). Then 1 holds by inductive hypothesis
and Remark 12.36. Otherwise, x ∈ g−1F (u) and u ∈ C(w) (since w is reflexive,
w ∈ C(w) and the case x ∈ g−1F (w) is also covered). Then, x is a gF -endpoint.
Then, by Proposition 12.32, for every y, z ∈ R such that y < x < z, we have:
gF ((y, z) \ {x}) = rng(gF ) = R(w) = R(u).
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2. Consider an arbitrary x ∈ domgF and v ∈ W. Then, since W = Ww, we have
that either v = u for some u ∈ R•(w) or v = u ∈ C(w). By definition of shuﬄe
and equation (12.7) defining gF , in both cases we find y, z ∈ dom(gF ) such that
gF (y) = gF (z) = v.
3. Suppose that v ∈ W = Ww is a leaf. If v ∈ R•(w), then 3 holds for v because gFv
is an ingredient of the shuﬄe in (12.7) defining gF . Otherwise, ¬wR•v. Then,
v ∈ C(w). Then, Fv = Fw = F . Now, since gF is a shuﬄe, as the reader may
confirm, we have gF  gA + gF + gB for some gA and gB.
(b) Suppose the assumption of Case (a) does not hold. Then, since F is connected
and locally 2-connected, a bit of work shows that there is a sequence
...u−1d0u0d1u1d2...
of elements of W such that:
• For every i ∈ Z, we have uiRdi and uiRdi+1.
• For every i ∈ Z, we have W = ⋃ j<i Wu j and W = ⋃ j>i Wu j .
• {di | i ∈ Z} is the set of all leaves of F .
• For every i ∈ Z, if Ci and Di are the connected components of the frame
(R(ui),RR(ui)) that contain di and di+1 respectively, then R(ui) = Ci ∪ Di.
Let us sketch how we can find such a sequence. Since F is connected, there is a
cycle d0u0d1...dn−1undn such that d0 = dn and:
• For every i ∈ n, we have uiRdi and uiRdi+1.
• W = ⋃i∈n Wui .
• The leaves of F are among d0, d1, ..., dn.
If di is not a leaf, then there is d′i such that d
′
i is a leaf and diRd
′
i . Then, we can
replace di with d′i . Then, we can assume that all the di are leaves. Consider ui for
an arbitrary i ≤ n. Since F is locally 2-connected, (R(ui),RR(ui)) can be parti-
tioned in two (possibly equal) connected components C,D. If di ∈ C and di+1 <
D, choose a leaf d in D, and replace the subsequence diuidi+1 with diuiduidi+1.
Do this for every i ≤ n. At the end, we obtain a cycle d0u0d1...dm−1um−1dm such
that d0 = dm. The sequence:
...dmu0d1...dm−1um−1dmu0d1...dm−1um−1dmu0...
is as desired.
Now, for every i ∈ Z, if we define Ci := (Ci,RCi), we obtain a frame satisfying
the hypotheses of this proposition. We can define a frame Di on Di similarly. If
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Ci = F , we would have F = Ci ⊆ R(ui) ⊆ F . Then, F = R(ui). Then, since
ui ∈ F , we would have ui ∈ R(ui). Then, ui would be reflexive and F = Fui ,
a contradiction of the assumptions of Case (b). Then, we have |Ci| < |F | and
similarly for Di. Then, we can apply the inductive hypothesis on Ci and Di
obtaining functions gCi and gDi respectively. Now, since di ∈ Ci and di+1 ∈ Di,
and di and di+1 are leaves, then, by the inductive hypothesis, there are functions
gAi , gBi , gA′i , and gB′i such that:
gCi  gAi + gFdi + gBi ,
gDi  gA′i + gFdi+1 + gB′i .
Then, since dom(gCi ) = dom(gFdi ) = dom(gDi ) = dom(gFdi+1 ) = R, we have that
dom(gAi ) has a greatest element and no least element, dom(gBi ) has a least ele-
ment and no greatest element, and similarly for dom(gA′i ) and dom(gB′i ). Define:
gF :=
∑
i∈Z
(gFdi + gBi + ui + gA′i ). (12.8)
D−1
d0
C0
u0
D0
d1
C1
u1
D1
d2
C2
]( )[ )( ]( )[ )( ](
gA′−1
gFd0 gB0
u0
gA′0
gFd1 gB1
u1
gA′1
gFd2
Figure 12.5: gF :=
∑
i∈Z(gFdi + gBi + ui + gA′i )
Now, for each i ∈ Z, dom(gFdi +gBi +ui +gA′i ) is plainly isomorphic to an interval
of R with no least element and with greatest element. Then, by Proposition
12.30(2), we can assume dom(gF ) = R. We show that gF satisfies 1 − 3.
1. Consider an arbitrary x ∈ dom(gF ). Suppose that x ∈ dom(ui) for some i ∈ Z.
Then, by (12.8), x lies just after dom(gBi ). Now, dom(gBi ) is isomorphic to a
final part of dom(gCi ). Consider an arbitrary y ∈ dom(gBi ) such that y < x. Then,
by 2 for Ci, we have gF ((y, x)) = Ci. Then, there exists y ∈ R such that y < x
and, for every y′ ∈ R such that y ≤ y′ < x, we have gF ((y′, x)) = Ci. Similarly,
there is z ∈ R such that x < z and, for every z′ ∈ R such that x < z′ ≤ z, we
have gF ((x, z′)) = Di. Then, there are y, z ∈ R such that y < x < z and, for every
y′, z′ ∈ R such that y ≤ y′ < x < z′ ≤ z, we have:
gF ((y′, z′) \ {x}) = Ci ∪ Di = R(u j) = R(gF (x)).
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Then, x is gF -fair.
Otherwise, if x < dom(ui) for every i ∈ Z, then x lies in dom(gCi ) or dom(gDi )
for some i ∈ Z. Then, by inductive hypothesis and Remark 12.36, 1 holds for
such an x.
2. Consider arbitrary x ∈ R and v ∈ F . Suppose that x is in dom(gFdi + gBi +
ui + gA′i ) for some i ∈ Z. Then, by assumption on the ui, there are j, k ∈ Z such
that j < i < k and v ∈ Wu j ∩Wuk . Consider y ∈ domu j. Then, y < x. If v = u j,
then plainly gF (y) = v. If v , u j, then v ∈ R(u j). Then, by 1, there are z, t ∈ R
such that z < y < t < x and gF ((z, t) \ {y}) = R(u j). Then, in both cases, we find
y ∈ R such that y < x and gF (y) = v. We similarly find y ∈ R such that x < y and
gF (y) = v.
3. By assumption on the di, every leaf v of F is equal to some d j. Then,
we conclude by observing that, by (12.8), dom(gFdi ) occurs as an interval in
dom(gF ). 
Comparison with [52, Lemma 6.1]: Our proof follows exactly that of [52, Lemma
6.1]. However the thesis is written in a different form. In [52, Lemma 6.1] the thesis
is written according to the following observation: given a Kripke frame F = (W,R),
and a function g : R → W, if we take W as the set of propositional variables and
g : W → P(R) is defined as g(w) = g−1(w), then (R, g) is a model.
12.3.5 G,H, [d]: from Ψ-linked models to R
We are ready to prove Proposition 12.28, according to which if a formula is satisfiable
on a Ψ-linked model, then it is satisfiable on R.
Let M = (W,@,R,V) be a Ψ-linked model. Then, for every @-cluster C of M,
(C,RC) satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 12.38. Moreover, prelinearity of @
yields an enumeration without repetition {Ci | i = 0, 1, ..., k} of the @-clusters ofM with
C0 @ C1 @ ... @ Ck (for k some natural number). As observed, there are two cases:
1. Ci and Ci+1 are not adjacent. Then, there is a unique @-irreflexive ui with Ci @
ui @ Ci+1, Ci = λ(ui) and Ci+1 = ρ(ui). Let us say that i is open, Ci right-open
and Ci+1 left-open.
ui
Ci Ci+1
Figure 12.6: Ci and Ci+1 are not adjacent
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2. Ci and Ci+1 are adjacent. Then, there are R-reflexive points di ∈ Ci and si+1 ∈
Ci+1 with di ≡MBΨ si+1. Let us say that i is closed, Ci right-closed and Ci+1 left-
closed.
Ci
di ≡MBΨ
Ci+1
si+1
Figure 12.7: Ci and Ci+1 are adjacent
Moreover we say that C0 is left-open and Ck is right-open.
Definition 12.39. Consider a sequence of elements of R ∪ {−∞,+∞}:
−∞ = l0 < r0 ≤ l1 < r1 ≤ l2 < ... ≤ lk < rk = +∞
such that ri = li+1 if and only if i is open. For every i ≤ k, define f ∗i as follows:
1. If Ci is left-open and right-open, let f ∗i : (li, ri) → Ci be a function given by
Proposition 12.38.
ui−1
Ci
ui
li
(
ri
)
f ∗i
Figure 12.8: Definition 12.39(1)
2. If Ci is left-open and right-closed, let f ∗i : (li,+∞) → Ci be a function given by
Proposition 12.38. Since f ∗i is surjective, there is z ∈ R such that f ∗i (z) = di.
Then, the function
x 7→ f ∗i
(
li +
(x − li)(z − li)
ri − li
)
: (li,+∞) 7→ Ci
has the properties provided by Proposition 12.38 and additionally maps ri to di.
Then, by replacing f ∗i by this scaled version, we can suppose, without loss of
generality, that f ∗i (ri) = di.
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ui−1
Ci
di
li
(
ri
f ∗i
f ∗i (ri)
Figure 12.9: Definition 12.39(2)
3. If Ci is left-closed and right-open, by a specular argument, let f ∗i : (−∞, ri)→ Ci
be a function given by Proposition 12.38. By a scaling similar to that of Point 2,
we can suppose, without loss of generality, that f ∗i (li) = si.
ui
Ci
si
li ri
)
f ∗i
f ∗i (li)
Figure 12.10: Definition 12.39(3)
4. If Ci is left-closed and right-closed, let f ∗i : R → Ci be a function given by
Proposition 12.38. Then, there are x < y in R with f ∗i (x) = si, f
∗
i (y) = di and,
since Ci is finite, f ∗i ((x, y)) = Ci. By a scaling similar to that of Point 2, we can
assume x = li and y = ri.
Ci
si di
li ri
f ∗i
f ∗i (li) f
∗
i (ri)
Figure 12.11: Definition 12.39(4)
For every i ≤ k, define fi as f ∗i (li, ri).
Reasoning as in [53, Lemmas 7.13-15], we prove:
Proposition 12.40. (Cf. [53, Lemmas 7.13].) For every i ≤ k and x ∈ (li, ri), we have:
1. If Ci is left-open, then f ((li, x)) = Ci.
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2. If Ci is right-open, then f ((x, ri)) = Ci.
Proof. Suppose that Ci is left-open. Then, fi((li, x)) ⊆ rng( f ∗i ) = Ci. Conversely,
consider an arbitrary w ∈ Ci. Now, since Ci is left-open, we have dom( f ∗i ) = (li, z) for
z = ri or z = +∞. Moreover, by Proposition 12.38(2), there is y ∈ (li, x) with f ∗i (y) = w.
Then, since fi = f ∗(li, ri), we have fi(y) = w. Then, w ∈ fi((li, x)). Then, since w was
arbitrary, we have Ci ⊆ fi((li, x)). Therefore, Ci = fi((li, x)) as desired. This proves 1.
We can prove 2 by a specular argument. 
Proposition 12.41. (Cf. [53, Lemma 7.14].) For every i ≤ k, the function fi : (li, ri)→
Ci is surjective.
Proof. If Ci is both left- and right-closed, then the thesis follows from the definition of
f ∗i . Otherwise, the thesis follows from Proposition 12.40. 
Proposition 12.42. (Cf. [53, Lemma 7.15].) For every i < k, if i is closed, then:
1. There is y ∈ (li, ri) such that fi((y, ri)) ⊆ R(di).
2. There is z ∈ (li+1, ri+1) such that fi((li+1, z)) ⊆ R(si+1).
Proof. If i is closed then Ci is right-closed, Ci+1 is left-closed and di, si+1 are defined.
Now, by Proposition 12.38(2), ri is f ∗i -fair. Then, there are y, z ∈ dom f ∗i = (li,+∞)
such that y < ri < z and f ∗i ((y, z) \ {ri}) = R( f ∗(ri)) = R(di). Then, fi((y, ri)) =
f ∗i ((y, ri)) ⊆ f ∗i ((y, z) \ {ri}) = R(di). We can find z by a specular argument. 
In the following definition, our condition on di to be R-reflexive is used. In [53, Defi-
nition 7.16], there is no need of this condition because R is reflexive.
Definition 12.43. For each i < k, define functions f ′i : [ri, li+1]→ W as follows:
1. If i is open, then ri = li+1. Define f ′(ri) = ui.
ui
Ci Ci+1
li ri = li+1 ri+1
f ′i
Figure 12.12: Definition 12.43(1)
2. If i is closed, then Ci is right-closed, Ci+1 is left-closed and di and si+1 are de-
fined. Now, (R(di),RR(di)) is a finite, transitive frame. Moreover, since di is
R-reflexive, (R(di),RR(di)) is connected (here is where we use the R-reflexivity
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of di). Furthermore, since (Ci,RCi) is locally 2-connected, (R(di),RR(di)) is
locally 2-connected as well. Finally, (ri, li+1)  (R, <). So we can apply Proposi-
tion 12.38. Consider a function f ′i : (ri, li+1)→ R(di) given by Proposition 12.38.
Moreover, define f ′i (ri) := di and f
′
i (li+1) := si+1.
Ci
diR(di)
Ci+1
si+1
li ri
(
li+1
)
ri+1
f ′i (ri) f
′
i (li+1)
f ′i
Figure 12.13: Definition 12.43(2)
Reasoning as in [53, Lemma 7.17] we show that:
Proposition 12.44. (Cf. [53, Lemma 7.17].) If i < k is closed and x ∈ (ri, li+1), then
f ′i ((ri, x)) = f
′
i ((x, li+1)) = R(di).
Proof. The thesis is an immediate consequence of Proposition 12.38(2). 
Definition 12.45. Define g :=
⋃
i≤k( fi ∪ f ′i ) : R → W - that is, for every x ∈ R, we
have:
g(x) :=
 fi(x) if x ∈ (li, ri) for some i ≤ k,f ′i (x) if x ∈ [ri, li+1] for some i < k.
Example 12.46. Let k = 2 and 0 be open and 1 be closed. Then, the definition of g
yields the following picture:
C0
u0
C1
d1R(d1)
C2
s2
r0 = l1
)(
r1
)[
l2
](
f0
f ′0
f1
f ′1
f2
Figure 12.14: Example 12.46
Following the proofs of [53, Lemmas 7.21-24] it can be shown that:
Proposition 12.47. (Cf. [53, Lemmas 7.21-24].) The following facts hold:
1. g is surjective and order-preserving.
2. Every x ∈ R \ {ri, li+1 | i < k} is g-fair with respect to the frame ofM.
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3. For every i ≤ k and x ∈ (li, ri), we have:
(a) If Ci is left-open, then g((li, x)) = Ci.
(b) If Ci is right-open, then g((x, ri)) = Ci.
4. For every i ≤ k closed, we have:
(a) g((y, ri)) ⊆ R(di) for some y < ri.
(b) g((ri, x)) = g((x, li+1)) = R(di) for every x ∈ (ri, li+1).
(c) g((li+1, z)) ⊆ R(si+1) for some z > li+1.
Proof. 1. Surjectivity follows from Proposition 12.41 and the fact that, for every i such
that ui is defined, we have g(ri) = ui. That g is order-preserving plainly follows from
the definition of g.
2. Let x ∈ R \ {ri, li+1 | i < k}. Then, two cases are given:
(a) x is in dom( fi) for some i ≤ k. Then, by Proposition 12.38(1), we have that x is
fi-fair with respect to (Ci,RCi).
(b) x is in the interior of dom( fi) for some i < k. Then, again by Proposition
12.38(1), we have that x is fi-fair with respect to (R(di),RR(di)).
Then, in both cases by Remarks 12.35 and 12.36, we have that x is g-fair with
respect to the frame ofM.
3. Points (3a) and (3b) follow from points (1) and (2), respectively, of Proposition
12.40 and the fact that g(li, ri) = fi.
4. Points (4a) and (4c) follow from points 1 and 2, respectively, of Proposition
12.42 and the fact that g(li, ri) = fi and that g(li+1, ri+1) = fi, respectively. Point (4b)
follows from Proposition 12.44 and the fact that g(ri, li+1) = f ′i . 
Let V ′ : Φ → P(R) be a function defined by, for every propositional variable p,
V ′(p) = g−1(V(p)). Define R := (R, <,V ′).
Following [53, Lemma 7.25], we prove that:
Proposition 12.48. (Cf. [53, Lemma 7.25].) For every ϕ ∈ Ψ and x ∈ R, we have
R, x |= ϕ if and only ifM, g(x) |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. If ϕ is a propositional variable, then the thesis follows
immediately from the definition of V ′. The boolean cases are easy and left to the
reader. The most interesting cases are Gψ, Hψ and [d]ψ. Now, since Ψ is closed under
taking subformulas, then, by inductive hypothesis, we have that:
For every x ∈ R, R, x |= ψ if and only ifM, g(x) |= ψ. (12.9)
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Assume that M, g(x) |= Gψ and consider an arbitrary y ∈ R such that y > x. Then,
by Proposition 12.47(1), we have g(x) @ g(y). Then, we haveM, g(y) |= ψ. Then, by
(12.9), we have R, y |= ψ. Then, as y was arbitrary, we have R, x |= Gψ.
Conversely, suppose thatM, g(x) |= ¬Gψ. Then, since W is finite and @ transitive
and prelinear, there is w ∈ W such thatM,w |= ¬ψ and, for every u ∈ W withM, u |=
¬ψ, we have w w u. That is, w is a witness to ¬ψ in the last possible cluster. Then,
g(x) @ w. We show that:
There is y > x in R with g(y) = w. (12.10)
There are two cases:
1. w = ui for some i < k. Then, since g(x) @ w = ui, we have g(x) < λ(ui) = Ci.
Then, by definition of g, we have x ∈ (−∞, λi+1). Then, we have x < li+1 and, by
definition of g, g(li+1) = ui = w, proving (12.10) in this case.
2. w ∈ Ci for some i ≤ k. We show that Ci is right-open. Suppose, by contradiction,
that Ci is right-closed. Then, we have i < k, the points di and si+1 are defined,
and w and di are in the same @-cluster Ci. Then, we have di @ w. Then, we have
M, di |= ¬Gψ. Now, di ≡MBΨ si+1 and Gψ ∈ Ψ. Then, we haveM, si+1 |= ¬Gψ as
well. Then, there is u ∈ W such that si+1 @ u andM, u |= ¬ψ. Then, by choice
of w, we have u @ w. Then, we have si+1 @ u v w @ di. Then, by transitivity
of @, we have si+1 @ di. Moreover, since di ∈ Ci and si+1 ∈ Ci+1, we have
¬(si+1 @ di), obtaining a contradiction. Then, Ci is right-open. Then, if i < k, we
have ri = li+1. Moreover, we have rk = +∞. Then, by construction, we have that
{y ∈ R | g(y) @ Ci} = (−∞, ri). Then, since g(x) @ w ∈ Ci, we have x ∈ (−∞, ri).
Then, since Ci is right-open, by Proposition 12.47(3b), we have Ci ⊆ g((x, ri)).
Then, there is y > x with g(y) = w, proving (12.10) in this case as well.
Then, we can take y as in (12.10). Then, by (12.9), we have R, y |= ¬ψ. Then,
we have R, x |= ¬Gψ. The case Hψ, although not completely specular, can be proved
similarly.
The only remaining case is [d]ψ. First, an intermediate result:
Lemma 12.49. If x is g-fair, then R, x |= [d]ψ if and only ifM, g(x) |= [d]ψ.
Proof. Assume that x is g-fair. Suppose thatM, g(x) |= [d]ψ. Then, by g-fairness of
x, there exists y, z ∈ R such that y < x < z and g((y, z) \ {x}) ⊆ R(g(x)). Consider an
arbitrary t ∈ (y, z) \ {x}. Then, we have g(t) ∈ R(g(x)). Then, by semantics, we have
M, g(t) |= ψ. Then, by (12.9), we have R, t |= ψ. Then, by arbitrariness of t, we have
R, x |= [d]ψ.
Conversely, suppose that R, x |= [d]ψ. Then, by semantics, there exist y, z ∈ R such
that y < x < z and, for every t ∈ (y, z) \ {x}, we have R, t |= ψ. Consider an arbitrary
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w ∈ R(g(x)). Now, by g-fairness of x, we have R(g(x)) ⊆ g((y, z) \ {x}). Then, there is
t ∈ (y, z) \ {x} such that g(t) = w. Then, we have R, t |= ψ. Then, by (12.9), we have
M,w |= ψ. Therefore, by arbitrariness of w, we haveM, g(x) |= [d]ψ. 
Consider an arbitrary x ∈ R. The are four cases:
1. x ∈ R \ {ri, li+1}. Then, by Lemma 12.47(2), we have that x is g-fair. Then, by
Lemma 12.49, we have R, x |= [d]ψ if and only ifM, g(x) |= [d]ψ, as desired.
2. x = ri = li+1 for some i < k. We show that x is g-fair. Since ri = li+1, we have that
Ci is right-open, Ci+1 is left-open, and g(x) = ui. Consider arbitrary y, z ∈ R such
that li < y < x < z < ri+1. Then, since x = ri = li+1, by Proposition 12.47(3a,3b),
we have g((y, x)) = Ci and g((x, z)) = Ci+1. Then, we have:
g((y, z) \ {x}) = g((y, x)) ∪ g((x, z)) = Ci ∪Ci+1 = R(ui).
Then, x is g-fair. Therefore, by Lemma 12.49, we have R, x |= [d]ψ if and only
ifM, g(x) |= [d]ψ, as desired.
3. x = ri < li+1 for some i < k. Then, i is closed and g(x) = di. Then, by Proposition
12.47(4a), for every large enough y < x, we have g((y, x)) ⊆ R(di). Moreover, if
z ∈ (x, li+1), then, by Proposition 12.47(4b), we have g((x, z)) = R(di). Then, for
all large enough y and small enough z such that y < x < z, we have:
g((y, z) \ {x}) = g((y, x)) ∪ g((x, z)) = R(di).
Then, x is g-fair. Then, by Lemma 12.49, we have R, x |= [d]ψ if and only if
M, g(x) |= [d]ψ, as desired.
4. ri < li+1 = x for some i < k. Then, the claim does not apply, as x is not g-fair.
Indeed, g((ri, x)) is disjoint from R(g(x)). Now, since ri < li+1, we have that
Ci is right-closed, Ci+1 is left-closed, di and si+1 are defined, g(x) = si+1, and
di ≡MBΨ si+1.
Suppose that R, x |= [d]ψ. We show that M, di |= [d]ψ. Consider an arbitrary
y ∈ (ri, x) such that, for every t ∈ (y, x), we have R, t |= ψ. Then, by Lemma
12.47(4b), we have g((y, x)) = R(di). Consider an arbitrary w ∈ R(di). Then,
since g((y, x)) = R(di), there is t ∈ (y, x) such that g(t) = w. Then, by (12.9), we
haveM,w |= ψ. Then, since w was arbitrary, we haveM, di |= [d]ψ. Moreover,
we have di ≡MBΨ si+1 = g(x) and [d]ψ ∈ BΨ. Then, we haveM, g(x) |= [d]ψ.
Conversely, suppose that M, g(x) |= [d]ψ. Then, since g(x) = si+1 ≡MBΨ di
and [d]ψ ∈ BΨ, we have M, si+1 |= [d]ψ and M, di |= [d]ψ. Then, for every
w ∈ R(di) ∪ R(si+1), we have M,w |= ψ. Let y := ri < x. By Proposition
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12.47(4b), we have g((y, x)) = R(di). Moreover, by Proposition 12.47(4c), there
is z ∈ R such that z > x and g((x, z)) ⊆ R(si+1). Then:
g((y, z) \ {x}) = g((y, x)) ∪ g((x, z)) ⊆ R(di) ∪ R(si+1). (12.11)
Consider an arbitrary t ∈ (y, z) \ {x}. Then, by (12.11), we have g(t) ∈ R(di) ∪
R(si+1). Then, we haveM, g(t) |= ψ. Then, by (12.9), we have R, t |= ψ. There-
fore, since t was arbitrary, we obtain R, x |= [d]ψ. 
Now, pick w ∈ W such thatM,w |= ϕ. By Proposition 12.47.1, g is surjective. Then,
there is x ∈ R with g(x) = w. Then, since ϕ ∈ Ψ, by Proposition 12.48, we have
R, x |= ϕ. This proves Proposition 12.28.
12.4 Completeness of Ld
As stated in section 12, to prove the completeness of Ld with respect to R it suffices to
show that every Ld-consistent formula ϕ is satisfiable on R. In section 12.2 we showed
that for every Ld-consistent formula ϕ there is a ‘well-behaved’ model satisfying ϕ.
In section 12.3, we showed that every Ld-consistent formula ϕ satisfiable on a ‘well-
behaved’ model is satisfiable on R. Then, every Ld-consistent formula is satisfiable on
R, as desired.
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Chapter 13
Future works
In this chapter we present a number of open problems:
1. Study the logic of L on Q. In [86], Shehtman axiomatized the G,H,-logic of
Q. This might be a starting point.
2. As mentioned, G and H can be seen as a splitting of the difference operator [,],
with G meaning ‘everywhere after’ and H meaning ‘everywhere before’. In [42,
§6.1] the 〈d〉 operator has been split into its future and past counterparts, K+ and
K− respectively, with the following semantics:
• R, x |= K+ϕ provided for every y > x there is z ∈ (x, y) such that R, z |= ϕ.
• R, x |= K−ϕ provided for every y < x there is z ∈ (y, x) such that R, z |= ϕ.
Can we axiomatize K+,K− over classes of linear orders? In our completeness
proof for G,H, [d] on the reals, and in that of [53] for G,H, on the reals, a cru-
cial role is played by the Shuﬄe construction. To use Shuﬄe for G,H,K+,K−,
we may have to modify Shuﬄe and/or add other constructions in a way that
makes them sensitive to being after and to being before a point.
I would like to thank Valentin Shehtman for suggesting the following two open ques-
tions:
3. Study the logic of G only together with [d]. Observe that, without the operator
H, we lose the Prior Axiom.
4. Study the logic of L interpreted on a continuous circle rather than on R.
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Part III
On Spatial Logic with derivative
and graded operators
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Chapter 14
Introduction
Among other semantics, modal languages have been interpreted also on topological
spaces. Topological semantics has a long history (for example, see the seminal [71])
and there is ongoing interest in the field (see [4] and Section 8.2.1 for further reading,
and [5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 32, 45, 46, 48, 52, 57, 58, 62, 64, 70, 72, 88, 91] for examples
of recent work). The main idea is to associate propositional variables to sets of points
of a topological space and give a topologically flavored semantics to modal operators.
For example:
• Derivative operator: [d]ϕ holds at a point a provided there is a neighborhood U
of a such that, for every b ∈ U \ {a}, we have that ϕ holds at b.
Together with these operators, we may have other operators more focused on points
than on open sets. For example:
• Graded, or counting, operators: for every n ∈ N, ^nϕ holds (at a point a) pro-
vided there are more than n points b such that ϕ holds at b.
In this part we will study the expressivity of the modal language L with modal oper-
ators {[d],^n | n ∈ N} interpreted on topological spaces. Traditionally, the expressivity
of modal languages have been compared to that of first-order languages. For example:
• The van Benthem Characterization Theorem states (roughly) that on Kripke
models, the basic modal language is equivalent to the bisimulation invariant frag-
ment of the first-order language associated to Kripke models [94].
• The Kamp Theorem states (roughly) that, on the naturals or the reals, the lin-
ear temporal language with ‘Until’ and ‘Since’ is equivalent to the first order
language associated to the naturals or the reals [55].
We would like to follow this path. Then, we must find a suitable first-order language
to describe topological spaces.
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If one wants to describe topological spaces in first order terms, the following lan-
guage L2 is probably one of the most ‘natural’. L2 is a two-sorted first order language:
we have first-sort variables x, y, ..., that are assigned to points, and second-sort variables
X,Y, ..., that are assigned to open sets. L2 may be defined over the desired signature of
relation, function, and constant symbols. But we always have a symbol =, that is inter-
preted as the equality relation, and a symbol ε, that is interpreted as the set membership
relation. L2 has the ‘usual’ boolean connectives, and quantifiers ∀x, ∃x for first-sort
variables and quantifiers ∀X, ∃X for second-sort variables with the ‘usual’ meaning.
As we would like to characterize (a fragment of) L2 in modal terms, we restrict the
signature of L2 to a countably infinite set of unary relation symbols.
Unfortunately, L2 on topological spaces fails to have two important properties
‘characterizing’ First-order Logic1: Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems.
However, if we add some restrictions to L2, we obtain the first-order language Lt of
[40, Part 1 §2]. Lt is just as L2 except for the definition of second-sort quantification.
For Lt, second-sort quantification is defined by:
• If ϕ is positive2 in X, ∀X(xεX → ϕ) is a formula of Lt;
• If ϕ is negative in X, ∃X(xεX ∧ ϕ) is a formula of Lt.
The language Lt, unlike L2, interpreted on topological spaces enjoys the Compact-
ness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem [40, Part 1 §2, 3]. In fact, there is no language
(under certain conditions) for describing topological spaces that is more expressive
than Lt and enjoys compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem [40, Part 1 §8].
Moreover Lt can express ‘non-trivial’ topological properties: for examples, T0, T1,
T2 and T3 axioms, triviality, discreteness, continuity, etc. (However, Lt cannot express
normality, connectedness and compactness.) (See [40, Part 1 §3].)
Furthermore the Lt-theory of all T3 topological spaces is decidable. (However, for
i = 0, 1, 2, the Lt theory of all Ti topological spaces is undecidable, even without unary
relations.) (See [40, Part 2 §1].)
Finally, Lt is equivalent over topological spaces to the base-invariant fragment of L2
[40, Part 1, Theorem 4.19], where ‘base-invariance’ is defined as follows. Call a basoid
model every structure (A,B) where A is a set and B is a base for a topology over A.
Let B̂ denote the topology generated by B. Let us interpret L2 over basoid models by
interpreting second-sort variables as elements of B. A formula ϕ[x1, ..., xn, X1, ..., Xm]
of L2 is said to be base-invariant provided for every basoid model (A,B), a1, ..., an ∈ A
and U1, ...,Um ∈ B,
(A,B) |= ϕ[a1, ..., an,U1, ...,Um] iff (A, B̂) |= ϕ[a1, ..., an,U1, ...,Um].
1Recall that, according to the Lindstro¨m Theorem, First-order Logic is (roughly) ‘the strongest logic
(satisfying certain conditions) that enjoys compactness and satisfies the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem’.
2An L2 formula is positive (negative) in a second-sort variable X provided all the free occurrences of X
are under an even (odd) number of negation signs.
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Because of its ’nice’ properties, we will take Lt as our first-order language to de-
scribe topological spaces, and we will compare the expressivity of L to that of Lt.
14.1 Content of Part III
In Chapter 15, we fix preliminary notation and results. In Chapter 16, we introduce the
language L with modal operators {[d],^n | n ∈ N}. In Chapter 17, we prove that on the
class of all T3 topological spaces Lt and L are equivalent:
• For all formulas ϕ[x] ∈ Lt there is a formula ψ ∈ L such that, for every T3 model
M, and point a ∈ M, we have:
M |= ϕ[a] if and only ifM, a |= ψ.
• For all formulas ϕ ∈ L there is a formula ψ[x] ∈ Lt such that, for every T3 model
M, and point a ∈ M, we have:
M, a |= ϕ if and only ifM |= ψ[a].
There are at least two interpretations of this result that are worth mentioning. We
can read this result as a van Benthem characterization theorem: on the class of all T3
topological spaces L is the base invariant fragment of L2. We can read this result also
as a Kamp theorem: on the class of all T3 topological spaces, L ‘captures’ Lt.
In Section 17.2.3, we prove that there is a computable translation from Lt to L. In
Section 17.2.4 we prove that the equivalence between Lt and L fails over the class of
all T2 spaces. In Chapter 18 we try to answer the question if it is possible to extend
L to regain the equivalence between an extension of L and Lt on the class of all T2
topological spaces.
Traditionally, one way to extend a modal language is to add new modal operators.
This leads to the questions of what is a modal operator, and of whether we can add
modal operators to L to regain the equivalence between the extension of L and Lt on
the class of all T2 topological spaces.
As an answer, in Section 18.1 we give a more general definition of modal operator.
Following Gabbay, Hodkinson and Reynolds [42, Chapter 6], the semantics of modal
operators will be defined by a formula of Lt with at most one free first-sort variable
and no free second-sort variables. We will call point-sort modal operator every modal
operator whose semantics is defined by an Lt formula without occurrences of second-
sort variables. In Section 18.2, we show that even if we enrich L with all the point-sort
modal operators, call L+ the resulting language, however we add finitely many modal
operators to L+, we cannot express Lt on T2 topological models.
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Finally, in Chapter 19, we study the logic of L on any class X between the class of
all T1 topological spaces and the class of all T3 topological spaces. We prove that this
logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete. Moreover, we provide an axiomatization for
this logic, and prove that this logic is strongly complete.
14.2 Related works
14.2.1 Coderivative operator
See Section 8.2.1.
14.2.2 Graded modalities
Graded modalities have been introduced by Fine [38, 1969], [39, 1972], Goble [47,
1970], and Kaplan [56, 1970]. Fine gave axiomatizations for the class of all Kripke
models, all T (reflexive), all B (symmetric), all S5 (reflexive, transitive, symmetric),
and other classes of Kripke models. Their completeness is proved with a construction
a` la Lemmon and Scott. Goble interpreted graded modalities as different grades of
possibility on a non-Kripke semantics, and provided a complete axiomatization. We
could not access Kaplan’s work.
In [36, 1985], Fattorosi-Barnaba and de Caro also considered graded modalities on
the class of all T Kripke models, provided a set of axioms, and proved the complete-
ness and decidability of the resulting logic. As Fattorosi-Barnaba later stated in [34,
1999], he was not aware of Fine’s and Kaplan’s work when he and de Caro wrote [36,
1985]. In [26, 1988], de Caro extended [36, 1985] providing a more general complete-
ness proof, a` la Lemmon and Scott, and complete axiomatizations for the class of all
Kripke models, all K4 (transitive), all T, and all S5. In [35, 1988], Fattorosi-Barnaba
and Cerrato provided a complete axiomatization for the class of all S4 (reflexive and
transitive) Kripke models. In [22, 1990] Cerrato proved that the construction of [26,
1988] does not work for KB (symmetric), KBD (symmetric and serial), and KBT (re-
flexive and symmetric) Kripke models, and provided a new, more general, construction
and complete axiomatizations for these classes of Kripke models. In [96, 1992], van der
Hoek studied the expressivity, and definability of graded modalities. Also, he proved
the finite model property and decidability for the graded logic of the main classes of
Kripke models between K and S5. In [23, 1994], Cerrato also obtained decidability
for the logics of the main classes of Kripke models between K and S5, by means of a
filtration. In [98, 1995], de Rijke and van der Hoek proved that the satisfiability prob-
lem for graded modalities is PSPACE-complete (if the grades are coded in unary) and
EXPTIME (if the grades are coded in binary) on the class of all Kripke models, and
NP-complete (if the grades are coded in unary) and PSPACE (if the grades are coded in
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binary) on the class of all S5 Kripke models. In [93, 1999], Tobies proved that the sat-
isfiability problem for graded modalities is PSPACE-complete (even if the grades are
coded in binary). In [27, 2000], de Rijke offered a notion of bisimulation for graded
modalities, and from this he proved the finite model property, and some definability
and invariance results.
In [65, 2002], Kupferman, Sattler and Vardi investigated the graded µ-calculus,
proving that its satisfiability problem is EXPTIME-complete (both if the grades are
coded in unary and binary). In [17, 2004], Bonatti and Peron proved that µ-calculus
with inverse programs, graded modalities, and nominals is undecidable (full µ-calculus).
In [16, 2006], Bonatti, Lutz, Murano and Vardi investigated the complexity of the sat-
isfiability problem for the fragments of full µ-calculus obtained dropping one among in-
verse programs, graded modalities, and nominals. They obtained EXPTIME-completeness
in all cases (both if the grades are coded in unary and binary).
In [37, 1995], Fattorosi-Barnaba and Grassotti studied the infinitary version of
Graded Modal Logic. They noticed that in this framework, a finite modality stating
the existence of a finite number of elements, could be defined. They also provided a
complete axiomatization of this logic. Following this path, in [34, 1999], Fattorosi-
Barnaba and Balestrini considered the (finitary) modal logic with a modality stating
the existence of a finite number of elements, and they provided a complete axiomati-
zation. Similar to this, in [75, 2004] Pacuit and Salame introduced a majority modality
quantifying over more than half of the accessible worlds, and provided a complete ax-
iomatization for the resulting logic. And earlier in [97, 1996], van der Hoek introduced
a modality ≥ defined as ϕ ≥ ψ provided ϕ holds in at least as many accessible worlds
as ψ.
Graded modalities have also been interpreted according to other semantics. We
already mentioned the work of Goble [47, 1970]. In [90, 1997], in the context of Fuzzy
Logic, Suzuki considered grades of modality ranging continuously from 0 to 1. In [50,
2007] Hershfeld and Rabinovich, in the context of Metric Temporal Logic, interpreted
graded modalities as stating the existence of at least n points in the next unit of time,
and proved some results on expressivity, which are somehow related to our results in
Chapter 18. In [78, 2010] Rabinovich proved that the satisfiability problem for Until,
Since and this interpretation of graded modalities on the real line is PSPACE-complete
if the index is coded in unary and EXPSPACE-complete if the index is coded in binary.
In [12, 2012], in the context of Computational Tree Logic (CTL), Bianco, Mogavero
and Murano enriched CTL with graded modalities stating the existence of at least n
(equivalence classes of) paths, proved results on expressivity, and that the satisfiability
problem is EXPTIME, both if the grades are coded in unary and binary.
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Chapter 15
Preliminaries
15.1 Topology
In this section we introduce some basic aspects of Topology. Topology is a well es-
tablished branch of Mathematics that studies topological spaces. Topological spaces
are a general representation of ‘space’, that allow us to define and study notions such
as ‘continuity’, ‘connectedness’, and ‘convergence’. Other representations of spaces
in Mathematics, for example metric spaces, rely on topological spaces enriched with
additional structure. For further reading see [99].
15.1.1 Topological spaces
A topological space is a tuple (A, τ) such that A is a set, τ ⊆ P(A), and:
1. ∅, A ∈ τ.
2. τ is closed under unions and finite intersections - that is, for every set I, and
{Ui}i∈I ⊆ τ, we have ⋃i∈I Ui ∈ τ, and, for every U1,U2 ∈ τ, we have U1∩U2 ∈ τ.
The set τ is called a topology on A. The elements of A are called points. The elements
of τ are called open sets. For every a ∈ A, we call a neighborhood of a every U ∈ τ
such that a ∈ U. For every C ⊆ A, if A \ C ∈ τ, then we call C a closed set. For every
open U, if U is also closed, then we call U a clopen set.
Example 15.1. We give some examples of topological spacesA = (A, τ):
1. τ = P(A). Plainly, τ is a topology on A, called the discrete topology on A.
2. τ = {∅, A}. Plainly, τ is a topology on A, called the trivial topology on A.
3. A = {a, b}, and τ = {∅, {a}, A}. Plainly, τ is a topology on A.
4. Further examples will be given later.
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15.1.2 Topological bases
For every topological space (A, τ), we call a base for τ every set B ⊆ τ such that
τ = {⋃ B | B ⊆ B}. If B is a base for τ, we say that B generates τ.
Proposition 15.2. For every set A, and B ⊆ P(A), the following facts are equivalent:
1. There is a topology τ on A generated by B.
2. B enjoys:
(a) A =
⋃B.
(b) For every B, B′ ∈ B, and a ∈ B ∩ B′, there is B′′ ∈ B such that a ∈ B′′ ⊆
B ∩ B′.
Proof. See [99, Theorem 5.3]. 
Example 15.3. For every x, y ∈ R such that x < y, the set (x, y) = {z ∈ R | x < z < y} is
called an open interval of R. The set of all open intervals of R is a base for a topology
over R, called the usual topology and denoted by ε.
A topological space (A, τ) such that there is a base B for τ of which every element is a
clopen set of τ is called a 0-dimensional topological space.
15.1.3 Interior and closure
Definition 15.4. Consider a topological space (A, τ), and a subset B ⊆ A. Define the
interior of B, notation int(B), as the biggest open set included in B:
int(B) :=
⋃
{U ∈ τ |U ⊆ B}.
Define the closure of B, notation cl(B), as the smallest closed set including B:
cl(B) :=
⋂
{U |U is closed ∧ B ⊆ U}.
Observe that, since topologies are closed under arbitrary unions, the notions of interior
and closure are well defined.
Example 15.5. For every a, b ∈ R such that a < b, recall that (a, b] = {c ∈ R | a < c ≤
b}, [a, b) = {c ∈ R | a ≤ c < b}, and [a, b] = {c ∈ R | a ≤ c ≤ b}. Consider (R, ε). As the
reader may confirm, we have:
int((a, b]) = (a, b),
cl((a, b]) = [a, b].
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15.1.4 Ti topological spaces (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
In this section we define T1, T2, and T3 topological spaces. These definitions provide a
classification of topological spaces according to ‘how much their topologies separate’,
with T1 topologies separating the least, and T3 topologies separating the most1.
Definition 15.6. We say that:
1. A topological space (A, τ) is a T1 topological space provided, for every distinct
a, a′ ∈ A, there is U ∈ τ such that a ∈ U and a′ < U.
a′a
U
Figure 15.1: There is U ∈ τ such that a ∈ U and a′ < U
2. A topological space (A, τ) is a T2 topological space provided, for every distinct
a, a′ ∈ A, there are U,U′ ∈ τ such that a ∈ U, a′ ∈ U′, and U ∩ U′ = ∅.
a′a
U′U
Figure 15.2: There are U,U′ ∈ τ such that a ∈ U, a′ ∈ U′, and U ∩ U′ = ∅
3. A topological space (A, τ) is a regular topological space provided, for every
a ∈ A, and closed set C such that a < C, there are U,U′ ∈ τ such that a ∈ U,
C ⊆ U′, and U ∩ U′ = ∅.
a
C UU
′
Figure 15.3: There are U,U′ ∈ τ such that a ∈ U, C ⊆ U′, and U ∩ U′ = ∅
4. A topological space (A, τ) is a T3 topological space provided it is T2 and regular.
For every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let Ti be the class of all Ti topological spaces. Plainly, for every
i ∈ {1, 2}, Ti+1 ⊆ Ti.
Example 15.7. Consider a topological space A = (A, τ) such that A is an infinite set,
and τ is the set of all cofinite subsets of A (recall that a subset is cofinite provided its
complement is finite). PlainlyA is T1, and not T2.
1There are also other classes. For example, a topological space (A, τ) is a T0 topological space provided,
for every distinct a, a′ ∈ A, there is U ∈ τ such that (a ∈ U and a′ < U) or (a < U and a′ ∈ U).
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Example 15.8. LetB1 := {(a, b) | a, b ∈ R∧a < b}, B2 := {(a, b)∩Q | a, b ∈ R∧a < b},
and B := B1 ∪ B2. Plainly, B is a base for a topology on R, say τ. To continue our
example, we show that:
Proposition 15.9. (R, τ) is T2 and not T3.
Proof. Observe that B1 generates the usual topology ε over R. As the reader may
confirm, (R, ε) is T2. Then, since B1 ⊆ B and (R, ε) is T2, we have that (R, τ) is T2 as
well.
We show that (R, τ) is not T3. Since T3 means T2 and regular, showing that (R, τ)
is not regular suffices. Since Q =
⋃
n∈N((−n, n)∩Q), we have Q ∈ τ. Then, Q := R \Q
is closed in (R, τ). Consider a point a ∈ R\Q. Suppose by contradiction that (R, τ) is
regular. Then, there are open sets Ba ∈ B and OQ ∈ τ such that a ∈ Ba, Q ⊆ OQ, and
Ba ∩ OQ = ∅.
Now, since Ba ∈ B, and Ba ∩ Q = ∅, we have Ba ∈ B2. Then, Ba = (b, c) ∩ Q for
some b, c ∈ R such that b < c. Then, since Q is dense in (R, ε), there is d ∈ (b, c) ∩Q.
Consider an arbitrary set B in B such that d ∈ B. Then, since d ∈ Q, we have that
B ∈ B1. Moreover, since d ∈ (b, c) and d ∈ B, we have that (b, c) ∩ B , ∅. Then, since
Q is dense in (R, ε), we have that ((b, c)∩ B)∩Q , ∅. Then, since Ba = (b, c)∩Q, we
have that Ba ∩ B , ∅. Then, by arbitrariness of B, we have that d ∈ cl(Ba). Then:
cl(Ba) ∩Q , ∅. (15.1)
However, the closure cl(Ba) of Ba in (R, τ) is the smallest closed set in (R, τ) in-
cluding Ba. Then, its complement cl(Ba) is the biggest open set in (R, τ) disjoint from
Ba. Then, since OQ is an open set in (R, τ) disjoint from Ba, we have OQ ⊆ cl(Ba).
Then, as Q ⊆ OQ, we have Q ⊆ cl(Ba), a contradiction of (15.1). 
Recall that ⊂ denotes proper inclusion. Then, for every i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Ti+1 ⊂ Ti.
Example 15.10. As the reader may confirm, (R, ε) is T3.
15.2 First-order Logic
The aim of this section is to fix notation and concepts of First-order Logic that will be
used throughout the rest of this document. Since this dissertation treats advanced topics
in Logic, we assume the reader familiar with these definitions and results. Then, we do
not contextualize or discuss them, and we may use them later without mentioning. We
refer to [24] for a deeper treatment.
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15.2.1 First-order languages
Consider a countably infinite set Var, whose elements are called variables and are
denoted by small latin letters x, y, ....
Call a signature every tuple ({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a). The elements of { fi}i∈I are
called function symbols, the elements of {R j} j∈J are called relation symbols, and the
elements of {ck}k∈K are called constant symbols. a is a function a : { fi}i∈I∪{R j} j∈J → N,
called arity. For every ξ ∈ { fi}i∈I ∪ {R j} j∈J , a(ξ) is called the arity of ξ.
For every signature σ = ({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a), define the terms (in σ) recur-
sively as follows:
• Every variable is a term.
• Every constant symbol is a term.
• If f is a function symbol, and t0, ..., ta( f )−1 are terms, then f (t0, ..., ta( f )−1) is a
term.
Define the atomic formulas (in σ) as follows:
• > is an atomic formula.
• For every two terms t0, t1, t0 = t1 is an atomic formula.
• For every relation symbol R, and terms t0, ..., ta(R)−1, R(t0, ..., ta(R)−1) is an atomic
formula.
Then, ‘equality’ is always available. Define the first-order language (in σ), denoted by
Lσ, as the smallest set such that:
• All atomic formulas are in Lσ.
• For every ϕ ∈ Lσ, we have ¬ϕ ∈ Lσ.
• For every ϕ, ψ ∈ Lσ, we have (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ Lσ.
• For every x ∈ Var, and ϕ ∈ Lσ, we have ∀xϕ ∈ Lσ.
Call a formula (of Lσ) every element of Lσ. To avoid proliferation of parentheses, the
usual precedence rules among operators are assumed. ⊥, ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ → ψ, ϕ ↔ ψ, and
∃xϕ are defined as the usual abbreviations.
For every x ∈ Var, and ϕ ∈ Lσ, we say that x occurs free in ϕ provided:
• If ϕ is an atomic formula, x occurs in ϕ.
• If ϕ is ¬ψ, x is free in ψ.
• If ϕ is ψ ∧ χ, x is free in ψ or χ.
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• If ϕ is ∀yψ, x is free in ψ and x is different from y.
For every pairwise distinct x0, ..., xn−1 ∈ Var, and ϕ ∈ Lσ, if we write ϕ[x0, ..., xn−1],
then the variables that occur free in ϕ are among x0, ..., xn−1. An array of variables
x0, ..., xn−1 may be denoted by x. Call a sentence of Lσ every formula of Lσ with no
occurring free variables. For every ϕ ∈ Lσ, x ∈ Var, and term t, define ϕ[t/x] as the
formula that we obtain by replacing every free occurrence of x in ϕ with t.
The quantifier depth of a first-order formula is the maximal nesting of quantifiers.
More precisely, for every ϕ ∈ Lσ, define the notion of quantifier depth of ϕ, denoted by
qd(ϕ), recursively as follows:
• If ϕ is an atomic formula, then qd(ϕ) = 0.
• If ϕ is ¬ψ, then qd(ϕ) = qd(ψ).
• If ϕ is ψ ∧ χ, then qd(ϕ) = max{qd(ψ), qd(χ)}.
• If ϕ is ∀xψ, then qd(ϕ) = 1 + qd(ψ).
For every n ∈ N, let Lnσ := {ϕ ∈ Lσ | qd(ϕ) ≤ n} be the set of formulas of Lσ with
quantifier depth at most n.
15.2.2 Semantics
For every signature σ = ({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a), call a model (for σ) every tuple:
M = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K)
such that:
• A is a non-empty set, called the domain (ofM).
• For every i ∈ I, fMi : Aa( fi) → A.
• For every j ∈ J, RMj ⊆ Aa(R j).
• For every k ∈ K, cMk ∈ A.
For every ξ ∈ { fi}i∈I ∪ {R j} j∈J ∪ {ck}k∈K , ξM is called the interpretation of ξ (inM).
For every model M = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K), call an assignment (in M)
every function g : Var → A. For every assignment g, x ∈ Var, and a ∈ A, define g[a/x]
as the function that associates x to a and on every other variable behaves like g.
For every modelM, term t, and assignment g, define g(t) recursively as follows:
• If t is a variable x, then g(t) := g(x).
• If t is a constant symbol c, then g(t) := cM.
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• If t is of the form f (t0, ..., ta( f )−1) ( f a function symbol, and t0, ..., ta( f )−1 terms),
then g(t) := fM(g(t0), ..., g(ta( f )−1)).
For every model M = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K), ϕ ∈ Lσ, and assignment g,
defineM |= ϕ(g) recursively as follows:
• If ϕ is >, thenM |= ϕ(g) always.
• If ϕ is t0 = t1 (t0, t1 terms), thenM |= ϕ(g) provided g(t0) = g(t1).
• If ϕ is R(t0, ..., ta(R)−1) (R a relation symbol, and t0, ..., ta(R)−1 terms), then M |=
ϕ(g) provided (g(t0), ..., g(ta(R)−1)) ∈ RM.
• If ϕ is ¬ψ (ψ ∈ Lσ), thenM |= ϕ(g) provided notM |= ψ(g).
• If ϕ is ψ ∧ χ (ψ, χ ∈ Lσ), thenM |= ϕ(g) providedM |= ψ(g) andM |= χ(g).
• If ϕ is ∀xψ (x ∈ Var, ψ ∈ Lσ), then M |= ϕ(g) provided, for every a ∈ A, we
haveM |= ψ(g[a/x]).
IfM |= ϕ(g), then we say thatM satisfies ϕ under the assignment g. It is easy to see
that for every modelM = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K), formula ϕ[x0, ..., xn−1] ∈ Lσ,
and assignment g, whetherM |= ϕ(g) depends only on the value of g on x0, ..., xn−1 -
that is, for every two assignments g and g′, if:
g{xi | i ∈ n} = g′{xi | i ∈ n},
then:
M |= ϕ(g) if and only ifM |= ϕ(g′).
For every pairwise distinct a0, ..., an−1 ∈ A, let M |= ϕ[a0, ..., an−1] denote that there
is an assignment g such that g(xi) = ai (i ∈ n) and M |= ϕ(g). By what we said,
M |= ϕ[a0, ..., an−1] is equivalent to say that for every assignment g such that g(xi) = ai
(i ∈ n), we haveM |= ϕ(g).
As a consequence, for every sentence ϕ, and model M, whether M |= ϕ(g) does
not depend on the assignment g - that is, for every assignment g, g′:
M |= ϕ(g) if and only ifM |= ϕ(g′).
For every sentence ϕ, letM |= ϕ denote that there is an assignment g such thatM |=
ϕ(g). Then, M |= ϕ is equivalent to the fact that, for every assignment g, we have
M |= ϕ(g). IfM |= ϕ, then we say thatM satisfies ϕ.
For every two modelsM andN , we say thatM andN are elementarily equivalent,
notationM ≡Lσ N , provided, for every sentence ϕ ∈ Lσ, we have:
M |= ϕ if and only if N |= ϕ.
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For every set of sentences Γ ⊆ Lσ, we say that Γ has a model provided there is a
modelM such that, for every γ ∈ Γ, we haveM |= γ. For every modelM, ifM is a
model of Γ, then we writeM |= Γ.
15.2.3 Isomorphisms
For every two models for σM = (A, ...) andN = (B, ...), call an isomorphism between
M and N every function g : A→ B such that:
1. g is a bijection.
2. For every relation symbol R, and a0, ..., aa(R)−1 ∈ A, we have (a0, ..., aa(R)−1) ∈ RM
if and only if (g(a0), ..., g(aa(R)−1)) ∈ RN .
3. For every function symbol f , and a0, ..., aa( f )−1 ∈ A, we have g( fM(a0, ..., aa( f )−1)) =
fN (g(a0), ..., g(aa( f )−1)).
4. For every constant symbol c, we have g(cM) = cN .
IfM = N , then g is called automorphism. If there is an isomorphism betweenM and
N then we say thatM and N are isomorphic. If two models are isomorphic, then they
are elementarily equivalent. For further reading see ([24, Chapter 1]).
15.2.4 Properties
A vast number of results in First-order Logic lies on the following two properties of
first-order languages.
Theorem 15.11. Let σ be a signature. Then, the following facts hold:
• Compactness Theorem. For every set of sentences Γ ⊆ Lσ, if every finite subset
of Γ has a model, then Γ has a model.
• Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. For every countable set of sentences Γ ⊆ Lσ,
if Γ has an infinite model, then Γ has a countably infinite model. (This is the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem as stated in [40]. More general versions of the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem exist - see [24, Chapter 2].)
Not only are these properties important, they also characterize First-order Logic in the
sense of the Lindstro¨m Theorem. Roughly, the Lindstro¨m Theorem states that there
is no language (satisfying certain properties) that is more expressive than first-order
languages and enjoys Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem simultaneously.
A more formal statement of the Lindstro¨m Theorem would require a detour which is
outside the scope of this thesis (for further reading see [24, Chapter 2]).
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15.2.5 n-sorted first-order languages (n ∈ N)
Suppose that we want to talk about mathematical structures whose domain is made of
objects of n different types (n ∈ N). Then, we may want to use the so-called n-sorted
first-order languages.
For every sort i = 1, ..., n we have a countably infinite set of variables Vari, whose
elements are called ith sort variables.
Signatures have to specify information about sorts. Call a signature every tuple
({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a, b, c). As before, the elements of { fi}i∈I are called function
symbols, the elements of {R j} j∈J are called relation symbols, the elements of {ck}k∈K
are called constant symbols, and a : { fi}i∈I ∪ {R j} j∈J → N is called arity. b is a function
b : { fi}i∈I ∪ {ck}k∈K → {1, ..., n}. For every ξ ∈ { fi}i∈I ∪ {ck}k∈K , b(ξ) is called the sort of
ξ. c is a function that associates every ξ ∈ { fi}i∈I ∪ {R j} j∈J to an element of a(ξ){1, ..., n} -
that is, to an a(ξ)-tuple (n0, ..., na(ξ)−1) such that, for every i ∈ {0, ..., a(ξ) − 1}, we have
ni ∈ {1, ..., n}. For every ξ ∈ { fi}i∈I ∪ {R j} j∈J , the a(ξ)-tuple c(ξ) = (n0, ..., na(ξ)−1) is
called the template of ξ.
Terms, atomic formulas and formulas are defined taking into account the sort of
terms and the template of function and relation symbols. For every signature σ =
({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a, b, c), define the terms (in σ) and their sort recursively as fol-
lows:
• For every i = 1, ..., n, every ith sort variable is a term, whose sort is i.
• Every constant symbol c is a term, whose sort is b(c).
• If f is a function symbol such that c( f ) = (n0, ..., na( f )−1), and t0, ..., ta( f )−1 are
terms such that, for every i ∈ a( f ), the sort of ti is ni, then f (t0, ..., ta( f )−1) is a
term, whose sort is b( f ).
Define atomic formulas (in σ) as follows:
• > is an atomic formula.
• For every i ∈ {1, ..., n}, and terms t1, t2 with the same sort, t1 = t2 is an atomic
formula.
• If R is a relation symbol such that c(R) = (n0, ..., na(R)−1), and t0, ..., ta(R)−1 are
terms such that, for every i ∈ a(R), the sort of ti is ni, then R(t0, ..., ta(R)−1) is an
atomic formula.
Define the n-sorted first-order language (in σ), denoted by Lσ, as the smallest set such
that:
• All atomic formulas are in Lσ.
• For every ϕ ∈ Lσ, we have ¬ϕ ∈ Lσ.
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• For every ϕ, ψ ∈ Lσ, we have ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Lσ.
• For every i = 1, ..., n, x ∈ Vari, and ϕ ∈ Lσ, we have ∀xϕ ∈ Lσ.
15.2.6 Semantics
For every signature σ = ({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a, b, c), call a model (for Lσ) every
tuple:
M = (A1, ..., An, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K)
such that:
• A1, ..., An are pairwise disjoint non-empty sets;
• For every i = 1, ..., n, Ai is called the ith-sort domain ofM.
• The domain of the interpretation of a function symbol is defined by c, while the
range by b - that is, if f is a function symbol such that c( f ) = (n0, ..., na( f )−1),
then:
fMi : An0 × ... × Ana( f )−1 → Ab( f ).
• The domain of the interpretation of a relation symbol is defined by c - that is, if
R is a relation symbol such that c(R) = (n0, ..., na(R)−1), then:
RMi ⊆ An0 × ... × Ana(R)−1 .
• The domain of the interpretation of a constant symbol is defined by b - that is, if
c is a constant symbol, then:
cM ∈ Ab(c).
For every ξ ∈ { fi}i∈I ∪ {R j} j∈J ∪ {ck}k∈K , ξM is called the interpretation of ξ (inM).
For every model M = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K), call an assignment (in M)
every tuple g = (g1, ..., gn) of functions such that, for every i ∈ {1, ..., n}, gi : Vari → Ai.
For every gi, x ∈ Vari, and a ∈ Ai, define gi[a/x] as the function that associates x to a
and on every other ith-sort variable behaves like gi.
For every modelM, term t, and assignment g = (g1, ..., gn), define g(t) recursively
as follows:
• If t is a ith-sort variable x, then g(t) := gi(x).
• If t is a constant symbol c, then g(t) := cM.
• If t is of the form f (t0, ..., ta( f )−1) ( f a function symbol and t0, ..., ta( f )−1 terms),
then g(t) := fM(g(t0), ..., g(ta( f )−1)).
143
For every model M = (A1, ..., An, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K), ϕ ∈ Lσ, and assign-
ment g, defineM |= ϕ(g) recursively as follows:
• If ϕ is >, thenM |= ϕ(g) always.
• If ϕ is x = y (i ∈ {1, ..., n}, and x, y ∈ Vari), thenM |= ϕ(g) provided gi(x) = gi(y).
• If ϕ is R(t0, ..., ta(R)−1) (R a relation symbol and t0, ..., ta(R)−1 terms), then M |=
ϕ(g) provided (g(t0), ..., g(ta(R)−1)) ∈ RM.
• If ϕ is ¬ψ (ψ ∈ Lσ), thenM |= ϕ(g) provided notM |= ψ(g).
• If ϕ is ψ ∧ χ (ψ, χ ∈ Lσ), thenM |= ϕ(g) providedM |= ψ(g) andM |= χ(g).
• If ϕ is ∀xψ (i ∈ {1, ..., n}, x ∈ Vari, and ψ ∈ Lσ), thenM |= ϕ(g) provided, for
every a ∈ Ai, we haveM |= ψ(g0, ..., gi[a/x], ..., gn).
15.2.7 Properties
Plainly, first-order languages can be seen as 1-sorted first-order languages. Conversely,
every n-sorted first-order language can be translated into a first-order language. Indeed,
for every sort i ∈ {1, ..., n}, introduce a relation symbol Pi with arity 1. To have n many
domains, one for every sort, require that the domain is partitioned into n non-empty
parts. This can be expressed by a first-order sentence using the Pis:∧
i∈{1,...,n}
∃x Pi(x) ∧ ∀x
( ∨
i∈{1,...,n}
Pi(x) ∧
∧
i, j∈{1,...,n}
i, j
¬(Pi(x) ∧ P j(x))
)
.
To quantify over sort i, use the Pis to restrict the quantification to the sort i:
∀x (Pi(x)→ ϕ).
For every n ∈ N, to say that an n-ary function symbol f has sort i, use the Pis in the
formula:
∀x0...∀xn−1Pi( f (x0, ..., xn−1)).
To say that a constant symbol c has sort i, use the Pis in the formula:
Pi(c).
Therefore, the Compactness, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem and Lindstro¨m Theorems hold for
n-sorted first-order languages as well.
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15.3 Monadic Second-order Logic
Monadic second-order languages extend first-order languages. Together with a count-
ably infinite set of variables Var1, which will be assigned to elements of the domain
and whose elements are called first-order variables, we have a second countably infi-
nite set Var2 of variables, which will be assigned to subsets of the domain and whose
elements are called second-order variables. Moreover, we can say that a (first-order)
term belongs to a second order variable: we just write X(t), where X is a second-order
variable and t a (first-order) term. Finally, quantification is allowed over both set of
variables.
Formally, for every signature σ = ({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a), we have the additional
atomic formulas in σ given by:
• For every (first-order) term t and X ∈ Var2, X(t) is an atomic formula.
Finally, we have the additional formulas given by:
• For every X ∈ Var2, ϕ ∈ Lσ, we have ∀X ϕ ∈ Lσ.
Observe that monadic second-order languages can be translated into 2-sort first-order
languages by interpreting the latter over models whose second-sort domain is the pow-
erset of the first-sort domain and is assumed disjoint from the first-sort domain.
15.3.1 Semantics
For every signature σ = ({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a), models for Lσ are, as before, tu-
plesM = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K). For every modelM = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J ,
{cMk }k∈K), call an assignment (inM) every tuple g = (g1, g2) of functions g1 : Var1 → A
and g2 : Var2 → P(A). For every modelM = (A, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K), formula
ϕ, and assignment g = (g1, g2), the definition of M |= ϕ(g) requires the following
additional conditions:
• If ϕ is X(t) (t a (first-order) term, and X ∈ Var2), then M |= ϕ(g) provided
g1(t) ∈ g2(X).
• If ϕ is ∀X ψ (X ∈ Var2), thenM |= ϕ(g) provided, for every B ∈ P(A), we have
M |= ψ(g1, g2[B/X]).
15.3.2 Properties
Monadic second-order languages are strictly more expressive than first-order languages.
For example, when interpreted over (R, <), the corresponding monadic second-order
language can express the Completeness Axiom - that is, the sentence stating that every
non-empty, bounded subset of R has a least upper bound. Indeed:
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• Let ϕne(X) := ∃x X(x). Then ϕne(X) states that X is non-empty.
• Let ϕub(x,X) := ∀y (X(y) → y ≤ x). Then ϕub(X) states that x is an upper bound of
X.
• Let ϕ := ∀X(ϕne(X) ∧ ∃xϕub(x, X)→ ∃x (ϕub(x,X) ∧ ∀z (ϕub(z, X)→ x ≤ z)).
Then, ϕ is the desired formula.
On the other hand, the corresponding first-order language cannot express the Com-
pleteness Axiom. Indeed, the real numbers are the unique (up to isomorphism) com-
plete ordered field [89]. Now, being an ordered field is expressible in first-order lan-
guages. Then, if ϕ were expressible in first order-languages, by the Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorem, we would have a countable complete ordered field, sayM. Then, the
reals would be isomorphic toM. Then the reals would be countable, a contradiction.
This example also shows that monadic second-order languages do not satisfy the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. For, suppose they did. Then, since being a complete
order field is expressible in second-order languages, by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theo-
rem, we would have a countable complete ordered field, obtaining the same contradic-
tion.
Finally second-order languages do not enjoy the Compactness Theorem either. For,
consider the following set Γ of sentences:
1. < is linear.
2. For every n ∈ N, there are at least n distinct points.
3. For every set X, if X is non-empty, then X has a greatest element or a least
element.
Plainly, the sentences of Γ are expressible in second-order languages. Moreover, each
finite subset of Γ has a model. Now, suppose by contradiction that the Compactness
Theorem held for Monadic Second-order Logic. Then, Γ would have a model, say
M. Then, by 2, M would be an infinite linear order. However, as the reader may
confirm, each infinite linear order admits an infinite ascending sequence or an infinite
descending sequence. Then,M would not satisfy 3, a contradiction.
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Chapter 16
Language and semantics
Let Φ be a countable set, and τ := {[d],^n | n ∈ N}. Throughout Part III, we will work
with the language L := LΦ,τ. Let 〈d〉 := ¬[d]¬ and, for every n ∈ N, n := ¬^n¬.
The modal depth of a formula is the maximal nesting of modal operators and is
defined as:
Definition 16.1. For every ϕ ∈ L, define the modal depth of ϕ, denoted by md(ϕ),
recursively as follows:
• If ϕ is > or a propositional variable, then md(ϕ) := 0.
• If ϕ is ¬ψ, then md(ϕ) := md(ψ).
• If ϕ is ψ ∧ χ, then md(ϕ) := max{md(ψ),md(χ)}.
• If ϕ is [d]ψ, then md(ϕ) := 1 + md(ψ).
• If ϕ is ^nψ, then md(ϕ) := (n + 1) + md(ψ).
Cf. with the notion of quantifier depth defined in Section 15.2.1. For every n ∈ N, let
Ln := {ϕ ∈ L |md(ϕ) ≤ n} be the set of formulas of L with modal depth at most n.
16.1 Semantics
Call a topological model (for L) every tuple (A, τ,V) such that (A, τ) is a topological
space and V : Φ → P(A) is a function, called evaluation. Given a topological model
M = (A, τ,V), if we write a ∈ M, we mean a ∈ A.
For every topological model M = (A, τ,V), every a ∈ A, every p ∈ Φ and every
ϕ, ψ ∈ L, define:
• M, a |= > always.
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• M, a |= p provided a ∈ V(p).
• M, a |= ¬ϕ providedM, a 6|= ϕ.
• M, a |= ϕ ∧ ψ providedM, a |= ϕ andM, a |= ψ.
• M, a |= [d]ϕ provided there is a neighborhood U of a such that, for every a′ ∈
U \ {a}, we haveM, a′ |= ϕ.
• For every n ∈ N, M, a |= ^nϕ provided there are more than n distinct points
a′ ∈ A such thatM, a′ |= ϕ - that is:
|{a′ ∈ A |M, a′ |= ϕ}| > n.
Observe that then, for every n ∈ N,M, a |= nϕ provided there are at most n distinct
points a′ ∈ A such thatM, a′ 6|= ϕ - that is:
|{a′ ∈ A |M, a′ 6|= ϕ}| ≤ n.
Moreover, the satisfiability of formulas of the form ^nϕ and nϕ (n ∈ N) is invariant
under changing the point of evaluation - that is, for every a, a′ ∈ A we have:
M, a |= ^nϕ if and only ifM, a′ |= ^nϕ,
M, a |= nϕ if and only ifM, a′ |= nϕ.
For this reason, we call sentences of L the formulas in L which are a boolean com-
bination of formulas of the form ^nϕ and nϕ. For every sentence ϕ ∈ L, for every
topological modelM, if we writeM |= ϕ, we meanM, a |= ϕ for some (every) a ∈ M.
Analogously to Section 2.3, for every topological model M, and ϕ ∈ L (Γ ⊆ L,
respectively), we say thatM satisfies ϕ (M satisfies Γ, resp.) provided there is a ∈ M
such thatM, a |= ϕ (such thatM, a |= δ for every γ ∈ Γ, resp.).
For every two topological models M and N , a point a ∈ M and a point b ∈ N
are said to be modally equivalent (up to modal depth n resp.), denotedM, a ≡L N , b
(M, a ≡nL N , b resp.), provided, for every formula ϕ ∈ L (ϕ ∈ Ln resp.), we have
M, a |= ϕ if and only if N , b |= ϕ. If the models are understood, we simply write
a ≡L b (a ≡nL b resp.).
For every two topological models M and N , M and N are said to be modally
equivalent (up to modal depth n resp.), denotedM ≡L N (M ≡nL N resp.), provided,
for every sentence ϕ ∈ L (ϕ ∈ Ln resp.), we haveM |= ϕ if and only if N |= ϕ.
For every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and topological modelM = (A, τ,V), if (A, τ) is a Ti topo-
logical space, then we say thatM is a Ti topological model. We say that ϕ is satisfiable
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(Γ is satisfiable, resp.) on Ti provided there is a Ti topological model satisfying ϕ (sat-
isfying Γ, resp.), and that ϕ is valid on Ti provided ¬ϕ is not satisfiable on Ti. Let LTi
be the set of all valid formulas on Ti. Observe that LTi is a logic. For Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L,
we say that Γ semantically entails ϕ on Ti, notation Γ |=Ti ϕ, provided, for every Ti
topological modelM, and a ∈ M, ifM, a |= γ for every γ ∈ Γ, thenM, a |= ϕ.
Remark 16.2. The semantics for [d] defined in this section generalizes the semantics
for [d] defined in Section 10.1. Indeed, given a linear order I = (I, <), define the order
topology on I as the topology τ< generated by the base B consisting of all the open
intervals of I - that is, B = {(a, b) | a, b ∈ I ∧ a < b}. It is easy to prove that, for
every evaluation function V : Φ → I, formula ϕ ∈ LΦ,{[d]}, and a ∈ I, we have that the
following two statements are equivalent:
1. There are b, c ∈ I such that b < a < c and, for every d ∈ (b, c) \ {a}, we have
(I, <,V), d |= ϕ. (This is the semantics for [d] defined in Section 10.1.)
2. There is a neighborhood U of a such that for every b ∈ U\{a}we have (I, τ<,V), b |=
ϕ. (This is the semantics for [d] defined in this section.)
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Chapter 17
Expressivity
In this chapter we will study the expressivity of L. One way to study the expressivity
of a language is to compare its expressivity with the expressivity of another language.
Traditionally, the expressivity of modal languages has been compared to the expressiv-
ity of first-order languages. Famous examples are the van Benthem Characterization
Theorem [94] and the Kamp Theorem [55]. We will follow this tradition and compare
the expressivity of L to that of the first-order language Lt of Section 17.1.3. (For a
formal definition of what this means see Definitions 17.4 and 17.5.)
17.1 First-order languages
If one wants to talk about topological spaces in first-order terms, the ‘most natural’
choice is probably the language L2 of [40, Part 1, §1].
L2 is a two-sorted first-order language. We have a countably infinite set Var1 of
first-sort variables, which will be assigned to points, and will be denoted by small
Latin letters x, y, ...; and we have a countably infinite set Var2 of second-sort variables,
which will be assigned to open sets, and will be denoted by capital Latin letters X,Y, ....
L2 can be defined over the desired signature σ = ({ fi}i∈I , {R j} j∈J , {ck}k∈K , a, b, c),
with the only requirement that among the relation symbols {R j} j∈J of σ there is a re-
lation symbol ε that takes as arguments couples whose first component is a first-sort
variable and second component is a second-sort variable - that is, c(ε) = (1, 2). The
relation symbol ε will be interpreted as the set-membership relation ∈.
We will interpret L2 over topological models:
Definition 17.1. Call a topological model (for L2) every model for σ:
M = (A, τ, { fMi }i∈I , {RMj } j∈J , {cMk }k∈K , a, b, c),
such that (A, τ) is a topological space, and εM is the set-membership relation ∈. We
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say that a topological model (A, τ, ...) is countable provided A is countable and τ is
generated by a countable base1.
Let ∀Xx ϕ abbreviate ∀X (xεX → ϕ), and ∃Xx ϕ abbreviate ∃X (xεX∧ϕ). Moreover,
when, as in the case of topological models, Var1 is assigned to elements of a set, and
Var2 is assigned to subsets of this set, X = Y can, and will, be taken as an abbreviation
for ∀x(xεX ↔ xεY).
17.1.1 Properties of L2
On one hand, L2 can express a number of interesting topological properties [40, Part
1]:
• L2 can say that a topology is trivial:
∀X (∃x xεX → ∀x xεX).
• That a topology is discrete:
ϕdisc := ∀x∃X ∀y (yεX ↔ y = x).
• That a topological space is T1:
∀x∀y∃Xx (¬x = y→ ¬yεX).
• That a topological space is T2:
ϕT2 := ∀x∀y (¬x = y→ ∃X ∃Y (xεX ∧ yεY ∧ ∀z¬(zεX ∧ zεY))).
• That a topological space is regular:
ϕreg := ∀x∀Xx ∃Yx ∀y (¬yεX → ∃Wy ∀z¬(zεW ∧ zεY)).
Observe that this is a somehow ‘unusual’ definition of ‘regularity’. A more usual
one would be: for every closed set X, for every point x < X, there are disjoint
open sets Y and Z such that X ⊆ Y and x ∈ Z. This definition is expressible in
L2 and it is equivalent to the former definition of ‘regularity’. Nonetheless, the
former definition of ‘regularity’ is the one given in [40], and important formulas
in Chapter 18 are inspired by it. Therefore, we think it it useful to present this
definition of ‘regularity’ and define ϕreg as we did.
1In the literature, a topological space satisfying this condition is usually called second countable. How-
ever, we follow [40, p. 8] and say ‘countable’.
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• That a topological space is T3:
ϕT2 ∧ ϕreg.
• That a topological space is Alexandroff:
∀x∃Xx ∀Yx ∀y (yεX → yεY).
• That a topological space is dense-in-itself:
∀x∀Xx ∃y (¬y = x ∧ yεX).
• That a topological space is connected:
ϕcon := ∀X ∀Y (∀x (xεX ↔ ¬xεY)→ ∀x xεX ∨ ∀x¬xεX).
• That a topological space is normal:
ϕnor := ∀X ∀Y (X ∩ Y = ∅ → ∃Z ∃W (Z ∩W = ∅ ∧ X ⊆ Z ∧ Y ⊆ W)),
with, X ∩ Y = ∅ being an abbreviation for ∀x (xεX ∨ xεY), X ∩ Y = ∅ for
∀x¬(xεX ∧ xεY), and X ⊆ Y for ∀x (¬xεX → xεY).
• And, for every n-ary function symbol f , that f is continuous:
∀x1 ...∀xn ∀Y f (x1,...,xn) ∃X1x1 ...∃Xnxn ∀y1...∀yn
(y1εX1 ∧ ... ∧ ynεXn → f (y1, ..., yn) ∈ Y).
On the other hand, as stated in Section 15.2.4, the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorems are important properties of first-order languages. Moreover, they
characterize first-order languages in the sense of the Lindstro¨m Theorem. Therefore,
we would like L2 to enjoy these theorems.
Since L2 is a 2-sorted first-order language, as mentioned in Section 15.2.7, L2 en-
joys the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems when interpreted on the class
of all models for L2. But what about when interpreted on the class of all topological
models? Do we have the following versions of the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorems for topological models?
1. Compactness Theorem. For every set of sentences Γ ⊆ L2, if every finite subset
of Γ has a topological model, then Γ has a topological model.
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2. Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. For every countable set of sentences Γ ⊆ L2, if Γ
has an infinite topological model, then Γ has a countable topological model.
As observed in [40, Part 1, §1], the answer is no. Indeed, for every topological
modelM = (A, τ, ...), we have:
M |= ϕdisc if and only ifM has the discrete topology τ = P(A).
Then, monadic second-order languages can be expressed in L2 interpreted on the class
of all topological models. And, as mentioned in Section 15.3, the Compactness and
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems do not hold for monadic second-order languages.
17.1.2 A solution
If being a topological space were expressible in L2, then it would be easy to prove the
Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems for L2 interpreted on the class of all
topological models. Indeed, suppose that being a topological space were expressible by
a countable set of sentences Γ ⊆ L2. Then, for every set of sentences ∆ ⊆ L2, applying
the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems to Γ∪∆, we would obtain models
for Γ ∪ ∆. Then, these models would be topological models for ∆, as desired.
Although being a topological space is not expressible in L2, being a base for a
topology is - namely by the conjunction ϕbas of the following formulas:
• ∀x∃X xεX.
• ∀x∀X ∀Y (xεX ∧ xεY → ∃Z (xεZ ∧ ∀y (yεZ → yεX ∧ yεY))).
Moreover, call a basoid model every model:
M = (A,B, ...),
such that B is a base for a topology over A. Then, by reasoning as above, we obtain the
following versions of the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems:
1. Compactness Theorem. For every set of sentences Γ ⊆ L2, if every finite subset
of Γ has a basoid model, then Γ has a basoid model.
2. Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. For every countable set of sentences Γ ⊆ L2, if Γ
has an infinite basoid model, then Γ has a countable basoid model.
Suppose that Γ is invariant under changing base - that is, for every two basoid models
(A,B, ...) and (A,B′, ...) such that B and B′ generate the same topology, we have:
(A,B, ...) |= Γ if and only if (A,B′, ...) |= Γ.
Then, since every topology is a base for itself, we obtain:
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Theorem 17.2. The invariant under changing base fragment of L2 enjoys the Com-
pactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems:
1. Compactness Theorem. For every set Γ ⊆ L2 of sentences invariant under chang-
ing base, if every finite subset of Γ has a topological model, then Γ has a topo-
logical model.
2. Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. For every countable set Γ ⊆ L2 of sentences in-
variant under changing base, if Γ has an infinite topological model, then Γ has a
countable topological model.
Moreover, they characterize this fragment in the sense of the Lindstro¨m Theorem [40,
Part 1 §8]. Roughly, there is no language (satisfying certain properties) that is more
expressive than the invariant under changing base fragment of L2 and enjoys the Com-
pactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems simultaneously.
Recall that countable topological model means a model (A, τ, ...) such that A is
countable and τ is generated by a countable base. This is different from the statement
of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem for n-sorted first-order languages. There, we re-
quired the union of the n domains to be countable, while here τ may be uncountable.
However, since we are considering the invariant under changing base fragment of L2,
requiring A to be countable and τ to be generated by a countable base, let us work with
a basoid model (A,B) such that A is countable and B is a countable base for τ.
Now, one may ask:
• Can this fragment express interesting topological properties?
• Can we characterize this fragment in a ‘less obscure’ way than as the invariant
under changing base fragment of L2?
We try to answer these questions, starting from the latter, presenting the language Lt
of [40, Part 1, §2]. In [40, Part 1, Corollary 2.4 and Theorem 4.19], Lt is shown to be
equivalent to the invariant under changing base fragment of L2. We will then show that
Lt can express some interesting topological properties, although not as many as L2.
17.1.3 Language Lt
In this section we present the language Lt, introduced in [40, Part 1, §2]. For every
ϕ ∈ L2, and X ∈ Var2, say that ϕ is positive (negative, respectively) in X provided every
free occurrence of X in ϕ is within the scope of an even (odd, resp.) number of negation
symbols. Lt is the fragment of L2 obtained by allowing second-sort quantification only
in the following form:
• If s is a first-sort term, X ∈ Var2, and ϕ ∈ Lt is positive in X, then ∀Xs ϕ ∈ Lt.
• If s is a first-sort term, X ∈ Var2, and ϕ ∈ Lt is negative in X, then ∃Xs ϕ ∈ Lt.
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17.1.4 Properties of Lt
In this section we present some properties of Lt coming from [40, Part 1]. Lt can
express some interesting topological properties:
• Lt can say that a topology is trivial:
∀x∀Xx∀y yεX.
• That a topology is discrete:
∀x∃Xx ∀y (yεX → y = x).
• That a topological space is T1:
∀x∀y (x = y ∨ ∃Xx¬yεX).
• That a topological space is T2:
ϕT2 := ∀x∀y (x = y ∨ ∃Xx ∃Yy ∀z¬(zεX ∧ zεY)).
• That a topological space is regular:
ϕreg := ∀x∀Xx ∃Yx ∀y (yεX ∨ ∃Wy ∀z¬(zεW ∧ zεY)).
• That a topological space is T3:
ϕT3 := ϕT2 ∧ ϕreg.
• That a topological space is Alexandroff:
∀x∃Xx ∀Yx (¬yεX ∨ yεY).
• That a space is dense-in-itself:
∀x∀Xx ∃y (¬y = x ∧ yεX).
• And, for every n-ary function symbol f , that f is continuous:
∀x1 ...∀xn ∀Y f (x1,...,xn) ∃X1x1 ...∃Xnxn ∀y1...∀yn
(y1εX1 ∧ ... ∧ ynεXn → f (y1, ..., yn) ∈ Y).
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Moreover:
Theorem 17.3. The following facts hold:
1. Lt is invariant under changing base [40, Part 1, Corollary 2.4].
Therefore:
2. Compactness Theorem. For every set of sentences Γ ⊆ Lt, if every finite subset of
Γ has a topological model, then Γ has a topological model [40, Part 1, Theorem
3.2].
3. Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. For every countable set of sentences Γ ⊆ Lt, if Γ
has an infinite topological model, then Γ has a countable topological model [40,
Part 1, Theorem 3.4].
Furthermore:
4. For every invariant under changing base sentence ϕ ∈ L2, there is a sentence
ψ ∈ Lt such that, for every topological modelM, we have:
M |= ϕ if and only ifM |= ψ.
[40, Part 1, Theorem 4.19].
Points 1 and 4 together state that Lt is equivalent on topological models to the invariant
under changing base fragment of L2. Finally:
5. Lindstro¨m Theorem. Roughly, there is no language (satisfying certain properties)
that is more expressive than Lt and enjoys the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorem simultaneously. (For a more formal statement see [40, Part 1,
Theorem 8.1].)
Since Lt can express a number of interesting topological properties, enjoys the
Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems, by the Lindstro¨m Theorem is max-
imal with respect to the property of enjoying these theorems simultaneously, and is
equivalent to the invariant under changing base fragment of L2, we believe that Lt is
an excellent language to talk about topological spaces in first-order terms, and, since L
translate into Lt (Theorem 17.9), we will compare the expressive power of L to that of
Lt.
Nonetheless, there are interesting topological properties that Lt cannot express [40,
Part 1§3]. For example connectedness, expressible in L2 by the formula ϕcon of Section
17.1.1. Indeed, every connected and ordered topological field is isomorphic to the field
of the real numbers, Then uncountable. However, being an ordered topological field is
expressible in Lt. If connectedness were expressible in Lt too, then, by the Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorem, there would be a countable connected and ordered topological field,
a contradiction [40, Part 1, Proof of Corollary 3.6].
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17.2 Expressive power of L
In this section we compare the expressive power of L to the expressive power of Lt,
establishing that the two languages are equivalent on T3 topological models (see Defi-
nitions 17.4 and 17.5, and Theorem 17.13).
More formally, define Lt on the ‘same signature’ of L. That is, a signature σ con-
sisting only of the relation symbol ε and the propositional variables of L, intended as
unary relation symbols taking as arguments first-sort variables. An example of formula
in Lt is:
∀Xx ∃y (¬y = x ∧ yεX ∧ p(x)).
Observe that this is nothing else than the semantics of 〈d〉.
Incidentally, one may ask whether L2, defined over this signature and interpreted
over topological models, enjoys the Compactness and Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems
simultaneously. The answer is no (even if the signature consists of the only relation
symbol ε). Indeed, suppose by contradiction that L2, defined over this signature and
interpreted over topological models, enjoyed the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. Then,
as mentioned in [40, Part 1, Corollary 3.5], since L2 can express that a topological
space is regular and not normal, namely by the sentence ϕreg ∧ ¬ϕnor, there would be
a regular and not normal topological space with the topology generated by a countable
base. However, regular topological spaces with the topology generated by a countable
base are normal (see [99, Example 15.3(c), and Theorem 23.1]), and we would obtain
a contradiction.
Since the interpretation of ε is fixed to set-membership, from now on we will omit
mentioning ε when presenting topological models for Lt.
Moreover, observe that, for every topological modelM = (A, τ,V) for L, and p ∈
Φ, if we intend V(p) as the interpretation of p, then M can be seen as a topological
model for Lt. Conversely, for every topological modelM = (A, τ, {pM | p ∈ Φ}) for L,
and p ∈ Φ, if we intend pM as the evaluation of p, thenM can be seen as a topological
model for L. Then, we will confuse the two notions and simply call topological models
these objects.
Finally:
Definition 17.4. Given a class M of topological models, we say that:
1. Lt can express L sententially on M provided, for every sentence ϕ ∈ L, there
is a sentence ψ ∈ Lt such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on M - that is, for every
topological modelM ∈ M, we have:
M |= ϕ if and only ifM |= ψ.
2. L can express Lt sententially on M provided, for every sentence ϕ ∈ Lt, there is
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a sentence ψ ∈ L such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on M.
3. If both 1 and 2 hold, then we say that Lt and L are sententially equivalent on M.
Definition 17.5. Given a class M of topological models, we say that:
1. Lt can express L on M provided, for every formula ϕ ∈ L, there is a formula
ψ[x] ∈ Lt such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on M - that is, for every topological
modelM ∈ M, and a ∈ M, we have:
M, a |= ϕ if and only ifM |= ψ[a].
2. L can express Lt on M provided, for every formula ϕ[x] ∈ Lt, there is a formula
ψ ∈ L such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on M.
3. If both 1 and 2 hold, then we say that Lt and L are equivalent on M.
Definition 17.4 is motivated by the fact that sentences are evaluated on whole topolog-
ical models. Definition 17.5 is motivated by the fact that modal formulas are evaluated
at points of topological models. Observe that:
Proposition 17.6. For every class M of topological models, if Lt can express L on M,
then Lt can express L sententially on M.
Proof. Suppose that Lt can express L on M. Consider a sentence ϕ ∈ L. Then, ϕ is a
formula in L. Then, since, by hypothesis, Lt can express L on M, there is a formula
ψ[x] ∈ Lt such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on M. Then, plainly, ϕ and ∀xψ are
equivalent on M. Then, thesis follows by observing that ∀xψ is a sentence of Lt. 
Proposition 17.7. For every class M of topological models, if L can express Lt on M,
then L can express Lt sententially on M.
Proof. Suppose that L can express Lt on M. Consider a sentence ϕ ∈ Lt. Then, ϕ is
a formula in Lt with at most one free first-sort variable. Then, since, by hypothesis, L
can express Lt on M, there is a formula ψ ∈ L such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on M.
Then, plainly, ϕ and 0ψ are equivalent on M. Then, thesis follows by observing that
0ψ is a sentence of L. 
Corollary 17.8. For every class M of topological models, if L is equivalent to Lt on
M, then L is sententially equivalent to Lt on M.
In the next two sections we will prove that L and Lt are equivalent on the class of all
T3 topological spaces.
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17.2.1 Lt can express L on topological models
Lt can ‘always’ express L:
Theorem 17.9. The following facts hold:
1. Lt can express L sententially on the class of all topological models.
2. Lt can express L on the class of all topological models.
To prove this, we define the ‘standard translation’ from L to Lt.
Definition 17.10. For every formula ϕ ∈ L, and x ∈ Var1, define the standard transla-
tion S Tx(ϕ) of ϕ (from L to Lt) recursively as follows:
• If ϕ is >, then S Tx(ϕ) is >.
• If ϕ is p ∈ Φ, then S Tx(ϕ) is p(x).
• If ϕ is ¬ψ, then S Tx(ϕ) is ¬S Tx(ψ).
• If ϕ is ψ ∧ χ then S Tx(ϕ) is S Tx(ψ) ∧ S Tx(χ).
• For every n ∈ N, if ϕ is ^nψ, then S Tx(ϕ) is:
∃x0 ...∃xn (
∧
i, j∈n+1
i, j
¬xi = x j ∧
∧
i∈n+1
S Txi (ψ)),
with x0, ..., xn pairwise distinct first-sort variables.
• If ϕ is [d]ψ, then S Tx(ϕ) is:
∃Xx ∀y (¬x = y ∧ yεX → S Ty(ψ)),
with y ∈ Var1 \ {x}.
Remark 17.11. Plainly, for every formula ϕ ∈ L, we have that S Tx(ϕ) is a formula in
Lt with at most one free first-sort variable, namely x. Moreover, if ϕ is a sentence in L,
then S Tx(ϕ) is a sentence in Lt.
Proof of Theorem 17.9. For every ϕ ∈ L, take S Tx(ϕ). A simple induction shows that:
Lemma 17.12. For every topological modelM, and a ∈ M, we have:
M, a |= ϕ if and only ifM |= S Tx(ϕ)[a].
Proof. The only interesting cases are ^nψ and 〈d〉ψ.
Suppose that ϕ is^nψ. Consider an arbitrary topological modelM, and an arbitrary
a ∈ M. Suppose thatM, a |= ϕ. Then, by semantics, this is equivalent to the existence
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of pairwise distinct a0, ..., an ∈ M such that M, ai |= ψ (i ∈ n). Then, by inductive
hypothesis, this is equivalent toM |= S Txi (ψ)[ai] (i ∈ n, and x0, ..., xn ∈ Var1 pairwise
distinct). Then, by semantics, this is equivalent toM |= S Tx(ϕ)[a].
Suppose that ϕ is 〈d〉ψ. Consider an arbitrary topological modelM, and an arbitrary
a ∈ M. Suppose thatM, a |= ϕ. Then, by semantics, this is equivalent to: for every
neighborhood of a, there is a point b ∈ U \ {a} such thatM, b |= ψ. Then, by inductive
hypothesis, this is equivalent toM |= S Ty(ψ)[b] (y ∈ Var1 \ {x}). Then, by semantics,
this is equivalent toM |= S Tx(ϕ)[a]. 
From Lemma 17.12 and Remark 17.11, points 1 and 2 easily follow. 
17.2.2 Lt and L are equivalent on T3 topological models
In this section we prove that L is equivalent to Lt on the class of all T3 topological
models. More precisely, we prove that:
Theorem 17.13. The following facts hold:
1. L can express Lt sententially on the class of all T3 topological models. Moreover,
for every sentence ϕ ∈ Lt, there is an equivalent sentence ψ ∈ L such that qd(ϕ) =
md(ψ).
2. L can express Lt on the class of all T3 topological models. Moreover, for every
formula ϕ[x] ∈ Lt, there is an equivalent formula ψ ∈ L such that qd(ϕ) = md(ψ).
This, together with Theorem 17.9 yields the equivalence between L and Lt on T3 topo-
logical models. Observe that, here, we are also proving that we can go from Lt to L by
preserving the quantifier/modal depth of formulas. If we were not proving this preser-
vation property, by Proposition 17.7, we could get Point 1 from Point 2. However,
proving the preservation of quantifier/modal depth in Point 1 requires a direct proof of
Point 1.
To prove Theorem 17.13, we introduce (Definition 17.14) the Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´
game Gn(M,N) (n ∈ N andM,N topological models) of [40, Part 1, §4]. To prove 1,
we prove that: if Player II has a winning strategy in Gn(M,N), thenM and N agree
on the sentences of Lt with quantifier depth at most n (Corollary 17.16); and ifM and
N (M,N T3 0-dimensional topological models) agree on the same sentences of L with
modal depth at most n, then Player II has a winning strategy in Gn(M,N) (Proposition
17.18).
To prove 2, we prove that: if Player II has a winning strategy in Gn(M,N) (M,N
topological models) after (a, b) ∈ M × N has been played, then M and N agree on
the formulas of Lt with quantifier depth at most n − 1 and at most one free variable
assigned to a and b respectively (Corollary 17.17); and if M, a and N , b (M,N T3
0-dimensional topological models, and (a, b) ∈ M×N) agree on the same formulas of
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L with modal depth at most n − 1, then Player II has a winning strategy in Gn(M,N)
after (a, b) ∈ M ×N has been played (Proposition 17.21).
Definition 17.14. For every n ∈ N, and two distinct2 models M and N , define the
game Gn(M,N) between Player I and Player II as follows. n rounds are played. At
every round of the game, Player I first chooses a model C ∈ {M,N}, then Player I
chooses either to play a point c ∈ C or to play a couple (c,O), where c is a point in C
already played either by Player I or by Player II and O is a neighborhood of c. Then,
if Player I chose a point c ∈ C, Player II must choose a point d in D ∈ {M,N} \ {C}
while, if Player I chose a couple (c,O), Player II must choose a couple (d, P) such that
d is the point played in the same round as c, and P is an open in D ∈ {M,N} \ {C}
containing d. Player II wins if, at the end of the game:
1. If points a ∈ M and b ∈ N were played in the same round, and points a′ ∈ M
and b′ ∈ N were played in the same round, then a = a′ if and only if b = b′, and,
for every p ∈ Φ, pM(a) if and only if pN (b).
2. For every model C ∈ {M,N}, and point c ∈ C played either by Player I or by
Player II, if c is contained in an open O played by Player II, then the point d
played in the same round as c is contained in the open played by Player I in the
same round as O.
From now on, if we present a play in Gn(M,N) as (a, b), then we mean that a ∈ M and
b ∈ N ; similarly, if we present a play in Gn(M,N) as ((a,U), (b,V)), then we mean
that a ∈ M and U is a neighborhood of a, and b ∈ N and V is a neighborhood of b.
The game Gn offers a criterium to check whether two models are indistinguishable by
sentences in Lt of quantifier depth at most n (Corollary 17.16), and whether two points
in two models are indistinguishable by formulas in Lt with at most one free variable and
quantifier depth at most n − 1 (Corollary 17.17). To prove this, for every ϕ ∈ Lt, define
ϕ to be in negation normal form provided, treating ∨ and ∃ as additional primitive
operators, negation signs in ϕ occur only in front of atomic formulas. Then, prove the
following Proposition (cf. [40, Part 1, Lemma 4.6]):
Proposition 17.15. Let n be an arbitrary natural number. Let ϕ be an arbitrary formula
of ∈ Lnt such that:
• ϕ is in negation normal form;
• Each of ϕ’s free second-sort variables is either positive or negative - say ϕ is
ϕ[x, X+, X−], with x = (x1, ..., xm1 ) denoting the array of the first-sort variables
occurring free in ϕ, X+ = (X+m1+1, ..., X
+
m2 ) denoting the array of the positive
2Assuming the models distinct will simplify the notation. This assumption is harmless because we can
always assume the two models distinct, for example by conveniently renaming the elements of one of them.
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second-sort variables occurring free in ϕ, and X− = (X−m2+1, ..., X
−
m) denoting the
array of the negative second-sort variables occurring free in ϕ;
• qd(ϕ) + m ≤ n.
Assume that:
• Plays and only plays {(ai, bi)}m1i=1, {((ai,U+i ), (bi,V+i ))}m2i=m1+1, and {((ai,U−i ), (bi,V−i ))}mi=m2+1
have been played in some order;
• Player I played all the (a,U−)s;
• Player II played all the (a,U+)s;
• Player II has a winning strategy in Gn(M,N) at this point of the game.
Then:
• M |= ϕ[a,U+,U−] implies N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
Proof. By induction on ϕ. Since ϕ is in negation normal form, we treat the following
cases: >, x = y, xεX, p(x), ¬>, ¬x = y, ¬xεX, ¬p(x), ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, ∀Xxψ, and ∃Xxψ.
The > case is plain. Assume that ϕ is x = y. Then ϕ is xi = x j for some i, j ∈ N.
AssumeM |= xi = x j[a,U+,U−]. Then, ai = a j. Then, since Player II has a winning
strategy at this point of the game, by winning condition 1, we have bi = b j. Then,
N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
Assume that ϕ is xεX. Then, X occurs positively in ϕ. Then, ϕ is xiεX+j for some
i, j ∈ N. AssumeM |= xiεX j[a,U+,U−]. Then, ai ∈ U+j . Now, by hypothesis, U+j has
been played by Player II. Then, since Player II has a winning strategy at this point of
the game, by winning condition 2, we have bi ∈ V+j . Then, N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
Assume that ϕ is p(x). Then, ϕ is p(xi) for some i ∈ N. Assume M |= p(xi)[a,
U+,U−]. Then, pM(ai). Then, since Player II has a winning strategy at this point of
the game, by winning condition 1, we have pN (bi). Then, N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
The ¬> case is plain. Assume that ϕ is ¬(x = y). Then, ϕ is ¬(xi = x j) for some
i, j ∈ N. AssumeM |= xi = x j[a,U+,U−]. Then, ai , a j. Then, since Player II has
a winning strategy at this point of the game, by winning condition 1, we have bi , b j.
Then, N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
Assume that ϕ is ¬(xεX). Then, X occurs negatively in ϕ. Then, ϕ is ¬(xiεX−j ) for
some i, j ∈ N. AssumeM |= ¬(xiεX j)[a,U+,U−]. Then, ai < U−j . Now, by hypothesis,
V−j has been played by Player II. Then, since Player II has a winning strategy at this
point of the game, by winning condition 2, we have bi < V−j . Then, N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
Assume that ϕ is ¬p(x). Then, ϕ is ¬p(xi) for some i ∈ N. Assume M |=
¬p(xi)[a,U+,U−]. Then, not pM(ai). Then, since Player II has a winning strat-
egy at this point of the game, by winning condition 1, we have not pN (bi). Then,
N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
162
The ∧, ∨ cases are plain. Assume that ϕ is ∃Xx ψ. Then, x is xi for some i ∈ N and,
by definition of Lt, X is negative in ψ[x, X+, X−X]. Assume:
M |= ∃Xxi ψ[a,U+,U−].
Then, there is a neighborhood U of ai such thatM |= ψ[a,U+,U−U]. Let Player I play
(ai,U). Observe that in this case qd(ϕ) > 0. Then, m < n. Then, Player II can still make
a move according to its winning strategy. Let Player II play so choosing (bi,V). By def-
inition of the game, V is a neighborhood of bi. Observe that ψ and the plays {(ai, bi)}m1i=1,
{((ai,U+i ), (bi,V+i ))}m2i=m1+1, {((ai,U−i ), (biV−i ))}mi=m2+1, and ((ai,U), (bi,V)) satisfy the in-
ductive hypothesis. Then, since M |= ψ[a,U+,U−U], by inductive hypothesis, we
have N |= ψ[b,V+,V−V]. Then, N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−].
Assume that ϕ is ∀Xx ψ. Then, x is xi for some i ∈ N and, by definition of Lt, X is
positive in ψ[x, X+X, X−]. Assume:
M |= ∀Xxi ψ[a,U+,U−].
Then, for every neighborhood U of ai, we have M |= ψ[a,U+U,U−]. Consider an
arbitrary neighborhood V of bi and let Player I play (bi,V). Observe that in this case
qd(ϕ) > 0. Then, m < n. Then, Player II can still make a move according to its winning
strategy. Let Player II play so choosing (ai,U). By definition of the game, U is a neigh-
borhood of ai. Observe that ψ and the plays {(ai, bi)}m1i=1, {((ai,U+i ), (bi,V+i ))}m2i=m1+1,
{((ai,U−i ), (biV−i ))}mi=m2+1, and ((ai,U), (bi,V)) satisfy the inductive hypothesis. Then,
since M |= ψ[a,U+U,U−], by inductive hypothesis, we have N |= ψ[b,V+V,V−].
Then, N |= ϕ[b,V+,V−]. 
Now, observe that every formula in Lnt admits an equivalent formula in L
n
t in negation
normal form. Then, by Proposition 17.15, the following corollaries follow:
Corollary 17.16. (Cf. [40, Lemma 4.6].) For every n ∈ N, and two modelsM and N ,
if Player II has a winning strategy for Gn(M,N), then, for every sentence ϕ ∈ Lnt , we
have:
M |= ϕ if and only if N |= ϕ.
Corollary 17.17. For every n ∈ N, two modelsM and N , and two points a ∈ M and
b ∈ N , if Player II has a winning strategy for Gn(M,N) after (a, b) has been played,
then, for every formula ϕ[x] of Ln−1t , we have:
M |= ϕ[a] if and only if N |= ϕ[b].
We now prove that:
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Proposition 17.18. Assume that Φ is finite. Then, for every n ∈ N, for every two T3
0-dimensional topological modelsM andN , ifM ≡nL N , then Player II has a winning
strategy in Gn(M,N).
Observe that, being a T0 0-dimensional topological model implies T3ness. So we could
just as well have replaced T3ness with T0ness in the hypothesis. We kept T3ness for
sake of simplicity. Proposition 17.18 and its Corollary 17.21, together with Corollaries
17.16 and 17.17, will let us prove Theorem 17.13.
To prove Proposition 17.18, let us fix some notation:
Definition 17.19. 1. For every n ∈ N, topological model M, and point a ∈ M,
define typen(M, a) := {ϕ ∈ Ln |M, a |= ϕ}. If the modelM is understood, then
typen(M, a) may be referred as typen(a).
2. For every two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ L, ϕ and ψ are said to be equivalent provided for
every topological modelM, and point a ∈ M, we have:
M, a |= ϕ if and only ifM, a |= ψ.
3. For every subset Γ ⊆ L, call a representative of Γ every subset R ⊆ Γ of in-
equivalent formulas such that every formula in Γ is equivalent to a formula in
R.
4. For every n ∈ N, topological modelM = (A, τ,V), and B ⊆ A, call a represen-
tative with respect to equivalence up to modal depth n of B every subset R ⊆ B
such that, for every point a ∈ B, there is a point a′ ∈ R with a ≡nL a′ and, for
every pair a, a′ of points in R, we have a .nL a
′.
Proof of Proposition 17.18. First let us make the following remark:
Remark 17.20. Observe that, by winning conditions 1 and 2 for Player II in Gn(M,N),
for every natural number m ≤ n, if Player I chooses (c,O) and Player II has a winning
strategy, then Player II would have a winning strategy also if Player I had chosen (c,O′)
with O a subset of O′. Therefore, there is no harm in assuming that Player I plays as
small opens as desired.
Now, assume that m rounds, with m < n, have been played, that Player II is still in
the game and that:
1. For every natural number i ≤ m, if (ai, bi) were played at round i, then ai ≡n−iL bi;
2. For every natural number i ≤ m, and (c,O) played in C ∈ {M,N} either by
Player I or by Player II at round i:
(a) O is a clopen;
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(b) O is included in or disjoint from every other open played either by Player I
or by Player II earlier than the ith round. That is, if O′ has been played by
Player I or by Player II earlier than the ith round then O ⊆ O′ or O∩O′ = ∅;
(c) O contains c and does not contain any other point played either by Player I
or by Player II earlier than the ith round;
(d) For every point c′ in O \ {c}, and every neighborhood O′ of c, there is
c′′ ∈ O′ \ {c} with c′′ ≡n−(i+1)L c′;
(e) For every point c′ ∈ O \ {c} there are at least n − i points:
i. Modally equivalent up to modal depth n − (i + 1) to c′;
ii. Different from every point played either by Player I or by Player II
earlier than the ith round;
iii. Not contained in O nor in any open played either by Player I or by
Player II earlier than the ith round disjoint from O;
iv. Contained in the intersection of all opens played either by Player I or
by Player II earlier than the ith round and including O (if any).
Consider the m + 1st round and assume that Player I has played inM. Let us show
that Player II can play without losing Gn(M,N) and that Assumptions 1 and 2 remain
satisfied (with m replaced by m + 1 in their statement). Let us consider the possible
moves of Player I:
1. Player I chose a point a ∈ M. If a is a point a′ already played either by Player I
or by Player II, then Player II chooses the point b ∈ N played at the same round
as a′. By Assumption 2c, Player II is still in the game. Otherwise, a is different
from every point played either by Player I or by Player II. Let us consider two
cases:
(a) a does not belong to any open played by Player II. Consider, among the
points played either by Player I or by Player II earlier than a, those that
are modally equivalent up to modal depth n − (m + 1) to a. Let l be their
number. Let R be a representative of typen−(m+1)(a). Since Φ is finite, we
can assume R finite as well. Then,M |= ^l ∧ R. Observe that l ≤ m. Then
(l + 1) + n− (m + 1) ≤ n. Now, by definition of modal depth, md(^l ∧ R) =
(l + 1) + n− (m + 1). Then, md(^l ∧ R) ≤ n. Then, sinceM ≡nL N , we have
N |= ^l ∧ R. So, by semantics, there are at least l + 1 points in B modally
equivalent up to modal depth n − (m + 1) to a.
By Assumption 1, l is also the number of points played either by Player I
or by Player II in N modally equivalent up to modal depth n − (m + 1) to
a. Therefore, there is a point b ∈ B, modally equivalent up to modal depth
n − (m + 1) to a that has not been played either by Player I or by Player II.
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Now, two cases are given:
i. If b is not contained in any open played by Player II, then Player II
chooses b.
ii. Otherwise, b is contained in some open played by Player II. Consider
the latest open V ∈ B played by Player II that at the end of round m
is not contained in an open played by Player II (other than itself) and
that contains a point b′ ≡n−(m+1)L b.
Assume that i is the round in which V was played. By Assumption
2e and choice of V , at the end of round i there were at least n − i
points different from every point played either by Player I or by Player
II earlier than round i, not contained in V nor in any open played by
Player II earlier than the ith round, and modally equivalent up to modal
depth n − (i + 1) to b.
By Assumption 2b and choice of V , every open played by Player II in
B later than the ith round is either included in V or included in some
open disjoint from V played by Player II earlier than the ith round
or does not contain points b′ modally equivalent up to modal depth
n − (m + 1) to b.
Then, at round m, there are still at least n − i points not contained in
any open played by Player II modally equivalent up to modal depth
n − (i + 1) to b′. Observe that, since i ≤ m, we have n − (i + 1) ≥
n − (m + 1). Then, at round m, there are at least n − i points not
contained in any open played by Player II modally equivalent up to
modal depth n − (m + 1) to b.
After round i until the end of round m, at most m−i among these points
have been played. So, at least (n − i) − (m − i) = n − m points among
these points remain to be played. Observe that, since m < n, n−m > 0.
Let Player II choose one of these remaining points. It is obvious that
Player II, by choosing a point in this way, chooses a point modally
equivalent up to modal depth n − (m + 1) to a, different from every
point played either by Player I or by Player II, and not contained in
any open played by Player II.
(b) Otherwise a belongs to some opens played by Player II, say, in the order in
which they were played, U1,U2, ...,Ul. Let a′ be the point played with Ul
and (b′,Vl) be the couple played by Player I at the same round as (a′,Ul).
By definition of Gn(M,N), a′ ∈ Ul. SinceN is T3 and hence T1, for every
point b different than b′ played either by Player I or by Player II, there is
a neighborhood Vb of b′ not containing b. Since the number of points b
played by either Player I or Player II different from b′ is finite, if V denotes
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the intersection of the Vbs, then V ∩ Vl is a neighborhood of b′ included
in Vl, not containing any of the points different from b′ played either by
Player I or by Player II.
As before, we can find a finite representative R of typen−(m+1)(a). Since Ul
was played with a′ and a ∈ Ul \ {a′}, by Assumption 2d, we haveM, a′ |=
〈d〉∧ R. Then, since, by Assumption 1, a′ ≡n−mLn b′ and, by definition of
modal depth, md(〈d〉∧ R) = n − m, we obtain N , b′ |= 〈d〉∧ R.
Since N , b′ |= 〈d〉∧ R, we can find a point b in V ∩⋂li=1 Vi, then different
from any other point played either by Player I or by Player II, modally
equivalent up to modal depth n − (m + 1) to a. Now, two cases are given:
i. If b does not belong to any open played by Player II, then Player II
chooses b;
ii. Otherwise b belongs to some open played by Player II, say V . Observe
that, by assumption 2b, if V is included in Vl, then V has been played
later than Vl.
Then, by arguments similar to those used in case 1(a)ii, there is a point
b′′ different from every point played either by Player I or by Player II,
contained in Vl, not contained in any open played by Player II included
in Vl, and modally equivalent up to modal depth n − (m + 1) to a.
Then, by assumption 2b, if b′′ is contained in some open V played by
Player II, then V was played before than Vl. Moreover, as b′′ ∈ Vl, V
contains Vl.
Then, as b′ ∈ Vl, b′ ∈ V . Then, if U is the open played at the same
round as V , by winning condition 2, a′ ∈ U. Then, as a′ ∈ Ul and U
has been played earlier than Ul, by Assumption 2b, U includes Ul. So,
as a ∈ Ul, a ∈ U. Therefore, if Player II chooses b′′, Player II is still
in the game and Assumptions 1 and 2 remain satisfied.
2. Player I chooses (a,U). Let us define a neighborhood of a included in U and
satisfying Assumption 2. By Remark 17.20, U can then be assumed to be this
open. In order to do this, we define a sequence of neighborhoods of a, U1 ⊇
U2 ⊇ ... ⊇ U5 with U5 as desired.
(U1) Let X be the set of all opens played either by Player I or by Player II until
the end of round m containing a, and X′ be the set of all opens played
either by Player I or by Player II until the end of round m not containing
a. Observe that, by Assumption 2a, for every U′ ∈ X′, we have that U′ is
clopen and so that A \ U′ is open. Let U′′ := ⋂U′∈X U′ ∩⋂U′∈X′ (A \ U′).
SinceX∪X′ is finite, the set U1 := U∩U′′ is a neighborhood of a, included
in U and satisfying Assumption 2b.
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(U2) Consider all the points different from a played either by Player I or by
Player II. With arguments similar to those above, we can find a neighbor-
hood U2 of a contained in U1, and, then, still satisfying Assumption 2b,
satisfying Assumption 2c as well.
(U3) Let us focus on the points a′ ∈ U2 \ {a} such that there is a neighborhood
U′a′ of a with, for every a
′′ ∈ U′a′ \ {a}, a′′ .n−(m+1)Ln a′. Let P be the set of
these points.
Consider a representative with respect to equivalence up to modal depth
n − (m + 1) R of P. Since Φ is finite, we can assume R finite as well. Let
U′ :=
⋂
a′∈R Ua′ and U3 := U2 ∩ U′. U3 satisfies Assumptions 2b, 2c and
2d.
(U4) Consider a representative with respect to equivalence up to modal depth
n− (m + 1) R of U3 \ {a}. Again, and for the same reasons as above, we can
assume R finite.
For every a′ ∈ R, since A is T3 and hence T1, we can find a neighborhood
U′ of a such that a′ < U′. If we define U′4 := U3 ∩ U′, we obtain a
neighborhood of a still satisfying 2b, 2c and 2d and such that the number
of points modally equivalent up to modal depth n − (m + 1) to a′ outside
U′4 is one more than the number of points modally equivalent up to modal
depth n − (m + 1) to a′ outside U3.
Observe that, since U′4 satisfies Assumption 2d, there is a point a
′′ ∈ U′4
with a′′ ≡n−(m+1)Ln a′ and the same operation can be repeated. Plainly, by
repeating this operation as finitely many times as necessary and for every
a′ ∈ R, we can define a neighborhood U4 of a still satisfying 2b, 2c and 2d
and satisfying 2e as well.
(U5) Finally, since by assumptionM is 0-dimensional, there is a clopen neigh-
borhood U5 of a included in U4. U5 satisfies 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d and 2e, as
desired.
By Remark 17.20, U can be assumed to be U5. Let us consider the point b in
B played at the same round as a. By reasoning as above, Player II can choose a
neighborhood of b satisfying 2.
3. If Player I plays in N , Player II proceeds symmetrically
Clearly, by definition of Gn(M,N) this strategy is a winning strategy for Player II in
Gn(M,N). 
Corollary 17.21. Assume that Φ is finite. Then, for every n ∈ N, two T3 0-dimensional
topological modelsM and N , and points a ∈ M and b ∈ N , ifM, a ≡n−1L N , b, then
Player II has a winning strategy in Gn(M,N) after (a, b) has been played.
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Proof of Theorem 17.13. 1. Consider a sentence ϕ ∈ Lt. Let n be its quantifier depth
and restrict Φ to the propositional variables occurring in ϕ. Then, Φ is finite. Then, the
set of sentences in Ln admits a finite representative R. For every Γ ⊆ R, consider the
sentence:
ψΓ :=
∧
ψ∈Γ
ψ ∧
∧
ψ∈R\Γ
¬ψ.
The sentence ψΓ says that, among the sentences in R, those contained in Γ are satisfied
while the remainings are not. Then, since R is a representative of the set of all sentences
of Ln, we have that two topological modelsM and N agree on the same sentences in
Ln if and only if, for some Γ ⊆ R, they both satisfy ψΓ. Consider the formula:
χ :=
∨
{ψΓ | ∃ a T3 topological modelM s.t. M |= S Tx(ψΓ) ∧ ϕ}.
By Corollary 17.16 and Proposition 17.18, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 17.22. For every T3 topological model N , N |= χ if and only N |= ϕ.
Proof. From right to left is trivial. Let us prove the direction from left to right. Assume
that N |= χ. Then, for some ψΓ ∈ Ln such that there is a T3 topological modelM such
that M |= S Tx(ψΓ) ∧ ϕ, we have N |= ψΓ. Then, as observed, since both M and
N satisfy ψΓ ∈ Ln, we have M ≡nL N . Now, by [40, Part 2, Theorem 1.17, p. 88],
there are T3 0-dimensional topological models M′ and N ′ such that M ≡Lt M′ and
N ≡Lt N ′. Then, since M ≡nL N , M ≡Lt M′, and N ≡Lt N ′, by Theorem 17.9,
we have M′ ≡nL N ′. Then, by Proposition 17.18, Player II has a winning strategy in
Gn(M′,N ′). Then, by Proposition 17.16, M′ and N ′ agree on the sentences of Lnt .
Then, M and N agree on the sentences of Lnt . Then, since ϕ is a sentence of Lnt and
M |= ϕ, we have that N |= ϕ as desired. 
Then, χ is the desired sentence.
2. Consider an arbitrary formula ϕ[x] ∈ Lt. Let n be its quantifier depth and restrict
Φ to the propositional variables occurring in ϕ. Then, Φ is finite and Ln admits a finite
representative R. For every Γ ⊆ R, consider the formula:
ψΓ :=
∧
ψ∈Γ
ψ ∧
∧
ψ∈R\Γ
¬ψ.
For every two topological modelsM and N , and points a ∈ M and b ∈ N , we have
thatM, a ≡nL N , b if and only if, for some Γ ⊆ Ln,M, a |= ψΓ andN , b |= ψΓ. Consider
the formula:
χ :=
∨
{ψΓ | ∃ a T3 M and a ∈ M s.t. M |= (S Tx(ψΓ) ∧ ϕ)[a]}.
By Corollaries 17.17 and 17.21, the following lemma holds:
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Lemma 17.23. For every T3 topological model N and point b ∈ N we have:
N , b |= χ if and only if N |= ϕ[b].
Proof. From right to left is trivial. Let us prove the direction from left to right. Assume
that N , b |= χ. Then, for some ψΓ ∈ Ln such that there is a T3 topological model M
and a point a ∈ M withM |= (S Tx(ψΓ) ∧ ϕ)[a], we have N , b |= ψΓ. Then, since both
M, a |= ψΓ and N , b |= ψΓ, we haveM, a ≡nL N , b.
Consider a new constant symbol c. Let Lt{c} denote the language defined over the
signature of Lt augmented with c. For every topological model D for Lt and point
d ∈ D, let D{d} denote the topological model for Lt{c} obtained from D by adding d
as the interpretation of c. If we present a topological model for Lt{c} as D{d}, then we
mean thatD is a topological model for Lt and d is the interpretation of c inD{d}.
By [40, Part 2, Theorem 1.17, p. 88], there are T3 0-dimensional topological models
M′{a′} and N ′{b′} of Lt{c} and such thatM{a} ≡Lt{c} M′{a′} and N{b} ≡Lt{c} N ′{b′}.
We prove thatM′, a′ ≡nL N ′, b′. For, consider ψ ∈ Ln. Then, by Lemma 17.12, we
have:
M′, a′ |= ψ if and only ifM′ |= S Tx(ψ)[a′].
And, since a′ is the interpretation of c inM′a′ , we have:
M′ |= S Tx(ψ)[a′] if and only ifM′{a′} |= S Tx(ψ)[c/x].
And, sinceM{a} ≡Lt{c} M′{a′}, we have:
M′{a′} |= S Tx(ψ)[c/x] if and only ifM{a} |= S Tx(ψ)[c/x].
And, since a is the interpretation of c inMa, we have:
M{a} |= S Tx(ψ)[c/x] if and only ifM |= S Tx(ψ)[a].
And, by Lemma 17.12, we have:
M |= S Tx(ψ)[a] if and only ifM, a |= ψ.
And, sinceM, a ≡nL N , b, we have:
M, a |= ψ if and only if N , b |= ψ.
And, similarly, we have:
N , b |= ψ if and only if N ′, b′ |= ψ.
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Then,M′, a′ ≡nL N ′, b′, as desired.
Then, by Proposition 17.21, we have that Player II has a winning strategy in Gn+1(M′,N ′)
after that (a′, b′) has been played. Then, by Corollary 17.17, for every formula ϕ(x) of
Lnt , we have M′ |= ϕ[a′] if and only if N ′ |= ϕ[b′]. Now, M |= ϕ[a]. Then, with
arguments similar to those above, we can show that N |= ϕ[b] as desired. 
Then, χ is the desired sentence. 
17.2.3 The translation is computable
Proposition 17.24. 1. For every sentence ϕ ∈ Lt, there is an algorithm that com-
putes a sentence ψ ∈ L such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent on T3, and qd(ϕ) =
md(ψ).
2. For every formula ϕ[x] ∈ Lt, there is an algorithm that computes a formula ψ ∈ L
such that ϕ[x] and ψ are equivalent on T3, and qd(ϕ) = md(ψ).
Proof. 1. Consider a sentence ϕ ∈ Lt. Compute its quantifier depth, say n ∈ N.
Restrict Φ to the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ. By Lemma 17.22, there
is a subset of sentences Σ ⊆ Ln such that ∨ Σ is equivalent to ϕ on T3. Since Φ is finite,
we can compute a finite representative R of the set of all sentences in Ln. For every
subset Σ ⊆ R, check whether S Tx(∨ Σ) ↔ ϕ is valid on T3. By [40, Part 2, Corollary
1.25, p. 91] there is an algorithm that can do it. By Lemma 17.22, the algorithm will
answer positively for some Σ. Since the number of possible Σ is finite, the algorithm
will compute Σ in a finite number of steps.
∨
Σ is the desired sentence.
2. Consider a formula ϕ[x] ∈ Lt. Compute its quantifier depth, say n ∈ N. Restrict
Φ to the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ. By Lemma 17.23, there is a
set Σ ⊆ Ln such that S Tx(∨ Σ) is equivalent to ϕ on T3. Since the Φ is finite, we
can compute a finite representative R of Ln. For every subset Σ ⊆ R, check whether
∀x(S Tx(∨ Σ)↔ ϕ) is valid on T3 structures. By [40, Part 2, Corollary 1.25, p. 91] there
is an algorithm that can do it. By Lemma 17.23, the algorithm will answer positively
for some Σ. Since the number of possible Σ is finite, the algorithm will compute Σ in a
finite number of steps.
∨
Σ is the desired formula. 
17.2.4 The result fails for T2 spaces
In this section, we prove that L cannot express Lt sententially on T2 (Theorem 17.28).
Then, by Proposition 17.7, L cannot express Lt on T2 either.
Observe that Theorem 18.3 in Chapter 18 implies Theorem 17.28. Nonetheless,
a direct proof of Theorem 17.28 seems instructive because it allows us to introduce a
notion of bisimulation for L. Moreover, this proof essentially lies on the topological
spaces of Example 15.8 and does not consume much space.
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More precisely, to prove Theorem 17.28, we define a notion of bisimulation for L
(Definition 17.25), and prove that if two points in two topological models are bisimilar,
then they are modally equivalent (Proposition 17.26).
Then, we consider two topological models, one of them T2 but not T3, and the
other T3, and prove that they have two bisimilar points. Then, since Lt can express that
a topological model is T3, namely by the sentence ϕT3 of Section 17.1.4, if L could
express Lt on T2, there would be a sentence ψ ∈ L equivalent to ϕ on T2. Then, since
the two models have bisimilar points, they both would satisfy ψ. Then, they both would
satisfy ϕT3 . Therefore, they both would be T3, a contradiction.
Definition 17.25. For every two topological models M = (A, ...) and N = (B, ...)
define a bisimulation betweenM andN as a relation Z ⊆ A×B such that for every two
points a ∈ M and b ∈ N if aZb then the following conditions hold:
PV. For every p ∈ Φ, we haveM, a |= p if and only if N , b |= ϕ;
[d]F. For every neighborhood U of a there is a neighborhood V of b such that for every
point b′ ∈ V\{b} there is a point a′ ∈ U\{a} with a′Zb′;
[d]B. For every neighborhood V of b there is a neighborhood U of a such that for every
point a′ ∈ U\{a} there is a point b′ ∈ V\{b} with a′Zb′;
• For every n ∈ N:
^nF. For every n + 1 distinct points a0, a1, ..., an ∈ M there are n + 1 distinct
points b0, b1, ..., bn ∈ N such that for every i ∈ n we have aiZbi;
^nB. For every n + 1 distinct points b0, b1, ..., bn ∈ N there are n + 1 distinct
points a0, a1, ..., an ∈ M such that for every i ∈ n we have aiZbi.
For every two points a ∈ M and b ∈ N we say that M, a and N , b are bisimilar,
notationM, a - N , b, provided there is a bisimulation Z betweenM and N such that
aZb. If the topological models are understood, we just say that a and b are bisimilar,
notation a - b.
Proposition 17.26. For every two topological modelsM and N , for every two points
a ∈ M and b ∈ N , if a - b then a ≡L b.
Proof. We prove it by induction. Consider an arbitrary formula ϕ ∈ L. The only
interesting cases are when ϕ is [d]ψ, and ^nψ (n ∈ N).
Suppose that ϕ is [d]ψ. Suppose thatM, a |= [d]ψ. Then, there is a neighborhood
U of a such that for every a′ ∈ U \ {a}, we have M, a′ |= ψ. Then, by [d]F, there is
a neighborhood V of b such that, for every b′ ∈ V \ {b}, there is a′ ∈ U \ {a} with
a′Zb′. Then, by inductive hypothesis, there is a neighborhood V of b such that, for
every b′ ∈ V \ {b}, we haveM, b′ |= ψ. Then,M, b |= ϕ, as desired.
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Suppose thatN , b |= [d]ψ. Then, we can prove thatM, a |= ϕ proceeding as before
but using [d]B instead of [d]F.
Suppose that ϕ is ^nψ (n ∈ N). Suppose thatM, a |= ^nψ. Then, there are n + 1
distinct points a0, a1, ..., an ∈ M such that, for every i ∈ n + 1, we have M, ai |= ψ.
Then, by ^nF, there are n + 1 distinct points b0, b1, ..., bn ∈ B such that, for every
i ∈ n + 1, we have aiZbi. Then, by inductive hypothesis, there are n + 1 distinct points
b0, b1, ..., bn ∈ B such that, for every i ∈ n + 1, we have N , bi |= ψ. Then,M, b |= ϕ, as
desired.
Suppose that N , b |= ^nψ. Then, we can prove thatM, a |= ϕ proceeding as before
but using ^nB instead of ^nF. 
Let (R, ε) be the real numbers with the usual topology. Let (R, τ) be the real num-
bers with the topology defined in Example 15.8. As mentioned, the former is a T3 topo-
logical space, whereas the latter is a T2 but not T3 topological space. Let V : Φ→ P(R)
be the evaluation defined by, for every p ∈ Φ, V(p) := ∅. Let R1 := (R, ε,V) and
R2 := (R, τ,V). Plainly:
Proposition 17.27. R × R is a bisimulation between R1 and R2.
Proof. The only interesting cases are [d]F, [d]B,^nF, and^nB. The former two follows
by the fact that both (R, ε) and (R, τ) are dense-in-itself - that is, for every a ∈ R and
neighborhood U of a, there is b ∈ U \ {a} - whereas the latter two follows from the fact
that R is infinite. 
Then, reasoning as above, we can prove that:
Theorem 17.28. L cannot express Lt sententially on T2. Then, L cannot express Lt on
T2 either.
Observe that, in the proof of Proposition 17.27, we only use that the two spaces are
infinite and dense-in-themselves. Then:
Corollary 17.29. Let Φ = ∅. For every two infinite and dense-in-themselves topolog-
ical modelsM and N , for every a ∈ M and b ∈ N :
• a and b are bisimilar.
• a and b satisfies the same formulas of L.
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Chapter 18
On increasing the expressive
power of L
In Section 17.2.4 we proved that L cannot express Lt on T2 topological models. Can
we increase the expressive power of L so that the resulting language can express Lt on
T2 topological models? Traditionally, one way to increase the expressive power of a
modal language is to add new modal operators. But what is a modal operator? And
are there modal operators that added to L give a modal language expressing Lt on T2
topological models?
In Section 18.1 we give a more general definition of modal operator. Following
Gabbay, Hodkinson and Reynolds [42, Chapter 6], the semantics of modal operators
will be defined by a formula of Lt with at most one free first-sort variable and no free
second-sort variables. We will call point-sort modal operator every modal operator
whose semantics is defined by an Lt formula without occurring second-sort variables.
In Section 18.2, we show that even if we enrich L with all the point-sort modal opera-
tors, call L+ the resulting language, however we add finitely many modal operators to
L+, we cannot express Lt on T2 topological models.
18.1 Spatial languages
In this section we give a more general definition of modal operator. Following Gabbay,
Hodkinson and Reynolds [42, Chapter 6], we define the semantics of modal operators
by a first-order formula with at most one free variable and no free second-sort variables
(Definition 18.1(1)). Given a set of modal operators, we define the resulting modal
language recursively as usual (Definition 18.1(2)).
For every topological modelM = (A, τ,V), A0, ..., An−1 ⊆ A, and p0, ..., pn−1 ∈ Φ,
defineM[A0/p0, ..., An−1/pn−1] as the model obtained fromM by replacing, for every i ∈ n,
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pMi with Ai.
Definition 18.1. 1. A modal operator is a tuple (#, ϕ[x], p0, ..., pn−1) where # is an
identifier, x ∈ Var1, n is a natural number, p0, ..., pn−1 ∈ Φ, and ϕ is a formula of
Lt with at most one occurring free variable, namely x, and such that the proposi-
tional atoms occurring in ϕ are among p0, ..., pn−1.
2. For every set of modal operators τ, define the spatial language LΦ,τ as the small-
est set such that:
• Φ ∪ {>} ⊆ LΦ,τ.
• If ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ then ¬ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ.
• If ϕ, ψ ∈ LΦ,τ then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ LΦ,τ.
• If (#, ϕ[x], p0, ..., pn−1) ∈ τ and ϕ0, ..., ϕn−1 ∈ LΦ,τ, then #(ϕ0, ..., ϕn−1) ∈
LΦ,τ.
3. For every spatial language LΦ,τ, formula ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ, topological model M, and
a ∈ M, defineM, a |= ϕ, recursively as follows:
• M, a |= > always.
• For every p ∈ Φ,M, a |= p provided a ∈ pM.
• M, a |= ¬ϕ provided notM, a |= ϕ.
• M, a |= ϕ ∧ ψ providedM, a |= ϕ andM, a |= ψ.
• For every (#, ϕ[x], p0, ..., pn−1) ∈ τ, and #(ϕ0, ..., ϕn−1) ∈ LΦ,τ, M, a |=
#(ϕ0, ..., ϕn−1) providedM[ϕM0 /p0, ..., ϕMn−1/pn−1] |= ϕ[a] where, for every i ∈ n,
ϕMi := {b ∈ M |M, b |= ϕi}.
4. Call a point-sort formula every ϕ ∈ Lt such that there are no second-sort vari-
ables occurring in ϕ. Call a point-sort modal operator every modal operator
(#, ϕ[x], p0, ..., pn−1) such that ϕ is a point-sort formula. Let ρ be the set of all
point-sort modal operators.
Example 18.2. For every n ∈ N, the modal operator ^n of L, defined as per Definition
18.1(1), is:
(^n,∃x0...∃xn
( ∧
i, j∈n+1
i, j
xi , x j ∧
∧
i∈n+1
p(xi)
)
, p).
Observe that ^n is a point-sort modal operator. The modal operator [d] of L, defined
as per Definition 18.1(1), is:
([d],∃Xx ∀y (yεX ∧ y , x→ p(y)), p).
We prove that:
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Theorem 18.3. There is no finite set σ of modal operators such that, if τ := ρ ∪ σ,
then LΦ,τ can express Lt on T2.
Then, since {^n | n ∈ N} ⊆ ρ, we have:
Corollary 18.4. There is no finite setσ of modal operators such that, if τ := {[d],^n | n ∈
N} ∪ σ, then LΦ,τ can express Lt on T2.
18.2 Proof of Theorem 18.3
The proof stems from a result by Hodkinson [51] in Kripke semantics. However, sub-
stantial original contributions are required. The proof is as follows. For every n ∈ N,
we introduce a formula ϕn. Then, we define sets A1, A2 and A := A1 ∪ A2. Then, con-
sider two propositional variables p, q ∈ Φ. We define an evaluation function V such
that V(p) = A1, V(q) = A2 and, for every r ∈ Φ \ {p, q}, V(r) = ∅. Then, for every
natural number n > 0, we define a basoid model Mn = (A,Bn,V) (Section 18.2.2).
Then, we prove that:
1. For every n ∈ N,Mn has A as first-sort domain (by definition).
2. V(p) = A1, V(q) = A2 and, for every r ∈ Φ \ {p, q}, V(r) = ∅ (by definition).
3. For every n ∈ N,Mn is indeed a basoid model (Proposition 18.7).
4. For every n ∈ N,Mn |= ϕT2 (Proposition 18.9).
5. For every n ∈ N, ϕ[x] ∈ Lt, i ∈ {1, 2}, and a, a′ ∈ Ai, we haveMn |= ϕ[a] if and
only ifMn |= ϕ[a′] (Corollary 18.16).
6. There is a point a ∈ A such that, for every n ∈ N, Mn |= ϕn[a] and, for every
natural m > n,Mn 6|= ϕm[a].
Then, consider an arbitrary finite set σ of modal operators, and two distinct proposi-
tional variables {p, q}. Then, by 5, and since {p, q} and σ are finite, there are n,m ∈ N
such that n < m and, for every a ∈ A, and formula ϕ of the form #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1) with
# ∈ σ and, for every i ∈ k, ϕi ∈ {>,⊥, p, q}, we have:
Mn, a |= #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1) if and only ifMm, a |= #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1). (18.1)
Then, for every formula ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ with no occurring propositional variables, and a ∈ A,
we have:
Mn, a |= ϕ if and only ifMm, a |= ϕ. (18.2)
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This is Lemma 18.22 and is proved by induction on the formula, Point 1 above is used
when # ∈ ρ, and Point 2 above and (18.1) when # ∈ σ.
Suppose, by contradiction, that LΦ,τ can express Lt on T2. Then, since ϕm ∈ Lt,
there is ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ equivalent to ϕm on T2. Since ϕ is equivalent to ϕm, and there are no
propositional variables occurring in ϕm, we can assume that there are no propositional
variables occurring in ϕ.
Recall that Lt is invariant under changing bases, and so, since the semantics of
modal operators is determined by an Lt formula, also LΦ,τ is invariant under changing
bases. Let a be the point given by Point 6 above. Then,Mm |= ϕm[a]. Then, since ϕm
and ϕ are equivalent on T2, by Point 3 above, we haveMm |= ϕ[a]. Then, since there
are no propositional variables occurring in ϕ, by (18.2), we have Mn |= ϕ[a]. Then,
since ϕm and ϕ are equivalent on T2, we haveMn |= ϕm[a], against Point 5 above.
18.2.1 Formulas
In this section we introduce the formulas ϕn. For every 0 < n ∈ N, define:
ϕn :=∃X0x0 ∀Y0x0 ∃x1 (¬x1εX0 ∧ x1εcl(Y0)∧
∃X1x1 ∀Y1x1 ∃x2 (¬x2εX1 ∧ x2εcl(Y1)∧
...
∃Xn−1xn−1 ∀Yn−1xn−1 ∃xn (¬xnεXn−1 ∧ xnεcl(Yn−1) ∧ xnεcl(Y0) ))...)︸︷︷︸
n brackets
,
where, for every x ∈ Var1, and X ∈ Var2, we define xεcl(X) as ∀Yx ∃y (yεY ∧ yεX) for
some fresh y ∈ Var1, and Y ∈ Var2. Plainly, ϕn ∈ Lt. And, if n = 1, then ϕ1 is:
ϕ1 :=∃Xx ∀Zx ∃y (¬yεX ∧ ∀Xy ∃x(xεZ ∧ xεX)), that is¬ϕreg.
Observe that, for every 0 < n ∈ N, ϕn can be written in Lt using only 5 variables.
For example, if n = 3, ϕ3 can be written as:
ϕ3 :=∃Xx ∀Zx ∃y (¬yεX ∧ ∀Xy ∃x(xεZ ∧ xεX)∧
∃Xy ∀Yy ∃x (¬xεX ∧ ∀Xx ∃x(xεY ∧ xεX)∧
∃Xx ∀Yx ∃y (¬yεX ∧ ∀Xy ∃x(xεY ∧ xεX) ∧ ∀Xy ∃x(xεZ ∧ xεX)))).
18.2.2 Basoid Models
In this section we define the basoid modelsMn. They are somewhat technical and we
need a bit of preliminaries in order to define them and study their properties:
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Preliminaries
For every two sets A, B, let AB denote the set of all functions from A to B. For every
n ∈ Z, define:
[0, n) := {i ∈ Z | 0 ≤ i < n},
(−∞, n) := {i ∈ Z | i < n}.
Then, [0,0)Z is a singleton, namely the set containing the empty function ∅ : ∅ → Z.
Define:
N =
⋃
n∈N
[0,n)Z.
The elements ofN will be denoted by bold small latin letters a,b, .... Plainly, for every
a ∈ N , there is a unique n ∈ N such that a ∈ [0,n)Z. Define:
|a| := n − 1.
As a special case, the elements of [0,1)Z will be denoted by small latin letters b, c.... For
every element a of N , and b ∈ Z, define ab ∈ [0,|a|+2)Z ⊆ N as:
(ab)(i) = a(i) for every integer 0 ≤ i < |a| + 1,
(ab)(|a| + 1) = b.
Define:
Z :=
⋃
n∈Z
(−∞,n)Z.
The elements of Z will be denoted by small greek letters ν, µ, .... Plainly, for every
ν ∈ Z, there is a unique n ∈ Z such that ν ∈ (−∞,n)Z. Define:
|ν| := n − 1.
For every element ν ∈ Z, and a ∈ N , define νa ∈ (−∞,|ν|+|a|+2)Z ⊆ Z as:
(νa)(i) = ν(i) for every integer i < |ν| + 1, (18.3)
(νa)(i) = a(i − (|ν| + 1)) for every integer |ν| + 1 ≤ i < |ν| + |a| + 2. (18.4)
For every element ν ∈ Z, define:
ν − 1 := ν(−∞,|ν|)Z.
Plainly:
Remark 18.5. For every two A, B ⊆ Z, and translation t : Z → Z, if A is cofinite
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in Z and t[A] ⊆ B, then B is cofinite in Z. (Recall that a translation (from Z to Z)
is any function t : Z → Z such that there is m ∈ Z such that, for every n, we have
t(n) = n + m.)
Basoid Models
We are now ready to define the basoid modelsMn. We begin by defining their first-sort
domain A:
A1 := Z,
A2 := {(ν, n,m) | ν ∈ A1 ∧ n,m ∈ Z},
A := A1 ∪ A2.
A bit of commentary. A1 is Z. Z is the set of all functions from any interval (−∞, n]
for n ∈ Z to Z. Recall that for every two functions f , g, we have that f ⊂ g denotes that
the domain of f is a proper subset of the domain of g and g restricted to the domain of
f is equal to f . Then, if we order A1 by ⊂, we obtain a tree that is downward endless
and such that each point branches into Z-many new points.
νa
ν
ν − 1
Figure 18.1: (A1,⊂), ν ∈ Z and a ∈ Z
As for A2, we may think of it as some ‘dust’ around the points of A1. For every
ν ∈ A1, we may imagine the dust around ν organized in Z-many copies of Z. More
precisely, consider (ν, n,m) ∈ A2. Then, the first component ν tells us that (ν, n,m) is a
particle of dust around ν; the second component n ∈ Z tells us that (ν, n,m) belongs to
the nth copy of Z around ν; finally, the third component m ∈ Z distinguishes (ν, n,m)
from the other elements (ν, n, ...) of the nth copy of Z around ν.
n − 1
(ν, n,m)
n n + 1
ν
Figure 18.2: A particle of dust (ν, n,m) ∈ A2 around ν ∈ A1
Since ν branches into Z-many new points, and there are Z-many copies of Z around
ν, we can bijectively associate every new point with a copy of Z.
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νn
n − 1 n n + 1
ν
Figure 18.3: We can bijectively associate every new point with a copy of Z
Now, we define the second-sort domain ofMn. That is, a topological base Bn. We
begin by defining the preliminary notion of n-selection. For every n ∈ N, define:
<n+1N :=
⋃
0≤i<n+1
[0,i)Z.
For every integer n > 0, call a n-selection every tuple (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ C〉) such that:
1. C ⊆ <n+1N .
2. C , ∅.
3. If cb ∈ C, then c ∈ C.
4. For every c ∈ C ∩ <nN , {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C} is cofinite in Z.
5. For every c ∈ C, Dc is a cofinite subset of Z.
Point 1 says that C is a set of functions from [0, i) for any 0 ≤ i < n + 1 to Z. Point
2 that C is non-empty. Point 3 that C is closed under taking subsequences. Recall that
an element of C can be seen as a sequence:
(c(0), c(1), ..., c(|c|)).
Then, given an element ν ∈ A1, we can imagine C as a set of extensions of ν: if c ∈ C,
then νc is an extension of ν. Moreover, we can imagine c identifying a path starting at
the c(0)th copy of Z around ν, followed by the c(1)th copy of Z around ν(c(0)), and so
on until the c(|c|)th copy of Z around νc − 1 (see Figure 18.4 for c = (0, 1,−1)).
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ν01−1−1 0 1
ν01
−1 0 1
ν0
−1 0 1
ν
Figure 18.4: We can imagine C as a set of extensions of ν
For every c ∈ C ∩ <nN , Point 4 says that the set of copies of Z around νc identifiable
by an extension cb ∈ C of c is cofinite in Z. Moreover, for every c ∈ C, a set Dc is
associated to c. We may think of Dc as a subset of the c(|c|)th copy of Z around νc − 1.
Point 5 says that such subset Dc is cofinite in Z. Cofiniteness required by Point 4 and
5 will be important to prove thatMn are T2 (Proposition 18.9).
For every ν ∈ A1, and S = (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ C〉) an n-selection, define:
B(ν, S ) := {ν} ∪ {(νc − 1, (νc)(|νc|), d) | c ∈ C ∧ d ∈ Dc}.
Observe that B(ν, S ) ⊆ A. Sets B(ν, S ) will be some of the basics opens of Bn. They are
made of a point ν ∈ A1 plus the dust in A2 given by the n-selection S . More precisely,
together with ν we have dust particles of the form (νc − 1, (νc)(|νc|), d) for c ∈ C and
d ∈ Dc. That is, for every c ∈ C and d ∈ Dc, the particle identified by d in the c(|c|)th
copy of Z around νc − 1 is in B(ν, S ). Observe that, if c is ∅, then we obtain dust
particles of the form (ν − 1, (ν)(|ν|), d). That is, dust particles in the (ν)(|ν|)th copy of Z
around ν − 1.
ν
ν(|ν|) − 1 ν(|ν|)
(ν − 1, ν(|ν|), d)
ν(|ν|) + 1
ν − 1
Figure 18.5: A dust particle (ν − 1, (ν)(|ν|), d) in the (ν)(|ν|)th copy of Z around ν − 1
Define:
Bn := {B(ν, S ) | ν ∈ A1 ∧ S an n-selection} ∪ {{a} | a ∈ A2}.
Then, Bn is made of the sets B(ν, S ) together with the singleton of every element of A2.
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Now, we introduce the evaluation function. We would like to distinguish A1 from
A2 by means of propositional variable. This will be used in multiple places in Section
18.2.3. Then, we fix two distinct propositional variables p, q ∈ Φ, and, for every r ∈ Φ,
we define:
V(r) :=

A1 provided r = p,
A2 provided r = q,
∅ otherwise.
Define:
Mn := (A,Bn,V).
Remark 18.6. Observe that, since A and V are the same for everyMn (n ∈ N), then,
for every n,m ∈ N, point-sort formulas ϕ ∈ Lt and assignment g, we have:
Mn |= ϕ[g] if and only ifMm |= ϕ[g].
Properties ofMn
We now prove the aforementioned properties ofMn.
Proposition 18.7. Mn |= ϕbas - that is,Mn is a basoid model.
Proof. Plainly, A ⊆ ⋃Bn. Consider B1, B2 ∈ Bn. Three cases are given:
(a) B1 = {a1}, and B2 = {a2} for some a1, a2 ∈ A2. Then, either B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ or
B1 = B2. Then, for every a ∈ B1 ∩ B2, there is B ∈ Bn, namely B1 = B2, such
that a ∈ B ⊆ B1 ∩ B2.
(b) B1 = {a1}, and B2 = B(ν, S ) for some ν ∈ A1, and S n-selection. Then, either
B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ or B1 ∩ B2 = B1. Then, for every a ∈ B1 ∩ B2, there is B ∈ Bn,
namely B1, such that a ∈ B ⊆ B1 ∩ B2.
(c) B1 = (ν1, S 1), and B2 = B(ν2, S 2) for some ν1, ν2 ∈ A1, and S 1, S 2 selections for
n. Two cases are given:
i. ν1 , ν2. Then, by definition, B1 ∩ B2 ⊆ A2. Then, for every a ∈ B1 ∩ B2,
there is B ∈ Bn, namely {a}, such that a ∈ B ⊆ B1 ∩ B2.
ii. ν1 = ν2. Let S 1 = (C1, 〈D1c | c ∈ C1〉), and S 2 = (C2, 〈D2c | c ∈ C2〉).
Define C := C1 ∩ C2, and, for every c ∈ C, Dc := D1c ∩ D2c. Define
S := (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ D〉).
Lemma 18.8. S := (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ D〉) is an n-selection.
Proof. 1. By point 1 of the definition of n-selection, we have C1,C2 ⊆
<n+1N . Then, by definition of C, we have C ⊆ <n+1N .
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2. By point 2 of the definition of n-selection, we have ∅ ∈ C1 and C2. Then,
by definition of C, we have ∅ ∈ C. Then C , ∅.
3. Consider cb ∈ C. Then, by definition of C, cb ∈ C1 and cb ∈ C2. Then,
by point 3 of the definition of n-selection, we have c ∈ C1 and c ∈ C2.
Then, by definition of C, we have c ∈ C.
4. Consider c ∈ C ∩ <nN . Then, by definition of C, we have:
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C} = {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1 ∩C2}
= {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1} ∩ {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C2}.
Now, by point 4 of the definition of n-selection, both {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1} and
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C2} are cofinite in Z. Then, their intersection C is cofinite in
Z as well.
5. Consider c ∈ C, and Dc. Then, by definition of Dc, we have Dc =
D1c ∩ D2c. Then, by point 5 of the definition of n-selection, both D1c and
D2c are cofinite subsets of Z. Then, their intersection Dc is a cofinite subset
of Z. 
Then B(ν1, S ) ∈ Bn. We show that B(ν1, S ) = B1 ∩ B2. Consider a ∈
B(ν1, S ). If a = ν1, then, by definition (and recall that ν1 = ν2), we have
a ∈ B1∩B2. If a , ν1, then a = (ν1c−1, νc(|νc|), d) for some c ∈ C, and d ∈
Dc. Then, a = (ν1c−1, νc(|νc|), d) for some c ∈ C1∩C2, and d ∈ D1c∩D2c.
Then, by definition, a ∈ B1 ∩ B2. Then B(ν1, S ) ⊆ B1 ∩ B2. Conversely,
consider a ∈ B1 ∩ B2. If a = ν1, then, by definition, a ∈ B(ν1, S ). If a , ν1,
then, a = (ν1c − 1, νc(|νc|), d) for some c ∈ C1 ∩ C2, and d ∈ D1c ∩ D2c.
Then, a = (ν1c − 1, νc(|νc|), d) for some c ∈ C, and d ∈ Dc. Then, by
definition, a ∈ B(ν1, S ). 
Proposition 18.9. Mn |= ϕT2 - that is, since ϕT2 ∈ Lt and Lt is invariant under changing
base, the topological space generated by (A,Bn) is a T2 topological space.
Proof. Consider a1, a2 ∈ A such that a1 , a2. Three cases are given:
(a) a1, a2 ∈ A2. Then, a1 ∈ {a1} ∈ Bn, a2 ∈ {a2} ∈ Bn, and {a1} ∩ {a2} = ∅.
(b) a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2. Then a1 = ν1 and a2 = (ν2, n,m) for some ν1, ν2 ∈ Z,
and n,m ∈ Z. Consider B ∈ Bn such that ν1 ∈ B. Then, by definition of Bn,
we have B = B(ν1, S ) for some n-selection S = (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ Dc〉). Suppose
(ν2, n,m) < B(ν1, S ). Then, by definition, we have ν2 ∈ {(ν2, n,m)} ∈ Bn, and, by
hypothesis, we have B(ν1, S )∩{(ν2, n,m)} = ∅. Suppose that (ν2, n,m) ∈ B(ν1, S ).
Then, (ν2, n,m) = (ν1c − 1, ν1c(|ν1c|), d) for some c ∈ C and d ∈ Dc. Consider
D′c := Dc \ {d}. Since Dc is cofinite in Z, we have that D′c is cofinite in Z. Then,
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the object S ′ that we obtain from S by replacing D with D′ is an n-selection such
that (ν2, n,m) < B(ν1, S ′). Then ν1 ∈ B(ν1, S ′) ∈ Bn, (ν2, n,m) ∈ {(ν2, n,m)} ∈
Bn, and B(ν1, S ′) ∩ {(ν2, n,m)} = ∅.
(c) a1, a2 ∈ A1. Then, a1 = ν1, and a2 = ν2 for some ν1, ν2 ∈ Z. Consider B(ν1, S 1)
and B(ν2, S 2) for some selections for n S 1 = (C1, 〈D1c1 | c1 ∈ C1〉) and S 2 =
(C2, 〈D2c2 | c2 ∈ C2〉). Suppose that B(ν1, S 1) ∩ B(ν2, S 2) , ∅, then we have:
(ν1c1 − 1, ν1c1(|ν1c1|), d1) = (ν2c2 − 1, ν2c2(|ν2c2|), d2) (18.5)
for some c1 ∈ C1 and d1 ∈ D1c1 , and for some c2 ∈ C2 and d2 ∈ D2c2 . Then,
we have ν1c1 = ν2c2. Then, we have ν1 ⊂ ν2 or ν1 ⊃ ν2 (recall that ⊂ denotes
proper inclusion). Suppose, without loss of generality that ν1 ⊂ ν2. Define
C′1 = {c ∈ C1 | ν1c + ν2}, and S ′ := (C′1, 〈Dc | c ∈ C′1〉).
Lemma 18.10. S ′1 is an n-selection.
Proof. 1. Plainly, C′1 ⊆ C1. Then, by point of 1 of the definition of n-selection,
we have C′1 ⊆ <n+1N . 2. By point 2 of the definition of n-selection, we have
∅ ∈ C1. Moreover, since ν1 ⊂ ν2, we have ν1∅ + ν2. Then, by definition of C′1,
we have ∅ ∈ C′1. Then, C′1 , ∅. 3. Consider cb ∈ C′1. Then, by definition of C′1,
we have cb ∈ C1 and ν1cb + ν2. Then, by point 3 of the definition of n-selection
and since c ⊇ ν2 implies ν1cb ⊇ ν2, we have c ∈ C1 and c + ν2. Then, by
definition of C′1, we have c ∈ C′1. 4. Consider c ∈ C′1 ∩ <nN . Then, by definition
of C′1, we have:
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C′1} = {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1 ∧ ν1cb + ν2}. (18.6)
Now, since c ∈ C′1, by definition of C′1, we have ν1c + ν2. Then, two cases are
given:
i. ν1c ⊂ ν2. Then:
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1 ∧ ν1cb + ν2} ⊇ {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1} \ {ν2(|ν2|)}.
ii. There is i < |ν2| + 1, such that (ν1c)(i) , ν2(i). Then:
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1 ∧ ν1cb + ν2} = {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1}.
In both cases:
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1 ∧ ν1cb + ν2} ⊇ {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1} \ {ν2(|ν2|)}. (18.7)
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Now, by point 4 of the definition of n-selection, we have that {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1} is
cofinite in Z. Then {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C1} \ {ν2(|ν2|)} is cofinite in Z. Then, by (18.6)
and (18.7), we have that {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ C′1} is cofinite in Z.
4. Consider c ∈ C′1. Then, by definition of C′1, we have c ∈ C1. Then, since S 1 is
an n-selection, we have Dc is a cofinite subset of Z. 
Plainly, ν1 ∈ B(ν1, S ′1) ∈ Bn and ν2 ∈ B(ν2, S 2) ∈ Bn. Suppose that B(ν1, S ′1) ∩
B(ν2, S 2) , ∅. Then, we have (18.5) for some c1 ∈ C′1 and d1 ∈ D1c1 , and
for some c2 ∈ C2 and d2 ∈ D2c2 . Then, we have ν1c1 = ν2c2. Then, we have
ν1c1 ⊇ ν2, against c1 ∈ C′1. 
The points of A1 are pairwise automorphic, and the same holds for the points of A2
(Proposition 18.11). Then, the points of A1 agree on the same formulas of L2, and the
same holds for the points of A2 (Corollary 18.16).
Proposition 18.11. 1. For every a1, a2 ∈ A1, there is an automorphism f : Mn →
Mn such that f (a1) = a2.
2. For every a1, a2 ∈ A2, there is an automorphism f : Mn → Mn such that
f (a1) = a2.
Overview: we define a transformation, some kind of translation, depending on some
parameters, on A1 (18.8). This transformation induces a transformation, again depend-
ing on a parameter, on A2 (18.9), and a map Bn → Bn (18.10-18.14). Then, we take
the union of these maps and prove that the resulting function f is an automorphism on
Mn (Lemma 18.14). Finally, we prove that, for every i ∈ {1, 2}, and a1, a2 ∈ Ai, there
exist values of the parameters such that we have f (a1) = a2.
Proof. Let β ∈ Z, for every i ∈ Z, let γ(i) ∈ Z, and δ ∈ Z. For every ν ∈ A1, define
f (ν) ∈ (+∞,|ν|+β+1)Z by, for every integer i < |ν| + β + 1:
f (ν)(i) := ν(i − β) + γ(i). (18.8)
For every (ν,m, n) ∈ A2, define f ((ν, n,m)) ∈ A2 by:
f ((ν, n,m)) := ( f (νn) − 1, f (νn)(| f (νn)|),m + δ). (18.9)
For every {a} ∈ Bn, define f ({a}) ∈ Bn by:
f ({a}) := { f (a)}. (18.10)
For every ν ∈ A1, n-selection S = (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ D〉), and c ∈ C, define fν(c) ∈ [0,|c|+1)Z
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by, for every integer 0 ≤ i < |c| + 1:
fν(c)(i) := f (νc)(| f (ν)| + 1 + i). (18.11)
Define:
fν(C) := { fν(c) | c ∈ C}. (18.12)
Let us study fν:
Lemma 18.12. The following facts hold:
1. For every c ∈ C, and every integer 0 ≤ i < | fν(c)| + 1, we have:
fν(c)(i) = c(i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i).
2. fν is a bijection between C and fν(C).
3. For every c ∈ fν(C), for every 0 ≤ i < | f −1ν (c)| + 1, we have:
f −1ν (c)(i) = c(i) − γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i).
4. For every c ∈ C, we have:
f (ν) fν(c) = f (νc).
Proof. 1. For every integer 0 ≤ i < | fν(c)| + 1, we have:
fν(c)(i) = f (νc)(| f (ν)| + 1 + i) (by definition of fν(c)) (18.11)
= (νc)(| f (ν)| + 1 + i − β) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i) (by definition of f (18.8))
= (νc)(|ν| + β + 1 + i − β) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i) (by definition of f (ν) and of | |)
= (νc)(|ν| + 1 + i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i) (by arithmetic)
= c(i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i) (by definition of νc)
as desired.
2. Consider c1, c2 such that
fν(c1) = fν(c2).
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Then, by definition of fν and of | |, we have:
|c1| = | fν(c1)|,
|c2| = | fν(c2)|.
Then, since fν(c1) = fν(c2), we have:
|c1| = |c2|.
Moreover, by Point 1, for every i < |c1| + 1 = |c2| + 1, we have:
fν(c1)(i) = c1(i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i),
fν(c2)(i) = c2(i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i).
Then, since fν(c1) = fν(c2), for every i < |c1| + 1 = |c2| + 1, we have:
c1(i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i) = c2(i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i).
Then, by arithmetic, for every i < |c1| + 1 = |c2| + 1, we have:
c1(i) = c2(i).
Then, c1 = c2 as desired. Surjectivity plainly follows by definition of fν(C).
3. For every integer 0 ≤ i < |c|, we have:
c(i) = fν( f −1ν (c))(i) (by Point 2)
= f −1ν (c)(i) + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + i) (by Point 1).
From this, thesis plainly follows.
4. We have that:
| f (ν) fν(c)| = | f (ν)| + | fν(c)| + 1 (by definition of f (ν) fν(c) and of | |)
= |ν| + β + | fν(c)| + 1 (by definition of f (ν) and of | |)
= |ν| + β + |c| + 1 (by definition of fν(c) and of | |)
= |νc| + β (by definition of νc and of | |)
= | f (νc)| (by definition of f (νc) and of | |).
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Moreover, for every integer i < | f (ν)| + 1, we have:
f (ν) fν(c)(i) = f (ν)(i) (by definition of f (ν) fν(c) (18.3))
= ν(i − β) + γ(i) (by definition of f (18.8))
= (νc)(i − β) + γ(i) (by definition of νc (18.3))
= f (νc)(i) (by definition of f (18.8)).
And, for every integer | f (ν)| + 1 ≤ i < | f (ν)| + | fν(c)| + 2, we have:
f (ν) fν(c)(i) = fν(c)(i − (| f (ν)| + 1)) (by definition of f (ν) fν(c) (18.4))
= f (νc)(| f (ν)| + 1 + i − (| f (ν)| + 1)) (by definition of fν (18.11))
= f (νc)(i) (by arithmetic).
Then, f (ν) fν(c) = f (νc) as desired. 
For every c ∈ fν(C), define:
Dc := {d + δ | d ∈ D f −1ν (c)}. (18.13)
By Lemma 18.12(2), this is a good definition. Define:
fν(S ) := ( fν(C), 〈Dc | c ∈ fν(C)〉). (18.14)
Lemma 18.13. fν(S ) is an n-selection.
Proof. 1. Consider c ∈ fν(C). Then, by definition of fν(C), there is c′ ∈ C such that
fν(c′) = c. By point 1 of the definition of n-selection, we have |c′| < n. Moreover, by
definition of fν, we have | fν(c′)| = |c′|. Then, since c = fν(c′), we have |c| < n. Then,
by arbitrariness of c ∈ fν(C), we have fν(C) ⊆ <n+1N .
2. By point 2 of definition of n-selection, there is c ∈ C. Then, by definition of
fν(C), we have fν(c) ∈ fν(C). Then, fν(C) , ∅.
3. Consider cb ∈ fν(C). Then, by definition of fν(C), there is c′ ∈ C such that
fν(c′) = cb. We prove that fν(c′−1) = c. Indeed, for every 0 ≤ i < |c′−1|+1, we have:
fν(c′ − 1)(i) = (c′ − 1)(i) + γ(|ν| + β + 1 + i) (by Lemma 18.12(1))
= c′(i) + γ(|ν| + β + 1 + i) (by definition of c′ − 1)
= fν(c′)(i) (by Lemma 18.12(1))
= cb(i) (by choice of c′)
= c(i) (by definition of cb).
Moreover, by definition of fν, we have | fν(c′)| = |c′|. Then, since fν(c′) = cb, we have
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|c′| = |cb| ≥ 0. Then, by point 3 of definition of n-selection, we have c′ − 1 ∈ C. Then,
by definition of fν(C), we have fν(c′ − 1) ∈ fν(C). Then, since fν(c′ − 1) = c, we have
c ∈ fν(C).
4. Consider c ∈ fν(C) ∩ <nN . Then, we have:
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ fν(C)} = {b ∈ Z | f −1ν (cb) ∈ C} (by Lemma 18.12(2))
= {b ∈ Z | ( f −1ν (cb) − 1)(b − γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + |cb|) ∈ C} (by Lemma 18.12(3)).
Define:
E := {b ∈ Z | ( f −1ν (cb) − 1)b ∈ C}.
F := {b ∈ Z | ( f −1ν (cb) − 1)(b − γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + |cb|)) ∈ C},
t : Z→ Z := n 7→ n + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + |cb|).
Then, t is a translation from Z to Z. Consider b ∈ E. Then, by definition of E, we have
( f −1ν (cb)− 1)b ∈ C. Then, by definition of t, we have ( f −1ν (cb)− 1)(t(b)− γ(| f (ν)|+ 1 +
|cb|)) ∈ C. Then, by definition of F, we have t(b) ∈ F. Then t[E] ⊆ F. Moreover, by
Lemma 18.12(2), we have f −1ν (c) ∈ C. Then, by point 4 of the definition of n-selection,
we have that E is cofinite in Z. Then, by Remark 18.5, F is cofinite in Z. Then, since
we showed {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ fν(C)} = F, we have that {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ fν(C)} is cofinite in Z.
5. Consider c ∈ fν(C). Consider t : Z → Z := n 7→ n + δ. Observe that t is
a translation from Z to Z. Moreover, by definition of Dc, we have t[D f −1ν (c)] = Dc.
Moreover, by point 5 of the definition of n-selection, we have that D f −1ν (c) is cofinite in
Z. Then, by Remark 18.5, we have that Dc is cofinite in Z. 
Define:
f (B(ν, S )) := B( f (ν), fν(S )). (18.15)
Lemma 18.14. f is an automorphism onMn.
Proof. 1. Injectivity (first-sort). Consider a1, a2 ∈ A. Suppose that:
f (a1) = f (a2). (18.16)
Two cases are given:
(a) a1, a2 ∈ A1. Then, a1 = ν1 and a2 = ν2 for some ν1, ν2 ∈ Z. Then, by
(18.16), we have:
| f (ν1)| = | f (ν2)|.
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Then, by definition of f , we have:
|ν1| + β = |ν2| + β.
Then:
|ν1| = |ν2|.
Moreover, by definition of f (18.8), for every i < |ν1| + 1 = |ν2| + 1, we
have:
ν1(i) + γ(i + β) = f (ν1)(i + β),
ν2(i) + γ(i + β) = f (ν2)(i + β).
Then, by (18.16), for every i < |ν1| + 1 = |ν2| + 1, we have:
ν1(i) + γ(i + β) = ν2(i) + γ(i + β).
Then, for every i < |ν1| + 1 = |ν2| + 1, we have:
ν1(i) = ν2(i).
Then, ν1 = ν2 as desired.
(b) a1, a2 ∈ A2. Then, a1 = (ν1, n1,m1) and a2 = (ν2, n2,m2) for some ν1, ν2 ∈
Z and n1, n2,m1,m2 ∈ Z. Then, by definition of f (18.9), we have:
f (ν1, n1,m1) = ( f (ν1n1) − 1, f (ν1n1)(| f (ν1n1)|),m1 + δ),
f (ν2, n2,m2) = ( f (ν2n2) − 1, f (ν2n2)(| f (ν2n2)|),m2 + δ).
Then, we have:
f (ν1n1) = f (ν2n2),
m1 + δ = m2 + δ.
Then, by point 1(a) for the first equation, we have:
ν1n1 = ν2n2,
m1 = m2.
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Then, we have:
ν1 = ν2,
n1 = n2,
m1 = m2.
Then, we have (ν1, n1,m1) = (ν2, n2,m2) as desired.
2. Injectivity (second-sort). Consider arbitrary B1, B2 ∈ Bn. Suppose that:
f (B1) = f (B2). (18.17)
Then, two cases are given:
(a) B1 = {a1} and B2 = {a2} for some a1, a2 ∈ A2. Then, by definition of f
(18.10) and (18.17), we have:
{ f (a1)} = { f (a2)}.
Then, we have:
f (a1) = f (a2).
Then, by injectivity of f on A, we have a1 = a2 as desired.
(b) B1 = B(ν1, S 1) and B2 = (ν2, S 2) for some ν1, ν2 ∈ A1 and n-selections
S 1 = (C1, 〈D1c | c ∈ C1〉) and S 2 = (C2, 〈D2c | c ∈ C2〉). Then, by definition
of f (18.15) and (18.17), we have:
B( f (ν1), fν1 (S 1)) = B( f (ν2), fν2 (S 2)). (18.18)
Moreover, by definition (18.14-18.13), we have:
fν1 (S 1) = ( fν1 (C1), {d + δ | d ∈ D1 f −1ν1 (c)} | c ∈ fν1 (C1)}), (18.19)
fν2 (S 2) = ( fν2 (C2), {d + δ | d ∈ D2 f −1ν2 (c)} | c ∈ fν2 (C2)}). (18.20)
Then, by (18.18), definition of B(ν, S ), and (18.19,18.20), we have:
{ f (ν1)} ∪ {( f (ν1)c − 1, f (ν1)c(| f (ν1)c|), d + δ) | c ∈ fν1 (C1) ∧ d ∈ D1 f −1ν1 (c)} =
{ f (ν2)} ∪ {( f (ν2)c − 1, f (ν2)c(| f (ν2)c|), d + δ) | c ∈ fν2 (C2) ∧ d ∈ D2 f −1ν2 (c)}.
(18.21)
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Then, we have:
f (ν1) = f (ν2).
Then, by injectivity of f on A, we have:
ν1 = ν2. (18.22)
Then, again by (18.21) and arithmetic, for every c1 ∈ fν1 (C1) and d1 ∈
D1 f −1ν1 (c1), there is c2 ∈ fν1 (C2) and d ∈ D2 f −1ν1 (c2) such that:
( f (ν1)c1 − 1, f (ν1)c1(| f (ν1)c1|), d1) =
( f (ν1)c2 − 1, f (ν1)c2(| f (ν1)c2|), d2).
Then, for every c1 ∈ fν1 (C1) and d1 ∈ D1 f −1ν1 (c1), there is c2 ∈ fν1 (C2) and
d2 ∈ D2 f −1ν1 (c2) such that:
c1 = c2,
d1 = d2.
Then, for every c1 ∈ fν1 (C1) and d1 ∈ D1 f −1ν1 (c1), we have c1 ∈ fν1 (C2)
and d1 ∈ D2 f −1ν1 (c1). Moreover, similarly, for every c2 ∈ fν1 (C2) and d2 ∈
D2 f −1ν1 (c2), we have c2 ∈ fν1 (C1) and d2 ∈ D1 f −1ν1 (c2). Then, fν1 (C1) = fν1 (C2)
and, for every c ∈ fν1 (C1), D1 f −1ν1 (c) = D2 f −1ν1 (c). Then, by injectivity of fν1
we have C1 = C2, and 〈D1c | c ∈ C1〉 = 〈D2c | c ∈ C2〉. Then, B1 = B2 as
desired.
3. Surjectivity (first-sort). Consider a ∈ A. Then, two cases are given:
(a) a ∈ A1. Then, a = ν for some ν ∈ Z. Define µ ∈ (−∞,|ν|−β+1)Z by, for all
i < |ν| − β + 1:
µ(i) := ν(i + β) − γ(i + β). (18.23)
Then, we have:
| f (µ)| = |µ| + β (by definition of f and of | |)
= |ν| − β + β (by definition of ν and of | |)
= |ν| (by arithmetic).
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Moreover, by definition of f , for all i < | f (µ)| + 1 = |ν| + 1, we have:
f (µ)(i) = µ(i − β) + γ(i) (by definition of f (18.8))
= ν(i) − γ(i) + γ(i) (by definition of µ (18.23))
= ν(i) (by arithmetic).
Then, we have f (µ) = ν as desired.
(b) a ∈ A2. Then, a = (ν, n,m) for some ν ∈ Z, and n,m ∈ Z. By Point 2(a),
there is µ ∈ A1 such that f (µ) = νn. Define, b := (µ−1, µ(|µ|),m−δ). Then,
we have:
f ((µ − 1, µ(|µ|),m − δ)) = ( f (µ) − 1, f (µ)(| f (µ)|),m) (by definition of f (18.9))
= (ν, n,m) (by definition of µ (18.23)).
Then, f (b) = a as desired.
Surjectivity (second-sort). Consider B ∈ Bn. Two cases are given:
(a) B = {a} for some a ∈ A2. Then, by surjectivity of f on A2, there is a′ ∈
A2 such that f (a′) = (a). Then, by definition of Bn, we have {a′} ∈ Bn.
Moreover, we have:
f ({a′}) = { f (a′)} (by definition of f (18.10))
= {a} (by definition of a′).
Then, f ({a′}) = B as desired.
(b) B = B(ν, S ) for some ν ∈ A1 and n-selection S = (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ C〉). By
surjectivity of f on A1, there is ν′ ∈ A1 such that:
f (ν′) = ν. (18.24)
Define:
f −1ν′ (C) := { f −1ν′ (c) | c ∈ C}.
For every c ∈ f −1ν′ (C), define:
D′c := {d − δ | d ∈ D fν′ (c)}. (18.25)
Define:
f −1ν′ (S ) := ( f
−1
ν′ (C), 〈D′c | c ∈ f −1ν′ (C)〉).
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Lemma 18.15. f −1ν′ (S ) is a n-selection.
Proof. 1. Consider c ∈ f −1ν′ (C). Then, by definition of f −1ν′ (C), there is
c′ ∈ C such that f −1ν (c′) = c. By point 1 of the definition of n-selection, we
have |c′| < n. Moreover, by definition of fν, we have | f −1ν′ (c′)| = |c′|. Then,
since c = f −1ν′ (c
′), we have |c| < n. Then, by arbitrariness of c ∈ fν(C), we
have fν(C) ⊆ <n+1N .
2. By point 2 of definition of n-selection, there is c ∈ C. Then, by definition
of f −1ν′ (C), we have f
−1
ν′ (c) ∈ f −1ν′ (C). Then, f −1ν′ (C) , ∅.
3. Consider cb ∈ f −1ν′ (C). Then, by definition of f −1ν′ (C), there is c′ ∈ C
such that f −1ν′ (c
′) = cb. We prove that f −1ν′ (c
′ − 1) = c. Indeed, for every
0 ≤ i < |c′ − 1| + 1, we have:
f −1ν′ (c
′ − 1)(i) = (c′ − 1)(i) − γ(| f (ν′)| + 1 + i) (by Lemma 18.12(3))
= c′(i) − γ(| f (ν′)| + 1 + i) (by definition of c′ − 1)
= f −1ν′ (c
′)(i) (by Lemma 18.12(3))
= cb(i) (by choice of c′)
= c(i) (by definition of cb).
Moreover, by definition of fν′ , we have | f −1ν′ (c′)| = |c′|. Then, since f −1ν′ (c′) =
cb, we have |c′| = |cb| ≥ 0. Then, by point 3 of definition of n-selection, we
have c′−1 ∈ C. Then, by definition of f −1ν′ (C), we have f −1ν′ (c′−1) ∈ f −1ν′ (C).
Then, since f −1ν′ (c
′ − 1) = c, we have c ∈ f −1ν′ (C).
4. Consider c ∈ f −1ν′ (C) ∩ <nN . Then, we have:
{b ∈ Z | cb ∈ f −1ν′ (C)} = {b ∈ Z | fν′ (cb) ∈ C} (by Lemma 18.12(2))
= {b ∈ Z | ( fν′ (cb) − 1)(b + γ(| f (ν)| + 1 + |cb|) ∈ C} (by Lemma 18.12(1)).
Define:
E := {b ∈ Z | ( fν′ (cb) − 1)b ∈ C}.
F := {b ∈ Z | ( fν′ (cb) − 1)(b + γ(| f (ν′)| + 1 + |cb|)) ∈ C},
t : Z→ Z := n 7→ n − γ(| f (ν′)| + 1 + |cb|).
Then, t is a translation from Z to Z. Consider b ∈ E. Then, by definition of
E, we have ( fν′ (cb) − 1)b ∈ C. Then, by definition of t, we have ( fν′ (cb) −
1)(t(b) + γ(| f (ν′)| + 1 + |cb|)) ∈ C. Then, by definition of F, we have
t(b) ∈ F. Then t[E] ⊆ F. Moreover, by definition of f −1ν′ (C), we have
fν′ (c) ∈ C. Then, by point 4 of the definition of n-selection, we have that
E is cofinite in Z. Then, by Remark 18.5, F is cofinite in Z. Then, since
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we showed {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ f −1ν′ (C)} = F, we have that {b ∈ Z | cb ∈ f −1ν′ (C)} is
cofinite in Z.
5. Consider c ∈ f −1ν′ (C). Consider t : Z → Z := n 7→ n − δ. Observe
that t is a translation from Z to Z. Moreover, by definition of D′c, we have
t[D fν′ (c)] = D
′
c. Moreover, by point 5 of the definition of n-selection, we
have that D fν′ (c) is cofinite in Z. Then, by Remark 18.5, we have that D′c is
cofinite in Z. 
By definition of f (18.14,18.13), we have:
fν′ ( f −1ν′ (S )) := ( fν′ ( f
−1
ν′ (C)), 〈{d + δ | d ∈ D′f −1
ν′ (c)
} | c ∈ fν′ ( f −1ν′ (C))〉).
(18.26)
By definition of f −1ν′ (C) and of f (18.12), we have:
fν′ ( f −1ν′ (C)) = C.
Then, (18.26) simplifies in:
fν′ ( f −1ν′ (S )) = (C, 〈{d + δ | d ∈ D′f −1
ν′ (c)
} | c ∈ C〉).
Then, by definition of D′
f −1
ν′ (c)
(18.25), we have:
fν′ ( f −1ν′ (S )) = (C, 〈{d − δ + δ | d ∈ D fν′ ( f −1ν′ (c))} | c ∈ C〉)
= (C, 〈{d | d ∈ D fν′ ( f −1ν′ (c))} | c ∈ C〉) (by arithmetic)
= (C, 〈{d | d ∈ Dc} | c ∈ C〉) (by Proposition 18.12(2))
= (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ C〉)
= S . (18.27)
By definition of f (18.15), we have:
f (B(ν′, f −1ν′ (S ))) = B( f (ν
′), fν′ ( f −1ν′ (S )))
= B(ν, S ) (by (18.24,18.27)).
Then, f (B(ν′, f −1ν′ (S ))) = B as desired.
4. Relation symbols r ∈ Φ. Consider a ∈ A and r ∈ Φ. Suppose that a ∈ V(r).
Then, by definition of V , we have that either r = p or r = q. Suppose that
r = p. Then, by definition of V , we have that a ∈ A1. Then by definition of f ,
we have f (a) ∈ A1. Then, by definition of V , we have f (a) ∈ V(p). Suppose
that r = q. Then, by definition of V , we have that a ∈ A2. Then by definition of
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f , we have f (a) ∈ A2. Then, by definition of V , we have f (a) ∈ V(q). Suppose
that f (a) ∈ V(r). Then, by definition of V , we have that either r = p or r = q.
Suppose that r = p. Then, by definition of V , we have that f (a) ∈ A1. Then by
definition of f , we have a ∈ A1. Then, by definition of V , we have a ∈ V(p).
Suppose that r = q. Then, by definition of V , we have that f (a) ∈ A2. Then by
definition of f , we have a ∈ A2. Then, by definition of V , we have a ∈ V(q).
5. Relation symbol ε. Consider a ∈ A and B ∈ Bn. Then, either B = {a′} for some
a′ ∈ A2 or B = B(ν, S ) for some ν ∈ A1 and n-selection S . Suppose that B = {a′}
for some a′ ∈ A2. Suppose that a ∈ B. Then, a = a′. Then f (a) ∈ { f (a′)}. Then,
since, by definition of f (18.10), f (B) = { f (a′)}, we have f (a) ∈ f (B) as desired.
Suppose that B = B(ν, S ) for some ν ∈ A1 and n-selection S = (C, 〈Dc | c ∈ C〉).
Two cases are given:
(a) a ∈ A1. Then, a = µ for some µ ∈ Z. Suppose that:
µ ∈ B(ν, S ).
Then, by definition of B(ν, S ), this is equivalent to:
µ = ν.
Then, by injectivity of f (Lemma 18.12(2)), this is equivalent to:
f (µ) = f (ν).
Then, by definition of B( f (ν), fν(S )), this is equivalent to:
f (µ) ∈ B( f (ν), fν(S )).
Then, by definition of f (B(ν, S )) (18.15), this is equivalent to:
f (µ) ∈ f (B(ν, S )).
(b) a ∈ A2. Then a = (µ, n,m) for some µ ∈ Z, and n,m ∈ Z. Suppose that:
(µ, n,m) ∈ B(ν, S ).
Then, by definition of B(ν, S ), this is equivalent to:
(µ, n,m) = (νc − 1, (νc)(|νc|), d)
for some c ∈ C, and d ∈ Dc. Then, by injectivity of f (Lemma 18.12(2))
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and a bit of thought on the definition of f , this is equivalent to:
f ((µ, n,m)) = ( f (νc) − 1, f (νc)(| f (νc)|), d + δ)
for some c ∈ C, and d ∈ Dc. Then, by Lemma 18.12(4), this is equivalent
to:
f ((µ, n,m)) = ( f (ν) fν(c) − 1, ( f (ν) fν(c))(| f (ν) fν(c)|), d + δ)
for some c ∈ C, and d ∈ Dc. Then, by (18.12) and (18.13), this is equivalent
to:
f ((µ, n,m)) = ( f (ν)c − 1, ( f (ν)c)(| f (ν)c|), d)
for some c ∈ fν(C), and d ∈ Dc. Then, by (18.14), this is equivalent to:
f ((µ, n,m)) ∈ B( f (ν), fν(S )).
Then, by (18.15), this is equivalent to:
f ((µ, n,m)) ∈ f (B(ν, S ))
as desired. 
We are ready to prove Points 1 and 2. 1. Consider arbitrary a1, a2 ∈ A1. Then
a1 = ν1 and a2 = ν2 for some ν1, ν2 ∈ Z. Define:
β := |ν2| − |ν1|. (18.28)
For every integer i < |ν2| + 1, define:
γ(i) := ν2(i) − ν1(i − β). (18.29)
For every integer i ≥ |ν2| + 1, let γ(i) be arbitrary. Let δ be arbitrary. Let f be the
automorphism onMn defined by β, {γ(i) | i ∈ Z}, and δ. Then, we have:
| f (ν1)| = |ν1| + β (by definition of f and of | |)
= |ν1| + |ν2| − |ν1| (by definition of β (18.28))
= |ν2| (by arithmetic).
197
Moreover, for every i < | f (ν1)| + 1 = |ν2| + 1, we have:
f (ν1)(i) = ν1(i − β) + γ(i) (by definition of f (18.8))
= ν1(i − β) + ν2(i) − ν1(i − β) (by definition of γ(i) (18.29))
= ν2(i) (by arithmetic).
Then f (ν1) = ν2 as desired.
2. Consider arbitrary a1, a2 ∈ A2. Then a1 = (ν1, n1,m1) and a2 = (ν2, n2,m2) for
some ν1, ν2 ∈ Z and n1,m1, n2,m2 ∈ Z. Define an automorphism f onMn such that
f (ν1n1) = ν2n2 as per Point 1, taking:
δ = m2 − m1. (18.30)
Then, we have:
f ((ν1, n1,m1)) = ( f (ν1n1) − 1, f (ν1n1)(| f (ν1n1)|),m1 + δ) (by definition of f (18.9))
= ( f (ν1n1) − 1, f (ν1n1)(| f (ν1n1)|),m1 + m2 − m1) (by definition of δ (18.30))
= (ν2n2 − 1, (ν2n2)(|(ν2n2)|),m1 + m2 − m1) (by choice of f )
= (ν2, n2,m2) (by definition of ν2n2 − 1, (ν2n2)(|(ν2n2)|), and arithmetic).
Then, f ((ν1, n1,m1)) = (ν2, n2,m2) as desired. 
By Proposition 18.11, plainly follows:
Corollary 18.16.
For every a1, a2 ∈ A1, and ϕ[x] ∈ L2, we have:
Mn |= ϕ[a1] if and only ifMn |= ϕ[a2].
For every a1, a2 ∈ A2, and ϕ[x] ∈ L2, we have:
Mn |= ϕ[a1] if and only ifMn |= ϕ[a2].
We now prove that:
Proposition 18.17. For every a ∈ A1,Mn |= ϕn[a].
Proof. Consider a ∈ A1. Then a = ν0 for some ν0 ∈ Z. Let S Z = (CZ, 〈DZc | c ∈ C〉)
be the n-selection given by CZ := <n+1N , and, for every c ∈ CZ, DZc := Z. Consider
B(ν0, S Z). Consider an arbitrary B(ν0, S 0) such that S 0 = (C0, 〈D0c | c ∈ C0〉) is an
n-selection.
Lemma 18.18. For every 0 ≤ i < n:
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• Let b1, ..., bi be an arbitrary element of [0,i)Z (if i = 0, then b1, ..., bi = ∅ ∈ [0,0)Z);
• Let S i = (Ci, 〈Dic | c ∈ Ci〉) be an arbitrary n-selection.
Suppose that:
H1. b1...bi ∈ C0.
Then, there is bi+1 ∈ Ci such that:
T1. b1...bi+1 ∈ C0.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary 0 ≤ i < n. Suppose that hypothesis H1 holds. Then, by
point 4 of the definition of n-selection, we have that {b ∈ Z | b1...bib ∈ C0} is cofinite in
Z. Moreover, by point 2 of the definition of n-selection, we have that ∅ ∈ Ci. Then, by
point 4 of the definition of n-selection, we have {b ∈ Z | b ∈ Ci} is cofinite in Z. Then,
there is bi+1 ∈ {b ∈ Z | b1...bib ∈ C0} ∩ {b ∈ Z | b ∈ Ci}. 
Then, by Lemma 18.18 (i = 0), there is b1 ∈ C0 such that b1 ∈ C0. (Observe that, if
i = 0, then b1...bi = ∅, and, by point 2 of the definition of n-selection, we have ∅ ∈ C0.
Then, H1 (i = 0) is satisfied.) Consider ν1 := ν0b1. Consider B(ν1, S Z). Consider an
arbitrary B(ν1, S 1) such that S 1 = (C1, 〈D1c | c ∈ C1〉) is an n-selection. Plainly, H1
(i = 1) is satisfied. Repeat until you obtain bn ∈ Z such that b1...bn ∈ C0.
Lemma 18.19. For every 0 < i ≤ n:
1. νi < B(νi−1, S Z).
2. νi ∈ cl(B(νi−1, S i−1)).
3. νn ∈ cl(B(ν0, S 0)).
Proof. 1. By definition, for every 0 < i ≤ n, we have νi = νi−1bi. Then, we have
νi , νi−1. Then, by definition of B(νi−1, S Z), we have νi < B(νi−1, S Z).
2. Consider 0 < i ≤ n. Then, by Lemma 18.18, we have:
νi = νi−1bi; (18.31)
bi ∈ Ci−1. (18.32)
Consider an arbitrary B(νi, S ′i ) where S
′
i = (C
′
i , 〈D′i c | c ∈ C′i 〉) is an n-selection. By
point 2 and 3 of the definition of n-selection, we have ∅ ∈ C′i . Then, D′i∅ is defined. By
(18.32), Di−1bi is defined. By definition of n-selection, both Di−1bi and D
′
i∅ are cofinite
in Z. Then, there is d ∈ Di−1bi ∩ D′i∅. Then, we have:
B(νi−1, S i−1) 3 (νi−1bi − 1, νi−1bi(|νi−1bi|), d) (by definition of B(νi−1, S i−1))
= (νi − 1, νi(|νi|), d) (by (18.31))
∈ B(νi, S ′i ) (by definition of B(νi, S ′i )).
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Then, we have B(νi, S ′i )∩B(νi−1, S i−1) , ∅. Then, by arbitrariness of B(νi, S ′i ), we have
νi ∈ cl(B(νi−1, S i−1)).
3. By Lemma 18.18, we have:
νn = ν0b1...bn; (18.33)
b1...bn ∈ C0. (18.34)
Consider an arbitrary B(νn, S ′n) where S ′n = (C′n, 〈D′nc | c ∈ C′n〉) is an n-selection. By
point 2 of the definition of n-selection, we have ∅ ∈ C′n. Then, D′n∅ is defined. By
(18.34), D0b1...bn is defined. By definition of selection in n, both D0b1...bn and D
′
n∅ are
cofinite in Z. Then, there is d ∈ D0b1...bn ∩ D′n∅. Then, we have:
B(ν0, S 0) 3 (ν0b1...bn − 1, ν0b1...bn(|ν0b1...bn|), d) (by definition of B(ν0, S 0))
= (νn − 1, νn(|νn|), d) (by (18.33))
∈ B(νn, S ′n) (by definition of B(νn, S ′n)).
Then, we have B(νn, S ′n) ∩ B(ν0, S 0) , ∅. Then, by arbitrariness of B(νn, S ′n), we have
νn ∈ cl(B(ν0, S 0)). 
Then, by choice of a and, for every 0 ≤ i < n, of B(νi, S Z) and B(νi, S i), thesis follows.

Finally:
Proposition 18.20. For every m > n, and a ∈ A1,Mn 6|= ϕm[a].
Proof. We begin with a preliminary lemma:
Lemma 18.21. For every ν1 ∈ A1, B(ν1, S 1) where S 1 = (C1, 〈D1c | c ∈ C1〉) is an
n-selection, and a ∈ A, if a < B(ν1, S 1) and a ∈ cl(B(ν1, S 1)), then a = ν2 for some
ν2 ∈ Z and ν1 ⊂ ν2.
Proof. If a ∈ A2, then, since a < B(ν1, S 1) and {a} ∈ Bn, we have that a < cl(B(ν1, S 1)),
a contradiction. Then a ∈ A1. Then, a = ν2 for some ν2 ∈ Z. Consider B(ν2, S 2) where
S 2 = (C2, 〈D2c | c ∈ C2〉) is an n-selection. Since ν2 ∈ cl(B(ν1, S 1)), then B(ν1, S 1) ∩
B(ν2, S 2) , ∅. Then, we have:
(ν1c1 − 1, ν1c1(|ν1c1|), d1) = (ν2c2 − 1, ν2c2(|ν2c2|), d2) (18.35)
for some c1 ∈ C1 and d1 ∈ D1c1 , and for some c2 ∈ C2 and d2 ∈ D2c2 . Then, we
have ν1c1 = ν2c2. Then, we have ν1 ⊂ ν2 or ν1 = ν2 or ν1 ⊃ ν2. If ν1 = ν2, then
ν2 ∈ B(ν1, S 1), a contradiction.
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Suppose ν1 ⊃ ν2. Define C′2 = {c ∈ C2 | ν2c + ν1}, and S ′2 := (C′2, 〈Dc | c ∈ C′2〉).
By Lemma 18.10, S ′2 is an n-selection. Plainly, ν2 ∈ B(ν2, S ′2) ∈ Bn. Then, since
ν2 ∈ cl(B(ν1, S 1)), we have (18.35) for some c1 ∈ C1 and d1 ∈ D1c1 , and for some
c2 ∈ C′2 and d2 ∈ D2c2 . Then, we have ν1c1 = ν2c2. Then, we have ν2c2 ⊇ ν1, against
c2 ∈ C′2. 
Consider a ∈ A1. Then, a = ν0 for some ν0 ∈ Z. Suppose that Mn |= ϕm[ν0].
Then, there is B(ν0, S 0) ∈ Bn with S 0 = (C0, 〈D0c | c ∈ D0〉) an n-selection, and a1 ∈ A
such that a1 < B(ν0, S 0) and a1 ∈ cl(B(ν0, S 0)). Then, by Lemma 18.21, a1 = ν1 for
some ν1 ∈ A1 and ν0 ⊂ ν1. Repeat until you find ν0, ν1, ..., νm ∈ A1 such that ν0 ⊂
... ⊂ νm. Moreover, by definition of ϕm, we can suppose νm ∈ cl(B(ν0, S 0)). Consider
an arbitrary B(νm, S m) where S m = {Dmc | c ∈ Cm}. Then, since νm ∈ cl(B(ν0, S 0)), we
have B(ν0, S 0) ∩ B(νm, S m) , ∅. Then, we have:
(ν0c0 − 1, ν0c0(|ν0c0|), d0) = (νmcm − 1, νmcm(|νmcm−1|), dm) (18.36)
for some c0 ∈ C0 and d0 ∈ D0c0 , and for some cm ∈ Cm and dm ∈ Dmcm . Then, since
ν0 ⊂ νm, there is c ⊆ c0, such that ν0c = νm. Then, by point 3 of definition of n-
selection, we have c ∈ C0. Moreover, since ν0 ⊂ ... ⊂ νm, we have |c| + 1 ≥ m > n, a
contradiction since c ∈ C0 ⊆ ⋃integer i<n+1 [0,i)Z. 
18.2.3 Proof of Theorem 18.3
Proof of Theorem 18.3. Consider an arbitrary finite set σ of modal operators. Then,
by Corollary 18.16, and since {p, q} and σ are finite, there are distinct n,m ∈ N
such that n < m and, for every a ∈ A, and formula ϕ of the form #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1) with
(#, ψ[x], p0, ..., pk−1) ∈ σ and, for every i ∈ k, ϕi ∈ {>,⊥, p, q}, we have:
Mn, a |= #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1) if and only ifMm, a |= #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1). (18.37)
Then:
Lemma 18.22. For every formula ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ such that all propositional variables occur-
ring in ϕ are among {p, q}, and a ∈ A, we haveMn, a |= ϕ if and only ifMm, a |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The case in which ϕ is > is trivial. Suppose ϕ ∈ Φ. Then,
by hypothesis, ϕ ∈ {p, q}. Then, thesis plainly follows by definition of V . The boolean
cases are trivial. Suppose ϕ is #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1) for (#, ψ[x], p0, ..., pk−1) ∈ τ. Observe
that, since all propositional variables occurring in ϕ are among {p, q}, then, for every
i ∈ k, all propositional variables occurring in ϕi are among {p, q}. Then, by inductive
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hypothesis, we have:
ϕMni = ϕ
Mm
i for every i ∈ k. (18.38)
Suppose that (#, ψ[x], p0, ..., pk−1) ∈ ρ. Then, ψ is a point-sort formula. Then,
Mn, a |= #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1) if and only if, by semantics,Mn[ϕMn0 /p0, ..., ϕMnk−1/pk−1], a |= ψ[a] if
and only if, by Remark 18.6 and (18.38),Mm[ϕMm0 /p0, ..., ϕMmk−1/pk−1] |= ψ[a] if and only if,
by semantics,Mm, a |= #(ϕ0, ..., ϕk−1).
Suppose that (#, ψ[x], p0, ..., pk−1) ∈ σ. Let χ be #(χ0, ..., χk−1) where, for every
i ∈ k:
χi :=

> provided ϕMni = A,
p provided ϕMni = A1,
q provided ϕMni = A2,
⊥ provided ϕMni = ∅.
Then, by Corollary 18.16, the formulas χi are well defined. Moreover, by definition of
V , we have:
ϕMni = χ
Mn
i for every i ∈ k, (18.39)
and, by choice of n,m, we have:
χMni = χ
Mm
i for every i ∈ k. (18.40)
Then, we haveMn, a |= ϕ if and only if, by semantics,Mn[ϕMn0 /p0, ..., ϕMnk−1/pk−1] |= ψ[a]
if and only if, by (18.39), Mn[χMn0 /p0, ..., χMnk−1/pk−1] |= ψ[a] if and only if, by semantics,
Mn, a |= χ. Observe that χ is a formula of LΦ,τ such that all propositional variables
occurring in χ are among {p, q}. Then, by choice ofMn andMm, we haveMn, a |= χ
if and only ifMm, a |= χ if and only if, by semantics,Mm[χMm0 /p0, ..., χMmk−1/pk−1] |= ψ[a] if
and only if, by (18.38), (18.39) and (18.40),Mm[ϕMm0 /p0, ..., ϕMmk−1/pk−1] |= ψ[a] if and only
if, by semantics,Mm, a |= ϕ. 
Suppose, by contradiction, that LΦ,τ can express Lt on T2. Then, since ϕm ∈ Lt,
there is ϕ ∈ LΦ,τ equivalent to ϕm on T2. Since ϕ is equivalent to ϕm, and there are no
propositional variables occurring in ϕm, we can assume that there are no propositional
variables occurring in ϕ. Indeed, let p0, ..., pl−1 ∈ Φ be the propositional variables oc-
curring in ϕ, and ϕ[>/p0, ..., >/pl−1] the formula obtained by replacing, for every i ∈ l,
every occurrence of pi by >. Then, for every T2 topological model M = (A, τ,V),
we have M |= ϕm[a] if and only if, since there are no occurring propositional vari-
ables in ϕm,M[A/p0, ..., A/pl−1] |= ϕm[a] if and only if, since ϕm and ϕ are equivalent on
T2, M[A/p0, ..., A/pl−1], a |= ϕ if and only if, by definition of ϕ[>/p0, ..., >/pl−1], M, a |=
ϕ[>/p0, ..., >/pl−1]. Then, ϕm and ϕ[>/p0, ..., >/pl−1] are equivalent on T2 and, by definition
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of ϕ[>/p0, ..., >/pl−1], there are no propositional variables occurring in ϕ[>/p0, ..., >/pl−1].
Take ϕ[>/p0, ..., >/pl−1] as ϕ.
Recall that Lt is invariant under changing bases, and so, since the semantics of
modal operators is determined by an Lt formula, also LΦ,τ is invariant under changing
bases. By Proposition 18.17, for every a ∈ A1, we haveMm |= ϕm[a]. Then, since ϕm
and ϕ are equivalent on T2, by Proposition 18.9, we haveMm |= ϕ[a]. Then, since there
are no propositional variables occurring in ϕ, by Lemma 18.22, we haveMn |= ϕ[a].
Then, since ϕm and ϕ are equivalent on T2, we haveMn |= ϕm[a], against Proposition
18.20. 
203
Chapter 19
Logic of X such that T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3
In this chapter we study the logic LX of any class of topological models X such that
T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3. We axiomatize this theory, and prove that it is PSPACE-complete.
More precisely, in Section 19.1 we give a list of axioms Λ (let LΛ be the modal logic
generated by Λ as defined in Section 19.1). In Section 19.2, we prove that LΛ is sound
with respect to LT1 (that is, LΛ ⊆ LT1 ), and in Section 19.4 that LΛ is complete with
respect to LT3 (that is, LT3 ⊆ LΛ). Then, for every X such that T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3, we obtain
that LX is axiomatized by Λ (that is, LΛ = LX). In particular, LΛ = LT1 = LT2 = LT3 .
Moreover, we prove that LX is strongly complete (that is, for every Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L, we have
that Γ |= ϕ implies Γ `LX ϕ).
In Section 19.3, for every ϕ ∈ L, we define ‘ϕ-quasi models’. They are finite cod-
ifications of topological models satisfying ϕ (Cf. [13, §6.4]). Indeed, we prove that if
there is a ϕ-quasi model, then there is a T3 topological model satisfying ϕ (Proposition
19.3), and that if there is a T1 topological model satisfying ϕ, then there is a ϕ-quasi
model (Proposition 19.6). From this, since LT1 = LX = LT3 , we obtain that deciding if
ϕ ∈ LX is reducible to deciding if there is no ϕ-quasi models. Finally, in Section 19.5,
we prove that deciding if there is a ϕ-quasi model is PSPACE (Proposition 19.20).
Then, deciding if there is no ϕ-quasi model is PSPACE. Then, deciding if ϕ ∈ LX
is PSPACE. In fact, we prove that the validity problem for LX is PSPACE-complete
(Theorem 19.21).
19.1 The logic LΛ
For every ϕ ∈ L, define ^!0ϕ as an abbreviation for ¬^0ϕ, and, for every natural
number n > 0, define ^!nϕ as an abbreviation for ^n−1ϕ ∧ ¬^nϕ. Plainly, ^!nϕ means
that there are exactly n points satisfying ϕ. Consider the following Λ ⊆ L:
PL. All propositional tautologies.
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1. Axioms for ^n (n ∈ N). Let p, q be distinct propositional variables:
^N1. ^n+1 p→ ^n p (n ∈ N).
^N2. 0(p→ q)→ (^n p→ ^nq) (n ∈ N).
^N3. ^!0(p ∧ q)→ ((^!n1 p ∧ ^!n2 q)→ ^!n1+n2 (p ∨ q)) (n1, n2 ∈ N).
^N4. 0 p→ p.
^N5. ^n p→ 0^n p (n ∈ N).
2. Axioms for [d]:
[d]1. [d](p→ q)→ ([d]p→ [d]q).
[d]2. [d]p→ [d][d]p.
4. 〈d〉p→ ^n p (n ∈ N).
Let LΛ be the smallest subset of L containing Λ and closed under the following infer-
ence rules:
• Modus ponens: If ϕ ∈ LΛ and ϕ→ ψ ∈ LΛ, then ψ ∈ LΛ.
• Uniform substitution: if ϕ ∈ LΛ, then LΛ contains all the substitution instances
of ϕ.
• Generalization: if ϕ ∈ LΛ, then 0ϕ, [d]ϕ ∈ LΛ.
Plainly, LΛ is a modal logic. Axioms ^N1-4 come from [36], Axiom ^N5 comes from
[26], Axioms [d]1,2 are K4 for [d], Axiom 4 is an original axiom that relates [d] to the
{^n | n ∈ N}.
Observe that LΛ is not normal in the sense of Section 2.4. Indeed, let A := {0, 1}, τ
be the discrete topology on A, and V any evaluation such that V(p) = {0} and V(q) = ∅.
Then,M := (A, τ,V) is a T1 topological model such that:
|{a ∈ M |M, a 6|= p→ q}| ≤ 1,
|{a ∈ M |M, a 6|= p}| ≤ 1,
|{a ∈ M |M, a 6|= q}| > 1.
Then, by soundness of LΛ with respect to T1 (Proposition 19.1), we have 1(p →
q) → (1 p → 1q) < LΛ. Nonetheless, 0(p → q) → (0 p → 0q) is plainly
valid on T3. Then, by completeness of LΛ with respect to T3 (Theorem 19.8), we have
0(p → q) → (0 p → 0q) ∈ LΛ. This, together with Generalization for 0, gives
‘normality of LΛ with respect to 0’. Moreover, ‘LΛ is normal with respect to [d]’ too.
Furthermore, Axiom Schema ^N2’s structure is reminiscent of normality axioms.
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Observe also that Axiom ^N4 is T for 0, and Axiom ^N4 for n = 0 is 5 for 0.
Finally, Axiom Schema 4 states that if a point sees other points satisfying p arbitrarily
near, then there are infinitely many points satisfying p.
19.2 Soundness of LΛ with respect to LT1
Theorem 19.1. LΛ is sound with respect to LT1 .
Proof. As usual, to prove the soundness of LΛ with respect to LT1 , we prove that every
formula in Λ is valid on T1, and that the inference rules preserve validity on T1.
Validity on T1 of propositional tautologies, ^N1-5, and [d]1 is plain. As for Axiom
[d]2, consider a topological modelM ∈ T1, and a point a ∈ M, such thatM, a |= [d]p.
Then, there is a neighborhood U of a such that, for every a′ ∈ U \ {a}, we have
M, a′ |= p . Consider an arbitrary a′ ∈ U \ {a}. Then, since M is T1, there is a
neighborhood U′ of a′ with a < U′. Then, U ∩ U′ is a neighborhood of a′ such that,
for every a′′ ∈ U′′ \ {a′}, M, a′′ |= p. Then, M, a′ |= [d]p. Then, by arbitrariness of
a′ ∈ U \ {a}, we have M, a |= [d][d]p. (Cf. [66, p. 198, Axiom IV’] (in French) by
Kuratowski, 1922.)
As for Axiom 4, consider an arbitrary M ∈ T1, and a point a ∈ M such that
M, a |= 〈d〉p. Then, there exists a neighborhood U of a, and a point a′ ∈ U \ {a} such
thatM, a′ |= p. Then, sinceM is T1, reasoning as before, we can find a neighborhood
U′ of a such that U′ ⊆ U \{a′}. Moreover, sinceM, a |= 〈d〉p, we can find a′′ ∈ U′\{a},
and then a′′ , a′, with M, a′′ |= p. Iterating, we obtain ω distinct a′ ∈ M such that
M, a′ |= p.
Finally, observe that Modus Ponens, Substitution and Generalization preserve va-
lidity on T1. 
19.3 Quasi models
In this section, for every ϕ ∈ L, we define ‘ϕ-quasi models’. They are finite codifi-
cations of topological models satisfying ϕ (Cf. [13, §6.4]). They are used to study the
computability of LX (T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3).
Fix ϕ ∈ L. Let sub(ϕ) := {ψ ∈ L |ψ ≤ ϕ} denote the set of subformulas of ϕ. Call a
Hintikka set for ϕ every set w ⊆ sub(ϕ) such that:
H1. For every ¬ϕ ≤ ϕ, we have ¬ϕ ∈ w if and only if ϕ < w.
H2. For every ϕ ∧ ψ ≤ ϕ, we have ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ w if and only if ϕ ∈ w and ψ ∈ w.
Let Hin(ϕ) be the set of all Hintikka sets for ϕ.
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Hintikka sets encode points and formulas that these points satisfy (ϕ ∈ w meaning
that the point encoded by w satisfies ϕ).
Definition 19.2. A ϕ-quasi model is a tuple M = (W,m) with W ⊆ Hin(ϕ), and
m : W → ω + 1 such that:
Q1. ϕ ∈ ⋃ W.
Q2. For every n ∈ N, if ^nϕ ∈ ⋃ W, then ∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W} > n.
Q3. For every n ∈ N, and ^nϕ ≤ ϕ, if ∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W} > n, then ^nϕ ∈ ⋂ W.
Q4. For every w ∈ W, and every [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ such that [d]ϕ < w, there is w′ ∈ W such
that:
1. ϕ < w′.
2. For every [d]ψ ∈ w, we have ψ, [d]ψ ∈ w′.
3. m(w′) = ω.
A ϕ-quasi model (W,m) encodes a T3 topological modelM = (A, τ,V) satisfying
ϕ. (W,m) encodes the domain A of M, with m(w) encoding how many times a point
encoded by w occurs in A. Q1 encodes the fact that ϕ is satisfied inM. Q2 encodes the
fact that, for every n ∈ N, and ^nϕ ≤ ϕ, if a point inM satisfies ^nϕ, then there are
more than n points inM satisfying ϕ. Q3 encodes the fact that, for every n ∈ N, and
^nϕ ≤ ϕ, if there are more than n points inM satisfying ϕ, then all points inM satisfy
^nϕ. Q4 encodes the fact that for every point a ∈ M, there is a neighborhood U of a
such that:
• For every [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ, if a does not satisfy [d]ϕ, then there is a′ ∈ U \ {a} that does
not satisfy ϕ;
• For every [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ, if a satisfies [d]ϕ, then every a′ ∈ U \ {a} satisfies ϕ and
[d]ϕ.
• For every a′ ∈ U \ {a}, there are infinitely many points inM that satisfy the same
formulas ϕ ≤ ϕ as a.
We prove that, if there is a ϕ-quasi model, then there is a T3 topological model
satisfying ϕ (Proposition 19.3), and that if there is a T1 topological model satisfying ϕ,
then there is a ϕ-quasi model (Proposition 19.6).
Proposition 19.3. If there is a ϕ-quasi model then there is a T3 topological model
satisfying ϕ.
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary ϕ-quasi modelM = (W,m). Define:
A0 := {(w, n) |w ∈ W ∧ n ∈ m(w)},
α0 := ∅,
λ0 : A0 → W := (w, n) 7→ w.
Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N \ {0}, and suppose thatMi = (Ai, αi, λi) has been defined.
For every a ∈ Ai, for every [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ such that [d]ϕ < λi(a), let w′(λi(a),[d]ϕ) be as per Q4
applied to (λi(a), [d]ϕ). Let Ua := {w′(λi(a),[d]ϕ) | [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ∧ [d]ϕ < λi(a)}. Let Xa be a set
of new objects and fa a bijection from Xa to Ua. Assume the sets Xa pairwise disjoint.
DefineMi+1 = (Ai+1, αi+1, λi+1) as:
Ai+1 := Ai ∪
⋃
a∈Ai
Xa,
αi+1 := {{a} ∪ Xa | a ∈ Ai} ∪ {U ∪
⋃
a∈U
Xa |U ∈ αi},
λi+1 := λi ∪
⋃
a∈Ai
fa.
In words, we obtain αi+1 by adding, for every a ∈ Ai, new elements {a} ∪ Xa to αi+1 (if
{a} < αi and Xa , ∅) and extending old elements U ∈ αi to U∪⋃a∈U Xa ∈ αi+1. For each
of the new elements U ∈ αi+1 define (the date of birth of U) dob(U) := i+1. Each of the
extended elements V ∈ αi+1 must be obtained from an element U ∈ αn with dob(U) = n
(for some n < i + 1) by subsequent extending. Define at age(U, i + 1− n) := V . Define:
A :=
⋃
i∈N
Ai,
α := {
⋃
i∈N
at age(U, i) | n ∈ N ∧ U ∈ αn ∧ dob(U) = n},
λ :=
⋃
i∈N
λi.
Lemma 19.4. The following facts hold:
1. The set α is a base for a topology, say τ, over A.
2. (A, τ) is a T2 topological space.
3. For every U ∈ α, U is a closed set.
4. (A, τ) is a regular topological space.
5. (A, τ) is a T3 topological space.
Proof. 1. By construction each a ∈ A belongs to some U ∈ α. Moreover, by construc-
tion, for every U,U′ ∈ α such that U ∩ U′, we have that U ⊆ U′ or U ⊃ U′. Then, for
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every U,U′ ∈ α and a ∈ U ∩ U′, there is U′′ ∈ α with a ∈ U′′ ⊆ U ∩ U′. Then, by
Proposition 15.2, α is a base.
2. Consider a, a′ ∈ A such that a , a′. Then, by construction there is i ∈ N such
that a, a′ ∈ Ai and there are U,U′ ∈ αi such that a ∈ U, a′ ∈ U′ and U ∩U′ = ∅. Then,
by construction, we have a ∈ ⋃i∈N at age(U, i) ∈ α, a′ ∈ ⋃i∈N at age(U′, i) ∈ α, and⋃
i∈N at age(U, i) ∩⋃i∈N at age(U′, i) = ∅.
3. Consider U ∈ α, and a ∈ A \ U. Then, by construction there is i ∈ N such that
a ∈ Ai, at age(U, i) ∈ αi and there is V ∈ αi such that a ∈ V and V ∩ at age(U, i) = ∅.
Let Va :=
⋃
i∈N at age(V, i). Then, by construction, a ∈ Va ∈ α and U ∩ Va = ∅. In
conclusion, for every U ∈ α, and a ∈ A\U, there is Va ∈ α with a ∈ Va and Va∩U = ∅.
Then, for every U ∈ α, we have A \ U = ⋃a∈A\U Va. Then, U is a closed set.
4. Consider a closed set C and a ∈ A \C. Then, A \C is open. Then, there is U ∈ α
such that a ∈ U ⊆ A \ C. Moreover, by 3, we have that A \ U is open. Finally, plainly,
C ⊆ A \ U and U ∩ (A \ U) = ∅.
5. By definition, and points 2 and 4. 
For every p ∈ Φ, define V(p) := {a ∈ A | p ∈ λ(a)}, andM′ := (A, τ,V). We show that:
Lemma 19.5. For every a ∈ M′ and ϕ ≤ ϕ, we have:
ϕ ∈ λ(a) if and only ifM′, a |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. Assume that ϕ ∈ Φ. Then ϕ ∈ λ(a) if and
only if, by definition of V , a ∈ V(ϕ) if and only if, by semantics,M, a |= ϕ.
Assume that ϕ is ¬ψ. ¬ψ ∈ λ(a) if and only if, by H1, ψ < λ(a) if and only if, by
inductive hypothesis,M′, a 6|= ψ if and only if, by semantics,M′, a |= ¬ψ.
Assume that ϕ is ψ ∧ χ. ψ ∧ χ ∈ λ(a) if and only if, by H2, ψ ∈ λ(a) and χ ∈ λ(a)
if and only if, by inductive hypothesis, M′, a |= ψ and M′, a |= χ if and only if, by
semantics,M′, a |= ψ ∧ χ.
Assume that ϕ is of the form ^nψ. Assume that ϕ ∈ λ(a). By definition of λ, we
have λ(a) ∈ W. Then, by Q2, we have ∑{m(w) |ψ ∈ w ∈ W} > n. Then, by definition of
A0 and λ0, we have |{a′ ∈ A0 |ψ ∈ λ0(a′)}| > n. Now, by definition of A and λ, A0 ⊆ A
and λ0 ⊆ λ. Then, we have |{a′ ∈ A |ψ ∈ λ(a′)}| > n. Then, by inductive hypothesis,
we have |{a′ ∈ A |M, a′ |= ψ}| > n. Then, by semantics, we haveM′, a |= ^nψ.
Assume:
^nψ < λ(a). (19.1)
By definition of λ, we have λ(a) ∈ W. Then, by (19.1) and Q3, we have:∑
{m(w) |ψ ∈ w ∈ W} ≤ n.
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Then, by definition of A0 and λ0, we have:
|{a′ ∈ A0 |ψ ∈ λ0(a′)}| ≤ n. (19.2)
Now, by definition of λ, we have λ0 ⊆ λ. Then, by (19.2), we have:
|{a′ ∈ A0 |ψ ∈ λ(a′)}| ≤ n. (19.3)
Consider a′ ∈ A \A0. Then, by construction, a′ is obtained by application of Q4. Then,
by Q4(3), we have:
m(λ(a′)) = ω. (19.4)
Assume:
ψ ∈ λ(a′). (19.5)
By definition of λ, we have λ(a′) ∈ W. Then, by (19.4), (19.5) and Q3, we have
^nψ ∈ λ(a): contradiction, since, by (19.1), ^nψ < λ(a). Then, we have:
|{a′ ∈ A \ A0 |ψ ∈ λ(a′)}| = 0. (19.6)
Then, by (19.3) and (19.6), we have |{a′ ∈ A |ψ ∈ λ(a′)}| ≤ n. Then, by inductive
hypothesis, we have |{a′ ∈ A |M, a′ |= ψ}| ≤ n. Then, by semantics, we haveM, a 6|=
^nψ.
Assume that ϕ is of the form [d]ψ. Assume ϕ ∈ λ(a). Let i be the step at which
a has been introduced. Then, by construction, there is U ∈ αi+1 with a ∈ Ui+1 and
dob(U) = i + 1. Then, by construction, a ∈ U′ := ⋃i∈N at age(U, i) ∈ α. Now, by
construction, we have that every element a′ of U′ \ {a} have been introduced by some
sequence of applications of Q4:
(a, [d]χ) = (a0, [d]χ0), (a1, [d]χ1), ..., (an, [d]χn), an+1 = a′
(n some natural number) such that, for every j ∈ n + 1, we have [d]χ j ≤ ϕ and [d]χ j <
λi+ j(a j), and, for every j ∈ n, we have a j+1 is the element obtained by applying Q4 to
(λi+ j(a j), [d]χ j). Then, since [d]ψ ∈ λi(a), by Q4(2), for every a′ ∈ U′ \ {a} we have
ψ ∈ λn+1(a′). Then, since λn+1 ⊆ λ, for every a′ ∈ U′ \ {a}, we have ψ ∈ λ(a′). Then, by
inductive hypothesis, for every a′ ∈ U′ \ {a}, we haveM′, a′ |= ψ. Then, by semantics,
we haveM′, a |= [d]ψ.
Assume:
[d]ψ < λ(a). (19.7)
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Let U be an arbitrary neighborhood of a. Then, since α is a base for τ, there is U′ ∈ α
with a ∈ U′ ⊆ U. Then, by construction, there is i ∈ N and U′′ ∈ αi such that
dob(U′′) = i and U′ =
⋃
i′∈N at age(U′′, i′). Then, by construction, there is i′ ∈ N such
that a ∈ at age(U′′, i′ − i) ∈ αi′ . Now, by (19.7), Q4(1), and construction:
there is a′ ∈ at age(U′′, i′ + 1 − i) \ {a} with ψ < λi′+1−i(a′). (19.8)
Now, by definition of λ and U′, we have λi′+1−i ⊆ λ and at age(U′′, i′ + 1 − i) ⊆ U′.
Then, by (19.8), there is a′ ∈ U′ \ {a} with ψ < λ(a′). Then, since U′ ⊆ U, there is
a′ ∈ U \ {a} with ψ < λ(a). Then, by inductive hypothesis, there is a′ ∈ U \ {a} with
M′, a′ 6|= ψ. Then, by arbitrariness of U and semantics, we haveM′, a 6|= [d]ψ. 
Now, by construction, we have λ0[A0] ⊇ W. Then, since, by definition, λ0 ⊆ λ, we
have λ[A] ⊇ W. Then, by Q1 and Lemma 19.5, we have that ϕ is satisfiable inM′. 
Proposition 19.6. If there is a T1 topological model satisfying ϕ, then there is a ϕ-quasi
model (W,m).
Proof. Let M = (A, τ,V) be a T1 topological model satisfying ϕ. For every a ∈ W,
define:
type(a) := {ϕ ≤ ϕ |M, a |= ϕ}.
Define:
W := {type(a) | a ∈ A},
m : W → ω + 1 := type(a) 7→
 |{a′ ∈ A | type(a′) = type(a)}| if finite,ω otherwise.
M′ := (W,m).
Lemma 19.7. M′ is a ϕ-quasi model.
Proof. Q1. SinceM satisfies ϕ, there is a ∈ A such thatM, a |= ϕ. Then, by definition
of type, we have ϕ ∈ type(a). Then, by definition of W, we have ϕ ∈ ⋃ W.
Q2. Assume that ^nϕ ∈ ⋃ W. Then, by definition of W, there is type(a) ∈ W with
^nϕ ∈ type(a). Then, by definition of type, we haveM, a |= ^nϕ. Then, by semantics,
we have |{a′ ∈ A |M, a′ |= ϕ}| > n. Then, by definition of type, we have |{a′ ∈ A |ϕ ∈
type(a′)}| > n. Then, by definition of W and m, we have ∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W} > n.
Q3. Assume that
∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W} > n. Then, by definition of W and m, we
have |{a′ ∈ A |ϕ ∈ type(a′)}| > n. Then, by definition of type, |{a′ ∈ A |M, a′ |= ϕ}| > n.
Then, by semantics, for every a ∈ A, we have M, a |= ^nϕ. Then, by definition of
type, for every a ∈ A, we have ^nϕ ∈ type(a). Then, by definition of W, we have
^nϕ ∈ ⋂ W.
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Q4. Consider an arbitrary w ∈ W. Then, there is a ∈ A such that w = type(a).
Consider S 1 := {[d]ϕ | [d]ϕ ∈ type(a)}. Then, by definition of type and semantics, for
every [d]ϕ ∈ S 1, there is a neighborhood U[d]ϕ of a such that for every a′ ∈ U[d]ϕ \ {a}
we have:
ϕ ∈ type(a′). (19.9)
Moreover, by definition of type, Axiom [d]2, Proposition 19.1, and semantics, for every
[d]ϕ ∈ S 1, there is a neighborhood U′[d]ϕ of a such that for every a′ ∈ U′[d]ϕ \ {a} we
have:
[d]ϕ ∈ type(a′). (19.10)
Consider S 2 := {type(a′) |M, a 6|= 〈d〉∧ type(a′)}. Then, by definition of type, and
semantics, for every v ∈ S 2, there is a neighborhood Uv of a such that for every a′ ∈
Uv \ {a} we have:
type(a′) , v. (19.11)
Now, since S 1 and S 2 are finite, we have that:
Ua :=
⋂
ϕ∈S 1
Uϕ ∩
⋂
ϕ∈S 1
U′ϕ ∩
⋂
v∈S 2
Uv
is a neighborhood of a.
Consider an arbitrary [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ such that [d]ϕ < w. Then, by definition of type and
semantics, there is a′ ∈ Ua \ {a} such that:
ϕ < type(a′).
This is Q4(1).
Moreover, by (19.9) and (19.10), for every [d]ϕ ∈ w, we have ϕ, [d]ϕ ∈ type(a′).
This is Q4(2).
Finally, by (19.11), we have type(a′) < S 2. Then, by definition of S 2, we have
M′, a |= 〈d〉∧ type(a′). Then, by Axiom 4, Proposition 19.1, and semantics, we have
M, a |= ^n ∧ type(a′) for every n ∈ N. Then, by semantics, we have |{a′′ ∈ A |M, a′′ |=∧
type(a′)}| is infinite. Then, by definition of type, we have, |{a′′ ∈ A | type(a′′) =
type(a′)}| is infinite. Then, by definition of m, we have m(type(a′)) = ω. This is
Q4(3). 
This completes the proof. 
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19.4 Completeness of LΛ with respect to LT3
In this section we prove that:
Theorem 19.8. LΛ is complete with respect to LT3 . Moreover, LT3 is strongly complete.
Theorems 19.1 and 19.8, together with T1 ⊇ T3, imply that:
Corollary 19.9. For every X such that T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3, we have that LΛ = LX and LX is
strongly complete.
By classical arguments, to prove Theorem 19.8 it suffices to show that every max-
imal consistent Γ ⊆ L is satisfiable in T3 (see for example [13, Chapter 4]). We use
results in [26, 36] (and we strongly advise reading [26, 36]) to build what, with abuse
of language, could be described as a ‘Γ-quasi model’ (Proposition 19.11). Then, the
proof of Proposition 19.3 can straightforwardly be adapted to obtain a T3 topological
model satisfying Γ.
Let MC be the set of all maximal consistent Γ ⊆ L. Fix Γ ∈ MC. For every
Γ,Γ′ ∈ MC, define:
m(Γ,Γ′) :=
 ω provided, for every ϕ ∈ Γ′ and n ∈ N, we have ^nϕ ∈ Γ,min{n ∈ N | ∃ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Γ′ ∧ ^!nϕ ∈ Γ} otherwise,
m(Γ) := sup{m(Γ′,Γ) |Γ′ ∈ MC},
R := {(Γ,Γ′) |m(Γ,Γ′) , 0},
S := {(Γ,Γ′) | ∀[d]ϕ, if [d]ϕ ∈ Γ then ϕ ∈ Γ′}.
Plainly, the function m( , ) is well-defined. Then, ΓRΓ′ if and only if, by definition
of R, m(Γ,Γ′) , 0 if and only if, by definition of m( , ), for every ϕ ∈ Γ′, we have
^0ϕ ∈ Γ. Then, (MC,R, S ), together with the ‘canonical evaluation’, constitutes the
canonical model for L{Φ,0,[d]}. However, we have to take into account also the modal
operators ^n for n > 0. This is done by m( , ). For, in words, m( , ) determines the
multiplicity of the relation ΓRΓ′, and induces the multiplicity m( ) of Γ (see Proposition
19.10(1).)
Proposition 19.10. The following facts hold:
1. For every ϕ ∈ L, Γ ∈ MC and n ∈ N we have:
^nϕ ∈ Γ if and only if
∑
{m(Γ,Γ′) |ϕ ∈ Γ′ ∈ MC} > n.
2. For every Γ,Γ′ ∈ MC, if ΓRΓ′ then m(Γ) = m(Γ′,Γ).
3. S ⊆ R.
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Proof. 1 This is [26, Theorem 1]. It says that^nϕ ∈ Γ is equivalent to having more than
n maximal consistent sets Γ′ (counting their multiplicity) R-related to Γ and containing
ϕ. This is the Kripke semantics of ^n. The proof uses Axioms ^N1 − 3, which indeed
reflect the Kripke semantics for ^n.
2. Assume ΓRΓ′. Then, by definition of R, we have m(Γ,Γ′) , 0. Then, by the
proof of [26, Lemma 9], we have m(Γ) = m(Γ′,Γ), as desired. A bit of commentary.
Observe that the 0-instances of Axioms ^N4, 5 give S5. Then, R is an equivalence
relation. Then, this point reflects that within R-equivalence classes, R is the universal
relation. And the ^n’s semantics, from restricted to R-successors, becomes universal
as defined by us.
3. Consider Γ,Γ′ ∈ MC such that ΓS Γ′, and ϕ ∈ Γ′. Then, by classical work,
we have 〈d〉ϕ ∈ Γ. Then, by Axiom 4, for every n ∈ N, we get ^nϕ ∈ Γ. Then, by
definition of m, we have m(Γ,Γ′) = ω. Then, by definition of R, we have ΓRΓ′. 
Since within R-equivalence classes,^n’s semantics, from restricted to R-successors,
becomes universal as defined by us, we consider the smallest R-generated subset W ⊆
MC containing Γ (plainly existing). That is, the R-equivalence class containing Γ. Ob-
serve that by Proposition 19.10(3), W is also an S -generated subset of MC.
Proposition 19.11. The following facts hold:
Q’1. Γ ∈ W.
Q’2. If ^nϕ ∈ ⋃ W then ∑{m(Γ) |ϕ ∈ Γ ∈ W} > n.
Q’3. If
∑{m(Γ) |ϕ ∈ Γ ∈ W} > n then ^nϕ ∈ ⋂ W.
Q’4. For every Γ ∈ W, for every [d]ϕ < Γ, there is Γ′ ∈ W such that:
1. ϕ < Γ′.
2. For every [d]ϕ ∈ Γ, then ϕ, [d]ϕ ∈ Γ′.
3. m(Γ′) = ω.
Proof. Q’1. By definition of W. Q’2 and Q’3 follows by Proposition 19.10(1,2). Q’4.
By classical work, there is Γ′ ∈ S (Γ) such that ϕ < Γ′. Just take Γ′. 1 follows by
definition of Γ′. 2 follows by definition of S , Axiom [d]2, and classical work. 3
follows by Axiom 4, classical work, and definition of m. 
By Proposition 19.11, the proof of Proposition 19.3 can straightforwardly be adapted
to obtain a T3 topological model satisfying Γ.
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19.5 Complexity of LX (T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3)
In this section, we prove that, for every X such that T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3, the validity problem
for LX is PSPACE-complete (Theorem 19.21).
To prove Theorem 19.21, we prove that deciding the existence of a ϕ-quasi model
is PSPACE (Proposition 19.20). To prove Proposition 19.20, we alter the definition
of ϕ-quasi models into that of ‘ϕ-optimal quasi models’ (Definition 19.12). Then, we
prove that there is a ϕ-quasi model if and only if there is a ϕ-optimal quasi model
(Propositions 19.13 and 19.15). Finally, we prove that deciding the existence of a ϕ-
optimal quasi model is PSPACE (Proposition 19.16).
Now, by Corollary 19.9 and Propositions 19.3 and 19.6, deciding if ϕ ∈ LX is
reducible to deciding if there is no ϕ-quasi models. And, by Proposition 19.20, deciding
if there is no ϕ-quasi models is PSPACE. Then, deciding if ϕ ∈ LX is PSPACE. In fact,
we prove that the validity problem for LX is PSPACE-complete.
19.5.1 Optimal quasi models
For every formula ϕ ∈ L define len(ϕ) as:
• If ϕ ∈ Φ, then len(ϕ) := 1.
• If ϕ is of the form ¬ψ, then len(ϕ) := 1 + len(ψ).
• If ϕ is of the form ψ ∧ χ, then len(ϕ) := 1 + len(ψ) + len(χ).
• If ϕ is of the form ^nψ, then len(ϕ) := n + 1 + len(ϕ).
• If ϕ is of the form [d]ψ, then len(ϕ) := 1 + len(ψ).
Fix ϕ ∈ L and let n := len(ϕ).
Definition 19.12. A ϕ-optimal quasi model is a tupleM = (W,W ′,m) such that W ⊆
Hin(ϕ), W ′ ⊆ W, m : W ′ → ω + 1, and:
O0. |W ′| < n + 1.
O1. ϕ ∈ ⋃ W ′.
O2. For every n ∈ N, if ^nϕ ∈ ⋃ W ′, then ∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W ′} > n.
O3. For every n ∈ N, and [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ, if ∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W ′} > n then ^nϕ ∈ ⋂ W ′.
O4. For every w ∈ W and [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ, if [d]ϕ < w then there is w′ ∈ W such that:
0. For every n ∈ N, and ^nψ ≤ ϕ, ^nψ ∈ w′ if and only if ^nψ ∈ ⋂ W ′.
1. ϕ < w′.
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2. For every [d]ψ ∈ w, we have ψ, [d]ψ ∈ w′.
3. For every n ∈ N, and ^nψ ≤ ϕ, if ψ ∈ w′ then ^nψ ∈ ⋃ W ′.
Proposition 19.13. If there is a ϕ-optimal quasi model, then there is a ϕ-quasi model.
Proof. Suppose that M = (W,W ′,m) is a ϕ-optimal quasi model. Define V0 := W ′.
Suppose that Vi (for some i ∈ N) has been defined such that Vi ⊆ W. For every v ∈ Vi
and [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ with [d]ϕ < v, let v′(v,[d]ϕ) be the point in W provided by O4. Define:
V ′i+1 := {v′(v,[d]ϕ) | v ∈ Vi ∧ [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ < v},
Vi+1 := Vi ∪ V ′i+1.
Plainly, Vi+1 ⊆ W. Define V := ⋃i∈N Vi. Define V ′ as ⋃i∈N\{0} V ′i - that is, as the set
of elements of V that have served as a point provided by some application of O4 in the
construction of V . Observe that V \ V ′ ⊆ V0 = W ′, but we might have V0 ∩ V ′ , ∅.
Define n : V → ω + 1 as follows: if v ∈ V ′, then define n(v) := ω; if v ∈ V \ V ′, define
n(v) := m(v). Define:
N := (V, n).
Lemma 19.14. N is a ϕ-quasi model.
Proof. Q1 follows by O1. Q2. Assume that ^nϕ ∈ ⋃ V . Then, by definition of V and
O4(0), ^nϕ ∈ ⋃ W ′. Then, by O2, ∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W ′} > n. Then, by definition of
n,
∑{n(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ V} > n.
Q3. Assume
∑{n(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ V} > n and ^nϕ ≤ ϕ. Two cases are given:
1. ϕ, among the elements of V , belongs only to elements in V0 \ V ′. Then, since
V0 \ V ′ ⊆ W ′ ⊆ V , and definition of n:∑
{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W ′} =
∑
{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ V0 \ V ′}
=
∑
{n(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ V0 \ V ′}
=
∑
{n(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ V} > n.
2. Otherwise we have that ϕ belongs to some point v ∈ V ′ - that is, ϕ belongs to
some point v provided by the recursive application of O4 in the definition of V .
So, by O4(3), we have ^nϕ ∈ ⋃ W ′. Then, by O2:∑
{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W ′} > n.
In both cases,
∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W ′} > n. Then, by O3, ^nϕ ∈ ⋂ W ′. Then, by O4(0),
^nϕ ∈ ⋂ V .
Q4. Plainly, it follows by O4, and definition of n. 
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This completes the proof. 
Proposition 19.15. If there is a ϕ-quasi model then there is a ϕ-optimal quasi model.
Proof. Let M = (W,m) be a ϕ-quasi model. By Q1-Q3 we can find W ′ ⊆ W and
n : W ′ → ω + 1 satisfying O0-O3. Indeed, by Q1, there is w ∈ W with ϕ ∈ w.
Moreover, let ^n0ϕ0, ...,^nm−1ϕm−1 be all the formulas in
⋃
W of the form ^nϕ. By Q2,
there are subsets A0, ..., Am−1 of W such that, for every i ∈ m:
1. ϕi ∈ ⋂ Ai.
2. |Ai| ≤ ni + 1.
3.
∑{m(w) |w ∈ Ai} > ni.
Define W ′ := {w}∪⋃i∈m Ai and n := m  W ′. By definition of W, we have W ′ ⊆ Hin(ϕ).
Since ^n0ϕ0, ...,^nm−1ϕm−1 ≤ ϕ, we have
∑
i∈m(ni + 1) ≤ len(ϕ). Then, by 2, we have
|W ′| ≤ n + 1, proving O0. By definition of W ′, ϕ ∈ ⋃ W ′, proving O1. O2 follows by
1 and 3, and definition of n. As for O3, suppose that
∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W ′} > n. Then,
since W ′ ⊆ W, ∑{m(w) |ϕ ∈ w ∈ W} > n. Then, by Q3, ^nϕ ∈ ⋂ W. Then, again as
W ′ ⊆ W, ^nϕ ∈ ⋂ W ′, proving O3.
Plainly, Q4 yields that (W,W ′, n) satisfies O4(0,1,2): for every w ∈ W and [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ
such that [d]ϕ < w, just take w′ ∈ W as per Q4 applied to (w, [d]ϕ). As for O4(3),
observe that, by Q4(3), we have m(w′) = ω. Then, for every n ∈ N, and ^nψ ≤ ϕ, if
ψ ∈ w′, by Q3, we have ^nψ ∈ ⋂ W ⊆ ⋃ W ′. 
Proposition 19.16. There is an algorithm Alg that given ϕ ∈ L decides the existence
of a ϕ-optimal quasi model in PSPACE in len(ϕ).
Proof. By Savitch’s Theorem, it suffices to show that the problem is NPSPACE in n
(see for example [76, Theorem 7.5]). Fix ϕ ∈ L. Let n := len(ϕ).
Guess W ′ ⊆ P(sub(ϕ)) and m : W ′ → ω + 1 satisfying O0-O3. For every w ∈ W ′
run Witness(w) where Witness is the following algorithm:
if {
w is an Hintikka set
and for every [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ: [d]ϕ < w⇒ there is w′ ⊆ sub(ϕ) such that:
{
for every n ∈ N, and ^nψ ≤ ϕ: ^nψ ∈ w′ ⇔ ^nψ ∈ ⋂ W ′
and ϕ < w′
and for every [d]ψ ∈ w: ψ, [d]ψ ∈ w′
and for every n ∈ N, and ^nψ ≤ ϕ: ψ ∈ w′ ⇒ ^nψ ∈ ⋃ W ′
and {
if {
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w′ is an Hintikka set
and for every [d]ψ ∈ w′: [d]ψ ∈ w
}
then true
else Witness(w′)
}
}
}
then true
else false
If Witness(w) = true for every w ∈ W ′, then return true, otherwise return false.
Lemma 19.17. For every ϕ ∈ L, if Alg(ϕ) = true, then there is a ϕ-optimal quasi
model.
Proof of Lemma 19.17. Assume that Alg(ϕ) = true. Then, there is W ′ ⊆ Hin(ϕ)
and m : W ′ → ω + 1 satisfying O1-O3 and such that for every w ∈ W ′ we have
Witness(w) = true. Define W0 := W ′. Suppose that Wi (i > 0) has been defined and
that for every w ∈ Wi we have either:
C1. There is w′ ∈ Wi−1 such that, for every [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ, we have [d]ϕ ∈ w if and only if
[d]ϕ ∈ w′;
or Witness(w) = true. For every w ∈ Wi, if w fails C1, then, for every [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ, if
[d]ϕ < w, let w′(w,[d]ϕ) be the Hintikka set guessed by Witness on (w, [d]ϕ). Define:
Wi+1 := Wi ∪ {w′(w,[d]ϕ) |w ∈ Wi ∧ w fails C1 ∧ [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ ∧ [d]ϕ < w}.
Observe that, since Alg(ϕ) = true, then, by definition of Wi+1 and Witness, for every
w ∈ Wi+1, we have that either w satisfies C1 (with i replaced by i + 1) or Witness(w) =
true. Define:
W :=
⋃
i∈N
Wi,
M := (W,W ′,m).
We show that M is a ϕ-optimal quasi model. O0-O3 hold by choice of W ′ and m.
O4. Consider an arbitrary w ∈ W and an arbitrary [d]ϕ ≤ ϕ with [d]ϕ < w. Then, by
construction, there is i ∈ N such that w ∈ Wi. Denote w by wi. By construction, there
is 0 ≤ n ≤ i such that:
1. For every 0 ≤ j ≤ n, there is wi− j ∈ Wi− j with, for every [d]ψ ≤ ϕ: [d]ψ ∈ wi if
and only if [d]ψ ∈ wi− j;
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2. wi−n fails C1. (Observe that, by definition of C1, every element in W0 fails C1.)
Then, Witness(wi−n) = true. Then, we have w′ ∈ Wi−n satisfying O4(0-3) applied
to (wi−n, [d]ϕ). Then, since for every [d]ψ ≤ ϕ, we have [d]ψ ∈ wi if and only if
[d]ψ ∈ wi−n, and wi is w, w′ satisfies O4(0-3) applied to (w, [d]ϕ). 
And, plainly:
Lemma 19.18. For every ϕ ∈ L, if there is a ϕ-optimal quasi model then Alg(ϕ) = true.
Moreover:
Lemma 19.19. For every ϕ ∈ L, we have that Witness(ϕ) answer in NPSPACE in
len(ϕ).
Proof. By O0, the crucial point is whether the recursive calls of Witness cause a blow-
up in space requirements. Observe that, by definition of Witness, if Witness(w) = true
(w ∈ Hin(ϕ)) and w′ is given by Witness applied to w, then:
{[d]ϕ | [d]ϕ ∈ w′} ⊇ {[d]ϕ | [d]ϕ ∈ w}. (19.12)
By definition of Witness, we have that Witness is recursively applied to w′ if and only
if
{[d]ϕ | [d]ϕ ∈ w′} ⊃ {[d]ϕ | [d]ϕ ∈ w}
(recall ⊂ denotes proper inclusion in this dissertation). And, by (19.12), this can recur-
sively happen at most len(ϕ) many times. 
Then Alg run in NPSPACE, as desired. 
Propositions 19.13, 19.15 and 19.16 yield:
Proposition 19.20. For every ϕ ∈ L, deciding the existence of a ϕ-quasi model is
PSPACE.
19.5.2 Complexity of LX (T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3)
By Corollary 19.9 and Propositions 19.3 and 19.6, for every X such that T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3,
deciding if ϕ ∈ LX is reducible to deciding if there is no ϕ-quasi models. And, by
Proposition 19.20, deciding if there is no ϕ-quasi models is PSPACE. Then, the validity
problem for LX is PSPACE.
Moreover, a simple modification of the completeness proof shows that the [d]-logic
of X is K4. Now, by Ladner’s Theorem (see for example [13, Theorem 6.50]), K4 is
PSPACE-hard. And, the [d]-language can be translated into L. Then, the validity
problem for LX is PSPACE-hard. Then:
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Theorem 19.21. For every X such that T1 ⊇ X ⊇ T3, the validity problem for LX is
PSPACE-complete.
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Chapter 20
Future works
There are a number of questions, related to the work of Part III, that we would like to
investigate in the future:
1. We proved that there is a computable translation from Lt to L on the class of all
T3 topological spaces: what is the complexity of this translation?
2. We would like to study the axiomatizability and complexity of the L-theory of
particular topological spaces, or classes of topological spaces. For example, the
real line, or Rn (for n > 1); the class of all metric spaces; the class of all T0
spaces; and the class of all topological spaces. As for T0, and all topological
spaces, it is worth noting that Axiom 2 would not be sound.
3. Is L as expressive as the spatial language with modal operators {[d]} ∪ ρ (recall
that ρ is the set of all point-sort modal operators) on the class of all T3 topological
models?
4. We would like to increase the expressivity of L by adding fixed-point opera-
tors. Call L+ the resulting language. Since Lt cannot express some important
topological properties such as connectedness or compactness, we would like to
investigate if we can express these properties in L+.
5. We would like to study the axiomatizability and complexity of L+ when inter-
preted on particular classes of topological spaces.
6. The expressivity of modal languages, when interpreted on Kripke models, has
traditionally been compared to that of first-order languages. A fundamental tool
in this comparison is the notion of bisimulation. As it is well known, every
bisimulation-invariant property expressible in first-order languages is equivalent
to some property expressible in modal languages [94].
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In [5], a notion analogous to bisimulation, called topo-bisimulation, has been
devised to compare the expressivity of modal languages to the expressivity of
first-order languages interpreted on topological spaces.
Fixed point modal languages can express properties that are not expressible in
first-order languages. So we cannot compare their expressivity to that of first-
order languages. However, every property expressible in fixed point modal lan-
guages is equivalent to some property expressible in second-order languages.
And in [54], it is proved that every bisimulation-invariant property expressible in
second-order languages is equivalent to some property expressible in fixed point
modal languages.
From these observations, three questions arise:
(a) We would like to study if every topo-bisimulation-invariant properties ex-
pressible in Lt is equivalent to some property expressible in L. In [91], a
similar result is proved for a language simpler than L.
(b) Given the results in [54] and [91], we would like to investigate if we can
define the second-order version of Lt, call it L+t , and prove that all proper-
ties expressible in L+ are expressible in L+t , and that all topo-bisimulation-
invariant properties expressible in L+t are equivalent to some property ex-
pressible in L+.
(c) Since L is as expressive as Lt when used to reason about T3 topological
spaces, we would like to study whether L+ is as expressive as L+t when
used to reason about T3 topological spaces.
7. In Section 18.1, we gave a more general definition of modal operator. Following
Gabbay, Hodkinson and Reynolds [42, Chapter 6], the semantics of a modal
operator # is defined by a first-order formula in Lt with at most one free first-sort
variable and no free second-sort variables. We would like to study this notion in
its generality focusing on questions like:
• Given a class of models M, and a formula ϕ ∈ L{#}, which semantics for #
makes ϕ sound onM? For example, which semantics for # makes axiom K
#(p→ q)→ (#p→ #q) sound on the class of all Kripke models?
8. Can spatial modal logics be applied to real-world problems? In this respect, it is
worth mentioning [25, 2014], where a spatial modal logic similar to ours is used
for reasoning about geographical maps. It is worth mentioning their use of an
Until operator similar to:
• U(ϕ, ψ) holds at x provided there is a neighborhood U of x such that ϕ
holds on the boundary of U and ψ in U.
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9. We would like to study Until on topological spaces.
10. We would like to blend together the derivative and graded operators and study
operators 〈d〉n with semantics:
• 〈d〉nϕ holds at a point a provided for every neighborhood U of a there are
at least n points b ∈ U \ {a} such that ϕ holds at b.
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arity, 138
assignment, 139, 143, 145
atomic formula, 138, 142, 145
automorphism, 141
axiomatization, 33, 85, 204
base, 135
bundle, 30
canonicity
canonical formula, 22
canonical frame, 22
canonical model, 22
chronicle, 54
historic, 54
perfect, 54
prophetic, 54
clopen set, 134
closed set, 134
closure, 135
cluster, 76
adjacent clusters, 91
left-closed, 118
left-open, 117
maximal, 76
right-closed, 118
right-open, 117
completeness, 33, 85, 204
strong, 33, 85, 204
connectedness, 77
connected component, 77
locally connected, 77
consistence
consistent formula, 21
consistent set, 21
constant symbol, 138
countable set, 18
deducibility, 21
from a set of formulas, 21
derivation, 35, 65
domain, 139
ith-sort, 143
elementary equivalence, 140
endpoint, see Shuﬄe
equivalent formulas, see expressivity
evaluation, 19
Existence Lemma, 23
expressivity, 158
equivalent formulas, 164
sentential expressivity, 157
fairness, 113
filtration, 78
finite model property, 88
first-order language, 138
n-sorted, 142
function symbol, 138
generalization, 21
generated subset, 18
Hintikka set, 206
history, 30
indistinguishability function, 30
infinite binary tree, 29
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interior, 135
interior point, 88
interpretation, 139
interval, 110
open interval of R, 135
IRR set, 46
isomorphism, 141
isomorphism between functions, 113
Kripke completeness, 88
Kripke frame, 19
finite, 19
generated subframe, 20
subframe, 20
subframe generated by a set, 20
Kripke model, 19
finite, 19
generated submodel, 20
submodel, 20
submodel generated by a set, 20
leaf, 114
lexicographic sum
of functions on linear orders, 111
of linear orders, 110
Lindenbaum Lemma, 23
linear order, 110
link, 104
modal depth, 147
modal equivalence, 148
up to a certain modal depth, 148
modal language, 18
LΦ,τ, 18
modal logic, 20
normal, 21
modal operator, 18, 175
modus ponens, 21
monadic second-order language, 145
negation normal form, 161
neighborhood, 134
normality, 21
open set, 134
optimal quasi model, 215
Ψ-linked model, 91
path, 77
point-sort formula, 175
point-sort modal operator, 175
propositional variable, 18
q-maximal element, 76
quantifier depth, 139
quasi model, 207
relation
downward linear, 29
linear, 29
prelinear, 91
serial, 29
total, 29
relation symbol, 138
representative, 164
Sahlqvist Completeness Lemma, 24
Sahlqvist formula, 23
satisfiability, 19, 20
selection, 180
sentence, 148
seriality, 86
Shuﬄe, 113
endpoint, 112
signature, 138, 142
sort, 142
soundness, 33, 85, 204
spatial language, 175
template, 142
term, 138, 142
topological model, 147, 150
Ti topological model, 148
233
topological space, 134
0-dimensional, 135
regular, 136
T1, 136
T2, 136
T3, 136
topology, 134
discrete, 134
generated by a base, 135
trivial, 134
usual topology on R, 135
translation, 178
tree, 29
bundled I-tree, 30
bundled tree, 30
Truth Lemma, 23
uniform substitution, 21
validity, 19, 20
variable, 138
ith sort variable, 142
first order variable, 145
free, 138
second-order variable, 145
Zorn Property, 76
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